FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF SURGE STUDY

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Executive Summary

This research was commissioned by ActionAid, as part of the Transforming Surge Capacity Project of the Start Network. The objective is to identify the best approaches in funding surge capacity as well as to determine the most appropriate surge models. It clarifies the current funding situation for surge and highlights examples of cost effective models that ensure financial sustainability.

Qualitative interviews exploring the definitions of effectiveness of surge from particular organisational perspectives were combined with a quantitative analysis of surge budgets and costs. The quantitative findings must be interpreted in context, given the obstacles in obtaining comprehensive data. This research is, therefore, a stepping-stone in understanding cost effectiveness and financial substitutability in surge.

Despite the challenges in collecting comparable data, the report draws out key quantitative findings, which assist in fully understanding the cost of surge. Summary figures are demonstrated in the box below. A full review of the costs is presented in section 4 (“Cost Analysis”) in the report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of cost</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roster Annual Maintenance costs</td>
<td>Global Single Agency Roster</td>
<td>£65,150 per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Collaborative Roster</td>
<td>£77,400 per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Collaborative Roster</td>
<td>£58,352 per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Surge Costs</td>
<td>Daily Surge Cost for Individual from a Global Roster</td>
<td>£195 per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Surge Cost for Individual from a Regional Roster</td>
<td>£121 per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daily Surge Cost for Individual from a National Roster</td>
<td>£70 per day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional deployments can cost 61% of a global deployment. The cost differences are found both in the salary of those deployed as well as the cost of transport. The annual maintenance costs of a surge model are relatively comparable across the platforms. This is of particular interest to agencies that run single agency rosters, regionally or nationally, as it is likely that the operational costs for their roster are similar. This demonstrates the potential value of membership of collaborative rosters for those agencies, which were reported as between £2,580 and £1,945. The responses in the interviews highlighted the complex nature of cost effectiveness in surge and illustrated a number of areas of focus, notably: Localisation, Collaboration, and Preparedness.
• **Localisation:** Localised deployment has both speed implications and cost benefits. The quantitative analyses supported than claim. International and local surge models may have different benefits, regardless of the cost differences. The majority of agencies said that investment in rosters held more locally were a critical part of overall surge response. Reducing the overall cost of surge and reducing the reliance on staff surged from global rosters is another important goal. Having responders available from the national or regional platforms may encourage country offices to request assistance where otherwise they may not. In addition, localisation is seen as increasing participation rates in local communities in recovery efforts, due to the common culture and language shared by the effected population and the responder. This is especially true for national responses.

• **Collaboration:** Collaborating in certain areas to achieve a more cost-effective surge was explained as both logical and necessary. Given a finite amount of funding and a growing number of communities affected by disasters, ensuring funds are spent effectively is critical. Consortium members indicated several areas of collaboration that are important and generally supported regional and national collaborative rosters.

• **Preparedness:** Most agencies identified a need for an investment of unrestricted funding in preparedness. There is an overall lack of funding from donors to preparedness and donor funding for less publicised emergencies is especially limited. Regional and national agencies have so far received limited investment in their own surge capacity. This is potentially due to high costs; however, in certain cases, many donor stipulations for preparedness activities are said to be restricted. This has meant that rosters are maintained at a global level while regional and national rosters are left underfunded.

The report concludes with a summary of the findings and ideas for further research. Given the difficulty in compiling the data for this report, a template for collecting comparable data across agencies is also provided.
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Part I: Financial Sustainability Of Surge Study

1. Introduction
This research was commissioned by ActionAid, as part of the Transforming Surge Capacity Project of the Start Network. The objective of this research is to identify the best approaches in funding surge capacity as well as to determine the most appropriate surge models. It focuses on two critical areas: (1) Accessing funds for surge and (2) Cost effective models for surge. The research is designed to allow consortium members to better understand the current funding situation for surge and to highlight examples of cost effective models, which ensure financial sustainability.

2. Definitions
From the outset, this research established definitions of the key research themes. These definitions were compiled from three core documents of the Start Network1:

- Cost Effectiveness
- Financial Sustainability

2.1 Cost-effectiveness
This term compares the relative costs and outcomes of different courses of action: It is the relation between monetary (factor) inputs and desired outcomes. Broad themes of cost effectiveness discussed in this work come from ActionAid’s Transforming Surge Capacity Project Baseline2, the State of Surge3 and the Value for Money reports4. Whilst often specifically analysing the cost effectiveness of the ‘surge’ itself rather than the approach to funding it, cost effectiveness is well defined and well detailed.

In the context of ‘surge financing,’ cost effectiveness has been discussed throughout the literature as including collaboration, and by the supporting of regional and national surge responses. From the qualitative data collected through interviews with ActionAid and consortium members, it appears that the perception of the most cost effective models in surge funding take advantage of the results of collaboration in multiple areas and make more frequent use of teams stationed outside of the HQ environment. One of the aims of this research is to gain a greater understanding, from a quantitative perspective, of which models are cost effective for which responses.

Collaboration across the humanitarian system is understood to not only create organisational efficiencies which demonstrate cost effectiveness but also has been shown to produce lower instances of duplication in operations. On a holistic basis, effective collaboration could ensure cost effectiveness both on the organisational level and across the humanitarian system as a whole.

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5 Transforming Surge Capacity research report on VFM on UKINGO Collaboration (2016) Measuring the value-for-money of increased collaboration between UK INGOs in response to mega-disasters.
2.2 Financial sustainability

From the ToR, the concept of Financial Sustainability refers directly to the characteristics of surge funding. Financial sustainability covers the access to funding before, during, and after surge and aims to determine the most certain, predictable and long-term sources of financing.

Financial sustainability is a broad concept, which in more standard terms considers an organisation’s ability to sustain its operations financially without external support. In the instance of financing surge capacity in a humanitarian context the meaning of financial sustainability is quite different. From the wider literature, the following ideas are discussed in the context of financial sustainability, NGOs and humanitarian assistance:

- The ability to fund surge capacity requirements throughout the disaster period
- The ability to rapidly draw sufficient funds at the time of need
- Having access to the widest possible source of funds, including unrestricted funds
- How funds are replaced post surge

The definition of financial sustainability in this research focuses on availability and reliability of funding sources, combining these considerations ultimately with cost effective models to provide designs for sustainable cost effective surge.

2.3 Surge Cost Effectiveness

The concept of cost effectiveness as discussed in the Start Network’s three core documents corresponds with the general definition used in this report. With the understanding of the changing and subjective nature of the term, this research has ensured that the qualitative research allowed for the exploring of multiple models of cost effective surge.

A number of components that determine surge cost effectiveness have been researched. Frequent citations regarding efficiencies gained through collaboration as well as through the effective utilisation of regional and national staff in surge preparation and response are made. Key areas where collaboration and local resourcing are perceived to directly impact cost effectiveness:

- Collaboration at a global level on key operational areas such as rosters, shared training, information sharing;
- Regional surge mechanisms could lead to more cost-effective surge;
- Decentralisation of management to regional levels can improve cost effectiveness;
- Surge costs reduced by using national staff; and
- National staff provide greater understanding of context.

Collaboration is more frequent and more effective at a national level than at a global level. For example, 50% of agencies in the Philippines report that they work collaboratively with other agencies, compared to 9% globally\(^5\). The majority of organisations at a global level work only ‘sometimes’ in collaboration and often ‘alone’ when it comes to surge. Collaboration at a local level is understood to have resulted in increased cost effectiveness in surge through quicker access, enhanced local knowledge and greater capacity building. Organisations believed they were able to be more effective at a lower cost through local collaboration. In an era of increasing demands and a finite supply of funding, collaborating in certain areas to achieve a more cost-effective surge appears not only logical, but also necessary.

\(^5\) Start Network (2015) Transforming Surge Capacity Project Baseline
2.4 Surge Financial Sustainability

Financial sustainability discussed within the Transforming Surge Capacity Project key reports is examined with regards to the sustainability of donors and access to surge funds. Challenges to financial sustainability identified in the report include funding access, swiftness of accessing funds, efficiencies in funding rosters and preparedness as well as where those rosters are held. This research explores and maps funding opportunities taking into consideration the following discussions:

• How to sustainably fund national surge set ups
• HQ, regional and local roster sustainability
• Maintaining skill levels and well-being of response staff
• Sustainable ways to support local partners with their capacity
• Sustainability of surge into second wave longer term deployments funding needs
• Sustainable development in post disaster recovery phase
• Funding support as programme grows
• Coordination with local partners to ensure sustainable surge
• Capacity to maintain flexible skilled staff
• Adequate availability of financial resources
• Budget limitations are a major constraint
• Sustainable collaboration desired with Private Sector

Financial Sustainability is seldom covered with sufficient detail to ascertain the realities of funding surge. From the literature, budget limitations are often identified as barriers to surge capacity, acting to delay surge or even lead to the decision not to surge at all. This indicates a need for access to further and more reliable funds as well as cost effective models to channel these funds through. Research into the sustainable funding of regional and national partners is key especially if regional and national rosters prove to be cost effective.

Within the State of the Surge report, the sustainability of local partner funding and capacity is the prime focus. If the role of regional and national partners is to increase in surge, there is a growing understanding that they need to be sustainably funded both in terms of capacity building systems and in terms of resources during surge. Increasing the donor base is important in this case and there needs to be an understanding that funding should be focused on these regional and national platforms. Four key areas arise in the dialogue of sustainable funding requirements, new sources should focus on:

• Sustainably funding local partner capacity
• Sustainable funding of local partners during surge as they further relied upon
• Post disaster community resilience with sustainable development financing
• Sustaining the surge from initial phases to second wave longer term deployments

The small-scale donor mapping report (Part II) included as a part of this research has taken into consideration: the nature of the funding needed, the ideas presented represent possible avenues for approaching donors with a focus on humanitarian assistance. It looks particularly at unrestricted funding critical in maintaining surge capacity in the regional and local rosters.
3. Research Outline and Methodology

This research has been designed to explore both qualitative and quantitative aspects of cost effectiveness and financial sustainability within surge. Qualitative interviews exploring the definitions of effectiveness of surge from particular organisational perspectives were combined with a quantitative analysis of surge budgets and costs. The outcome is a greater understanding of the costs and effectiveness of different surge models across the Start Network. The starting point for this research is a broad outline of the surge models employed by different agencies and different geographical levels. Given the scope of the research, a strategic interview schedule was followed to ensure full coverage of platforms: international rosters, regional collaborative roster, national collaborative roster and standing teams. For full details see Annex 1. Where possible, multiple examples of platforms were given to provide the broadest range of comparative costs. The interviews were semi-structured, qualitative interviews that investigated cost effectiveness and financial sustainability as concepts within particular agencies. These qualitative interviews were complemented with quantitative reviews of formulas, costings and budgets covering a range of surge costs detailed in Annex 2. As part of the interview process, the subject of humanitarian procurement arose a number of times; because this is outside of the scope of the research, the details are recorded in Annex 3.

3.1 Limitations of the data

The research encountered some difficulties in obtaining the required comparative data and, therefore, the focus of the analysis shifted to allow comparisons where data was available.

As stated in the research outline, calculating the overall cost of surge from the perspectives of each model was the aim of this research. It was critical to have detailed financial data regarding set up, maintenance and surge costs. This would have enabled a full comparison of different surge models costs for enacting a particular surge, allowing for a wider range of variables that could have been broken down to understand the details of the costs. It is important to understand this review of costs is not direct reflection of cost effectiveness. Given there was no standard agreed measure of effectiveness or any metrics by which to measure it this report has taken the following approach. The review of costs clarifies and explains what agencies and platforms spend on setting up, maintaining and running particular surge models. This is then to be combined with the subjective understandings of effectiveness drawn from the interviews to enable agencies to better define their own response in terms of cost effectiveness.

4. Cost analysis

The cost analysis is broken down into three main costs: the roster set up costs, the annual roster maintenance cost and then the analysis of the cost of surging individuals from each of the platforms detailed in Annex 1. All rosters from agencies interviewed were internal rosters.
4.1 Set Up Costs
As expected, the majority of agencies’ operating standing teams and rosters on an international or global basis had been established for some time and, therefore, the ability to recall set up costs was diminished. The regional and local roster under analysis by this research were both able to provide the set-up costs.

- Go Team Asia – Regional
These costs are indicative for a local hire of a mid-level humanitarian HR staff. The Start Network has funded the set-up costs for Go Team Asia. The foundation of a regional platform, as explained, was to build the surge skill pools and enable more local actors to play greater roles within the global surge system. The table below illustrates the set-up costs for Go Team Asia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Monthly cost</th>
<th>Annual cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Salary Roster Coordinator(^d)</td>
<td>£1,750</td>
<td>£21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Setup roster technology</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>£12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Roster technology membership</td>
<td>£200</td>
<td>£2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Roster promotion costs</td>
<td>£200</td>
<td>£2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Training of roster members</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>£27,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Roster simulation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>£24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Meeting with roster steering group</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>£10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>£99,400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The combined cost for the Go Team Asia Roster is £99,400. The training of roster members was the cost for a five-day course for 20 roster members. The meetings with the roster steering group came at a high price but given the broad geographical collaboration required face to face was considered optimal over virtual meetings, any further meetings can be efficiently conducted online.

\(^d\) These costs are indicative for a local hire of a mid-level humanitarian HR staff in the region
On Call Philippines Surge Roster – National
As per the costs for Go Team Asia, the costs for On Call Philippines were covered from the Start Network funds. The costs for comparison with the set-up costs of Go Team Asia are listed in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Monthly cost</th>
<th>Annual cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Salary Roster Coordinator³</td>
<td>£1,768</td>
<td>£21,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Setup roster technology</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>£44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Roster launch costs</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>£9,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Training of roster members</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>£9,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Roster simulation</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>£10,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Initial Business Case</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>£7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£101,905</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total cost for the set-up of the On Call Philippines Roster was £101,905. The cost of training was provided on a per individual basis of $600 per person for a fiveday course. This was converted to sterling for comparison at $1.30-£1 and calculated for 20 members as per the total for Go Team Asia, resulting in the £9230 amount stated.

Comparative cost analysis of regional and national roster set up
The review of regional and national collaborative roster set up costs has illustrated the cost of setting up new rosters positioned in geographically strategic locations is c. £100,000. Giving agencies access to c. 350 skilled and vetted responders from that single collaborative roster. Understanding these set up costs is critical in making decisions with regards surge models and locations. The collaborative rosters give access to experienced, trained and vetted responders who are often positioned close to the disaster zone and can respond rapidly. For agencies that maintain a single agency roster at these levels, the understanding of the costs of their own roster versus the cost of accessing the collaborative roster should be fully explored to assist in decisions of cost effectiveness. The cost and speed implications of this will be explored later in the report.

³These costs are indicative for a local hire of a mid-level humanitarian HR staff in the country
4.2 Maintenance Costs

The cost of maintaining a Roster or a Standing Team on an annual basis is to be considered when analysing costs and relating that to effectiveness. The overall costs of holding and running a roster are imperative to understand from a funding perspective, especially when looking to sustainably fund surge preparedness. The annual maintenance costs were provided in a number of forms and with a wide spectrum of detail. The table below has been used to input all given costs for the annual maintenance of surge. This includes coordinator salaries and technical maintenance charges as well as full time salaries of standing teams.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>INGO 1</th>
<th>INGO 2</th>
<th>INGO 3</th>
<th>INGO 4</th>
<th>Go Team Asia</th>
<th>On Call Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>£61,947</td>
<td>£66,112</td>
<td>£33,862</td>
<td>£20,107</td>
<td>£21,000</td>
<td>£21,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roster Technology</td>
<td>£2,692</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£2,400</td>
<td>£17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£34,000</td>
<td>£2,000</td>
<td>£40,000</td>
<td>£27,600</td>
<td>£9,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roster Promotion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£2,400</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roster Simulation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£24,000</td>
<td>£10,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Costs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£25,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total of reported costs**

| £664,239 | £60,112 | £35,862 | £85,107 | £77,400 | £58,352 |

This report was provided with annual maintenance costs from each platform and model, but on a limited basis. It is, therefore, necessary to understand that the comparisons here are not comparing equals in terms of size, response, or effectiveness. As with all the costs provided, the data is about understanding the costs involved for models or platforms and allowing agencies to be informed when making decisions based on their definitions of effectiveness.

INGO 1’s annual cost reflects the nature of standing teams and includes the full-time salaries of the 19 team members based around the world. This cost is a true reflection of the cost of maintaining a surge team as it accounts for the individuals who surge. Within the costs for maintaining rosters the costs of the salaries of individuals who surge are borne elsewhere within the organisation (or externally), making the true cost comparison difficult to obtain. The annual maintenance costs vary greatly across the global or international platforms. INGO 1’s costs minus the standing team’s salaries stand at £79,615 making it comparable to other rosters across the platforms.

The annual cost for both the regional and national collaborative rosters is similar to the cost of maintaining rosters within the international context. This could partly be due to the fact that agencies with standing teams or global and international rosters carry certain costs within the larger agency budgets, or that overall the costs are generally similar. The important thing to note is the regional and national examples are collaborative rosters, meaning that the costs are to be shared across any agency that wishes to join. The funding model of these collaborative rosters is discussed later in the report. The illustration of costs across the platforms allows agencies to understand the costs of funding rosters globally, regionally and nationally, something that was little understood in the core documents of the Start Network.
4.2.1 Training Costs

Training is a critical element of surge response no matter what the platform. Training costs vary between agencies and between locations. The effectiveness of training has been said to be dependent on the timely nature of its delivery, which organisations bear in mind when training roster or team members. The cost of training is considered regardless of the platform when delivering on cost effectiveness. The costs of training across the International, Regional and National platforms are detailed below. This is not a direct comparison of effectiveness of training or an indication that training is more cost effective delivered any particular level. It is a demonstration of the associated costs for maintaining effective staff on rosters or in standing teams across the humanitarian system as a whole.

International

The majority of agencies are conscious of the costs of training at an international level. Across the three agencies that submitted training costs of this platform, the cost per person per training course was £1000. There were certain costs that were likely incurred during this process which were not included in this calculation. For example, one agency had senior leaders present at the training as an important part of team building but whose time was not accounted for.

Regional

The training costs for Go Team Asia stated the per person costs of £1150 per person for the five-day course in Bangkok. The costs were identified as particularly high due to the regional nature of the training. Training of this sort, conducted and approved by Go Team Asia, is critical in ensuring not only the preparedness of staff but also facilitating trust among agencies that roster members are trained to respond effectively.

National

As with the regional training, the training for On Call Philippines is also of critical importance in maintaining trust and effectiveness within the roster. The training costs in the Philippines are $120 per day and the course runs for five days, giving a total of $600 per person (c. £462).

The costs of the training programmes across the international and regional platforms show similar levels of per person expense. The cost of a national training programme is less half that of the regional and international platforms. The detailed breakdowns of training costs were not available across the platforms. However, from the interviews areas that would have increased costs were identified. Considering the fact that the cost base is likely to be higher for the international platform training as both costings provided were for training undertaken in the UK, there were other factors identified. Both the international and the regional rosters training had elements of travel costs built in as a number of participants travelled internationally to attend. Higher costs were also identified as being driven by the types of consultants used, external consultants driving costs higher. Whilst there was no measure of the effectiveness of the training provided, with all things considered equal this data demonstrated the real cost of having trained responders positioned in disaster zones is half that of regionally or globally positioned teams. The data allows agencies to understand the costs involved in maintaining skilled rosters and make decisions on budgets for roster maintenance globally.
4.3 Overall Cost of Surge Responses

This section reviews the cost of a response at an organisational level, considering: the type of response, how many team members were deployed, the seniority level of these individuals, and for how long they were deployed. The analysis then explains these costs on a per person basis to compare costs of deployees across the multiple platforms.

The information provided by the agencies presented some challenges in analysis in that data for one specific surge was not available across the agencies or platforms. There was also no uniform metric for comparing roles or grades across each organisation. Therefore, this data is taken as an illustration of costs across the agencies and platforms to allow observations of costs across agencies and platforms, for full details of responses including roles, grades, durations and locations see annex 5.

The data provided across the agencies and platforms was varied in terms of what was available. As with all costs comparisons, there is no direct link assumed between the cost and the effectiveness of the individual who responds. The costs are calculated to demonstrate what agencies spend on surging individuals from across the platforms. It is essential to note that the individuals within this cost review come from a range of roles and, in the absence of a uniform grading system across the agencies, it is important to note that the costs for each individual are not comparable. Of further note, each surge duration was different and, therefore, a per day surge cost was calculated. This is purely a division of the costs over the duration of the surge and would not increase at that rate daily if the surge was extended, because flights and other one-off costs are included.

With the above caveats considered the data illustrates the average daily cost of surge per individual to be £195 from a global or international platform. This compares to £121 per day from the regional platform and £70 from the national platform. This demonstrates that, on a daily basis, surge costs of the regional platform are 62% of that of the global platform and surge from the national platform represents 36% of the international costs. The greatest areas of cost differences are salary and transportation costs. The transport costs from the regional roster vary greatly across the deployments provided, depending on from where in the region the individual was based and to where they were surged.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>INGO 1</th>
<th>INGO 2</th>
<th>INGO 2</th>
<th>INGO 3</th>
<th>INGO 3</th>
<th>INGO 4</th>
<th>INGO 5</th>
<th>INGO 6</th>
<th>Go Team Asia</th>
<th>Go Team Asia</th>
<th>Go Team Asia</th>
<th>On Call Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
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\(^{a}\) 1-month deployment to South Sudan
\(^{b}\) 2-month deployment to Haiti
\(^{c}\) 1-month deployment to Haiti
\(^{d}\) 16-day deployment to South Sudan
\(^{e}\) 19-day deployment to Haiti
\(^{f}\) 5-week deployment to Haiti
\(^{g}\) 1-month average cost of recent deployments to Sri Lanka and Somalia
\(^{h}\) 1-month deployment from Nepal to India
\(^{i}\) 1-month deployment from India to Indonesia
\(^{j}\) 1-month deployment from Nepal to Indonesia
\(^{k}\) 3 month simulated deployment in the Philippines
Surge deployments from Nepal to India, for example, have a low transport cost (£258), whereas surge deployments from Nepal and India to Indonesia have comparable transport costs to deployments from international rosters. On average over the deployments provided, the transport costs from the regional roster are £686 per deployment, which is 76% of the £897 average from the global rosters. Salaries of deployees from the regional roster are on average £1,296 per month, which is £1,135 per month less than salaries from the global deployments, making salary costs from regional deployments less than 50% of global deployments on average. The transport cost for deployments from the national roster simulation is shown £1,133, which is just 15% of deployments from global rosters and 20% of those from the regional rosters. Salaries from the national perspective are reported from the simulation at £1,250 per month, which is on average 41% of those from the global platforms and 95% of those from the regional platform.

### 4.4 Charge-out Rates

The daily charge out rate is the rate charged per day for deployed staff members in order for agencies to recover costs. A range of charge-out rates were provided and sorted according to the criteria stated above. Often, given the range of skills and experiences of their staff, agencies submitted an average charge-out day rate, in one instance the highest rate was submitted. Given the scope of this research and the amount of data available the analysis will be based on these figures rather than a more detailed approach accounting for grade and experience level.

Cost recovery rates, the amount that agencies expect to recover of costs through the charge-out rate, have been stated as between 65% and 100% depending on the agency. The remainder of the costs being received is from the organisational budgets or institutional funds. Costs covered within the charge out rate vary, the majority including the functional costs of deploying an individual as per the cost formula above. One agency is working on a more accurate reflection of costs being apportioned in the daily charge-rate, especially aiming to cover the annual maintenance costs of the roster.

It is the organisation’s ability to recover the costs of surge deployments and, therefore, cover the expenses invested in preparedness and other activities that ultimately ensures sustainability of the platform. Whether it is the highest cost model or the lost cost, if costs are recovered through charge out then the model can be sustainable. Individuals are charged out to requesting country offices that meet the payments from their own expenses. It was indicated that if charge out rates are too high the requesting country office might be discouraged from requesting. Below are the agencies and platforms that submitted charge back rates, these are presented in US$ as that was the most frequently cited currency.

- **International Rosters and standing teams**
  - **Save the Children** – Grades 1 to 4 with daily rates (US$): 540, 482, 425 and 373 (£415, £370, £326 and £287\(^{10}\))
  - **ActionAid** – Charge out rates are calculation of salary over days deployed
  - **Tearfund** – Charge out rates are calculation of salary over days deployed
  - **Care International** – Grades 1 to 5 with daily rates (US$): 600, 500, 400, 300 and 200 (£461, £384, £307, £230 and £154\(^{10}\))
  - **Christian Aid** – Charge out rates are calculation of salary over days deployed

- **Regional Collaborative Rosters** – Charge out rates are calculation of salary over days deployed

- **National Collaborative Rosters** – $100 to $150 (£77.86 to £116.84) a day depending on role and grade

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\(^{10}\) US$ to GBP conversion at US$ 1.3 to £1

\(^{11}\) US$ to GBP conversion at US$ 1.3 to £1
5. Cost Effectiveness

Throughout the process of these interviews, the subjective nature of the concept of effectiveness has been discussed. Every agency – as well as every individual – understood what ‘effectiveness’ meant within surge. These ideas were discussed in detail to determine what elements of effectiveness were considered above the decision of costs and what elements could be traded off for a more cost-effective model in surge. Of all the definitions, the most critical element that always outweighed other factors was “does the surge cover those in need it is designed to assist?” It was a consensus view that meeting the needs of those at risk was the prime driver in surge response, and a goal that should not be compromised. This created the two core points regarding effectiveness: Surge Impact and Surge Response. Having identified the core elements, the research question further into how those two aspects could be better achieved in terms of cost effectiveness. This demonstrated that speed, cost and suitable staff were the essentials in achieving those core goals.

Across the research, the complexities of humanitarian disasters and surge response were laid out. There are multiple ideas about the roles of rosters based internationally, regionally and nationally from very linear conceptions determined by disaster size to more diversified ideas of locations determining skills as well as the value of certain technical skills remaining in the international sphere. The linear conception of national, regional and international surge responding to disasters of different magnitudes is something that most feel should be moved away from, especially as investment grows in regional and national rosters. The consideration that national, regional or international responses are an either-or decision is also one that is challenged by interviewees in this research. This is followed by a further position that the thought that highly skilled national rosters will remove the need for international surge response is mistaken.

Highly skilled national roster members can readily compliment regional or global responses, or vice versa. There are certain geographical locations, often due to their own frequent disasters of particular types, which produce high volumes of specific skills. There are also certain skills that, due to their globally generic nature, would be more cost effective to maintain the skill globally rather than invest heavily in individuals to have that skill in each national location. Having effective surge models across all platforms will no doubt improve the outcomes and the costs of surge. The qualitative part of the interviews identified four sub headings of what was defined by individuals and agencies as effectiveness. They are discussed below along with the supporting financial data from the analysis to indicate where cost effective models are found.

5.1 Effectiveness as Impact

Impact was identified across all agencies as the most critical element in their surge response. Surge is the ability of an organisation to rapidly and effectively increase [the sum of] its available resources in a specific geographic location, in order to meet increased demand to stabilise or alleviate suffering in any given population. It is with this definition of surge that effectiveness is measured in terms of impact, using coverage, experience, knowledge and local connectivity to obtain situational awareness and make decisions based on needs of the effected communities. Every humanitarian intervention should focus on maximising the impacts for the effected population by the use of all necessary available resources. At this point, the drive for greater financial efficiency should not be at the expense of quality in response, staff across all platforms should be highly trained responders.

Impact in respect of surge is something that can be considered difficult to measure, because the ability to assess the contribution of one or a number of individuals is challenging. In the absence of a counterfactual, there are limited methodologies to determine this impact. This does not mean that each humanitarian intervention should not be based on clear objectives and expected results. Agencies should have the flexibility as to how to achieve these results, considering capacity, risks, opportunities as well as feedback from key stakeholders.
Agencies should monitor results and measure them against the set objectives. To be really effective in surge, every instance should have a realistic set of objectives. Humanitarian resources, time and effort should be targeted towards these objectives and progress should be measured through real time evaluations. Objective setting could involve:

- Identifying and analysing trade-offs, opportunities, risks and dilemmas;
- Weighing up short-term versus long-term effects and actions;
- Inputs from the affected population; and
- Being realistic about what can be achieved in a given programme time-frame.

Monitoring to determine where surge is meeting those objectives and where not could facilitate adjustments to surge response and produce a more effective result overall. Given the difficulties of measuring and monitoring impact, it becomes critical to have trusted, experienced and well-trained staff on whom agencies can rely to perform in challenging conditions within all of the platforms.

5.2 Effectiveness as Response

The ability to respond to an emergency is the ultimate measure of effectiveness. It is impossible to be effective if there is no response sent at all. Agencies had the confidence and ability to deploy surge for large sudden onset disasters knowing that media coverage and public interest would ensure financial flows from appeals and other donors. However, within the interviews, there were agencies that described situations where they delayed their surge or decided not to surge at all. This situation was explained in multiple agencies as being driven by the inability to ensure that the funds would be available for the particular response. Slow onset low profile disasters were particularly difficult to predict funding availability for and were most often delayed or not responded to. Surge responses can be expensive and if there is a risk that the money cannot be recovered, then the decision must be delayed or risk the financial sustainability of the organisation.

This research has demonstrated that the average cost for a single responder from the global roster is £308 ($400) per day along with associated costs taken from the cost formula above. This means that deployment from an international roster would likely cost the requesting country office c. £8000 ($10,400) for a 4-week deployment plus average expenses of £3724\textsuperscript{21}. Regional deployments are in the region of £1,296 in salary costs and expenses of £2,339\textsuperscript{22}. The highest skilled responders from the national collaborative roster in the Philippines are available for £116.84 ($150) per day or £3,041.61 ($3,900) in total with expenses reported at £918 for the same 4-week deployment\textsuperscript{23}.

Whilst the supporting evidence is not of sufficient strength to reach conclusive results, agencies indicated that significantly lower costs and, therefore, the ability to respond would be something that would enable response to certain types of disaster that currently are not met with a response. The main issue of lack of funds for a costly international response to certain disasters may be alleviated as smaller amounts of funds are often available and the national response presents a lower financial risk. At this stage, the costs for the regional roster are calculated differently due to the charge being made on the basis of salary only meaning the costs are demonstrated as lower, this is likely to change once the Go Team Asia team has calculated their costs. With regards expenses, global deployments have a cost of £3,742, which is £1,403 more than the regional deployment expenses and £2,824 more than the national roster expense costs. With response being the only way to be effective in surge, the options across the platforms and the various costs they represent may provide a trusted way for global agencies to respond more frequently to smaller, lower profile disasters without the large financial risk and, therefore, be more effective under this definition.

\textsuperscript{21} $10,400 is the calculated costs of an average of $400 per day charge-out rate over a four-week deployment based on a 6-day working week. £3724 was the average expenses based on all deployment costs submitted from the global platform. Changed from $ to £ at a rate of 1.3

\textsuperscript{22} £1,296 are the average salary costs reported from regional deployments. This is a different comparison to the international and national rosters who both provided a per day charge-out rate. This is to be determined by Go Team Asia.

\textsuperscript{23} $3900 is the calculated costs of an average of $150 per day charge-out rate over a four-week deployment based on a 6-day working week. £918 was the expense cost submitted from the national platform. Changed from $ to £ at a rate of 1.3
5.3 The Importance of Speed in Impact and Response

In the interviews, the importance of reaction time was the most commonly cited response to the question of effectiveness in surge. The timeframe between the onset of the crisis and the planning and delivery of surge should be the shortest possible. To minimise the shocks on the affected communities, the response has to be delivered as quickly as possible. The response time from agencies within the consortium varied and depended on: the size of the agency, the surge model employed, and the type and size of disaster being responded to.

The primary driver of speed was funding, particularly the certainty of funding. In some cases, agencies could respond in between 6 and 48 hours for large sudden onset disasters due to the knowledge that funds from appeal would be forthcoming. In the case of many smaller scale or slow onset disasters, surge could be delayed up to three weeks whilst certainties of funding were clear. When funding is largely reliant on wider media coverage of the disaster and larger appeals, the scope of the disaster directly affects the media coverage and therefore the funding. It is in the instances of the lower profile slow onset disasters that the data illustrates a potentially critical role for regional and national rosters whatever the agencies global surge model. This will be explored further in the effectiveness as response section.

‘Effectiveness as speed’ is also discussed within the terms of the locations from where teams or individuals are deployed. The localisation of surge is working on building capacity in disaster prone regions for exactly these instances. Responders that are already in country are able to react more quickly than those having to travel from the other side of the globe. In some cases, roster members may even be in the disaster struck area at the time of disaster, meaning they can provide immediate assessments of needs and a flow of real time information from the outset. Not only are national responders able to be in the disaster struck areas more quickly, the associated transport costs are significantly less.

From the data available, expected transport costs from a deployee from a national roster is the equivalent of £133 and £686 for a regional deployment, whereas the average for an international deployment is £897. Regional responses are also expected to be quicker than a global response, especially where visa free travel is allowed between regional nations. There are examples where, although emergency teams are mobilised within 24 to 72 hours, there has been up to six weeks waiting times for visas for people deployed from outside of the country or region. Visa free travel within the regional context means that the time between mobilisation and deployment is reduced to days and the cost of transportation regionally is shown to be 75% of that from a further afield global location. Transport costs from a national surge perspective are demonstrated to be 15% of that of global deployment and 20% of regional deployments. The demonstration of costs of surge deployments illustrates that deploying as close to the disaster as possible whether from a global, regional or national roster has speed implications and cost benefits.

Speed within surge responses is also dependent on the model employed by agencies. Globally-based standing teams have been recorded as being deployed within 6 hours of a disaster being declared. Whilst this model is demonstrated to be of higher cost on an annual basis, due largely to the salaries paid to the staff, it does ensure that staff are mobilised almost instantly. For agencies using rosters, the decision to surge may be made swiftly but deployment can take longer due to the processes involved in requesting and mobilising roster members. The average cost of maintaining a global roster is c. £100,000, which is about the same as running a standing team minus the salary costs that are ultimately recovered. Standing teams are described as being more effective not only due to speed are also the fact that their roles are 100% surge. Roster members, on the other hand, come from other roles within organisations. Further research could explore the impact of gaps within the workforce while individuals are surged from rosters to better understand the cost effectiveness in each model.
Within the regional collaborative roster, a deployment time of within 72 hours is expected, based largely on simulated data at this stage. The positioning of the teams around the region and the ease of travel for certain nationalities between nations means that mobilisation to deployment is often quicker than from the international rosters. An important exception is when individuals from global rosters are positioned within the country or region of the disaster. The On Call roster in the Philippines has yet to determine what the average response time would be, but expectations are that given the location of the responders it is likely to be within 24 hours and could even be much shorter. From an individual basis, and from the data provided this report, this demonstrates that responses from regional and national platform are quicker than those from an international platform and on an upfront cost basis cost £553 and £780 less in terms of transport costs alone.

5.4 The Importance of Cost in Impact and Response

The cost of surge is something that all agencies are aware. As reflected in the responses to the interview questions, however, few seem to understand the total direct costs involved. Focusing on the most efficient use of resources helps to ensure that surge can deliver increasingly better results for the same, or less, expense. This is of particular importance because, according to wider research, whilst the demand for humanitarian response is growing significantly, the overall funding envelope is not.

A clearly identified method of reducing costs whilst remaining effective is critical to the localisation of surge. One of the fundamentals of the Start Network is responding to the evidence that regional and national agencies can play a successful role in surge if the capacity and resources are available. The majority of the agencies interviewed defined cost effectiveness as deploying from as close to the disaster as possible, whether from their international, regional or local teams. Local response is often recognised as the most effective and efficient approach to humanitarian emergencies and disasters. The location of the responders from national NGOs can save time and money. National responders do not require visas or air transport. Based on the data, this provided demonstrates c. £800 in cost savings on a global deployment and c. £500 on a regional deployment. It is always the case that the salary and per diem allowance is significantly lower than that of an internationally sourced counterpart of the same level: the salary of the most senior grade on the Philippines roster is £1250 per month whereas the most senior employee reported from the International platform has a monthly salary of £3577.

As always with the data provided, this is not to suggest that the work done by the two above-mentioned employees is identical. What this research has provided is a comparison of costs across agencies, platforms and grades. More detailed research, as proposed later in this work, may be able to draw a more accurate conclusion across the platforms and grades. A matrix of grades across the agencies and platforms and a standard measure of effectiveness would enable a true comparison. Translation costs or the wages of a translator are often not considered when responders travel from different countries, there may be occasions where costs are significantly increased by the use of a translator, with costs cited between £38 ($50) and £76 ($100) per day. There was no data as to how long translators were required or employed or for which deployment, but based on a deployment of a month, assuming a six-day working week and a translator employed daily the cost could be as much as $2500.

Another area identified frequently as critical for remaining cost effective in surge is collaboration. Areas for collaboration at the HQ or Global level are cited within a number of reports within the Start Network. Procurement (e.g. Oxfam’s HPC), Funding, Media (e.g. DEC), Advocacy (e.g. BOND facilitated advocacy) and Capacity Building (e.g. Save the Children’s HOP) are all areas where effective collaboration is occurring. Other areas potentially suitable for collaboration have been identified at this level (Group Purchasing, Sharing Back Office Functions, Sharing Surge Capacity and Joint Rosters), but collaboration in these areas are often described as an aspiration with significant challenges especially from organisational cultures and polices.
Interviewees championed regional and national collaboration, which they perceive as different from head office level collaboration. Each individual saw this area as fundamental in achieving cost effectiveness in surge and felt that investments in rosters held more locally were a critical part of overall surge response. Significant effort and resources have gone into creating the regional and national shared rosters, something about which all organisations involved were enthusiastic. Collaboration at this level goes further than rosters and there are examples of both joint needs assessments and implementation taking place.

The data provided by both the regional and national collaborative rosters shows that the set up costs of rosters are in the region of £100,000. These costs include: the entirety of the set-up, from business case to final simulation, promotion and launch. From the initial simulations and costings, these rosters demonstrate agencies working together coherently, efficiently and effectively, to achieve shared strategic and operational objectives. There is a strong motivation for different local actors to work together to improve relationships, minimise competition and promote synergies. Collaboration of this sort minimises any waste of resource and eliminates operational overlaps. The annual maintenance costs for the On Call Philippines roster (£59,000), which demonstrated that if 30 INGOs registered as members, for around £2,000 annually, they could have access to a local roster with currently c.350 vetted and trained responders. The same is true of the regional roster, with annual maintenance costs of £77,000. This means that if costs were shared amongst a number of larger INGOs, they would have access to a regionally deployable team for the fraction of the cost of maintaining a roster internationally. Responders from national collaborative rosters have daily charge out rates lower than the global responders. National roster rates are c. £115 ($150) per day whereas deployments from international rosters charge out at an average of £308 ($400) per day. A number of agencies stated that the international daily charge out rate was a deterrent for local offices requesting responders, having responders available from the national or regional platforms may encourage country offices to request assistance where otherwise they may not.

Every agency and platform agreed that there was a role for regional and national responses and that collaboration would be the most cost effective way of delivering that resource. Individual agency’s understanding and definition of cost effectiveness ultimately determines how they potentially would use the regional and national collaborative rosters. It was unclear if any agency would consider fully removing their own international roster in favour of solely using regional or national alternatives. However, if agencies identified occasions where surge was not instructed internationally due to high costs, then regional or national responses were said to be potential cost effective options. Other agencies that did not cite the same issues may view the setting up and maintaining of other rosters as an extra cost, which may not be seen as cost effective within their own definition. Certain agencies saw no way for regional and national rosters as replacements to any aspects of their current roster. These agencies explained that there are skills held locally that are of immense use and international and national surge should not be looked at as ‘either or’ but as complementary.

There are instances where localisation may not be the most cost effective method of surge. One particular example is responders that deal with donors, particularly institutional donors. The complex and detailed nature of paperwork from institutional donors warrants a highly skilled individual who is able to quickly manage all the processes across all the donors. Given that the time and cost of training individuals with these skills is incredibly high, and that the institutional donors paperwork is often the same across the world, having a globally based responder for this kind of work may be more cost effective than having and training individuals in each location with these skills. Donors themselves could play a role in cost effectiveness by simplifying and unifying their paperwork to ensure the task doesn’t require highly skilled global responders to complete.

Trust and respect are imperative in the success of these collaborative rosters. Feedback and information should be regular and organisations should be responsive to each other’s requests. Having reliable and experienced partners within the rosters will allow agencies to be certain of an effective response. Efforts to promote partnership such as joint capacity building or training can further assist in the success of these rosters.

5.5 The Importance of Suitable Staff in Impact and Response

The ability for responders to be active on the ground as quickly as possible is already identified as important. An important part of that response is the ability for that responder to deliver quality work that is sensitive to the local communities. This came down to two fundamental issues with regards to quality as effectiveness. Firstly, it was defined as the ability for the responding professional to have the right skills and experience to perform the task. Secondly it was about the ability of that person to understand and be accepted within the effected communities.

5.5.1 Highly Skilled Individuals

The ability for highly trained competent staff to be active on the ground is one of the core elements of surge. The importance of well-trained experienced staff with strong leadership capabilities for the success of the deployment is paramount. The longterm investment in staff with regards training and career development as well as technical and behavioral competencies has created an effective surge response. Through real time evaluations and other observations, skilled staff members provide the most effective response.

There is an understanding that currently the largest investments in training and competencies have been at a global or international level. Training costs have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter and regardless of where the training takes place it is a high cost activity. As previously stated an important step forward in understanding the effectiveness of the training provided across the network would be an effort to review the actual outputs of the training in terms of impact and understand of higher cost trainings performed at a global level are actually more effective than local alternatives or just costlier. Understanding this will ultimately determine the cost effectiveness of training but the most important aspect is the skill of the responders.

Highly skilled staff are important to maintain across the platforms. In the event of a large sudden onset disasters that significantly damages the ability for a local response expertise must be surged from outside the affected area, be it elsewhere nationally, regionally or globally. Taking the earlier understanding of the reason to surge, the breakdown of local capacity to maintain life or livelihood, it would always be important to maintain surge capacity outside of regularly affected areas. Ensuring that all platforms of response are of the highest quality should always remain the aim.

5.5.2 National and Regional Responders

Effectiveness was in some cases very clearly defined as the ability for the responder to have a deep contextual understanding of the environment in which they are working. Research showed that effected communities are more likely and willing to participate in the response if an individual from the same culture leads it. The familiarity with the language not only eliminates costs such as translators, it also allows a contextual understating of the community’s needs. The geographical location allows national responders to be in the disaster zone more quickly the responders are often tied to the local communities. There is a perception that local connectedness of national staff and the fact they are accustomed to the environmental conditions makes them less of a security concern than international staff. Whilst this can be the case as on a per capita basis, international staff do suffer greater risks, but it does not mean that local staff are unaffected. In 2015, there were 13 times more local victims of aid worker violence than international victims. Security is of prime concern for all responders and community ties can be a way of managing those concerns. Having highly trained local responders also can assist in the building of local capacity when it comes to resilience to future disasters, meaning effectiveness could be multifaceted when it comes to national response.

Currently, it is well recognised that regional and national agencies have so far received limited investment in their own surge capacity. The transforming surge capacity project is critical in strengthening regional and national agencies to allow them to build an effective surge response that could build local disaster resilience, reduce the overall costs and reduce the over reliance on international staff.

6. Challenges to Achieving Effectiveness

Throughout the qualitative interview stage, challenges to achieving effectiveness as identified above have arisen. The challenges, whilst multidimensional, appear to be rooted in two particular issues: sources as well as amount of financing and organisational culture.

With regards financing, there has been a strong feeling that the cost of maintaining multiple regional and national rosters is high. Despite the acknowledgement, they could lead to a more cost-effective surge response if the allocation of resources improves their development. Along with the high costs, many donor stipulations for preparedness actives are said to be restricted in certain cases meaning that rosters are maintained at a global level while regional and national rosters are left underfunded. From this research, this is presented with two particular challenges: first, that funding is finite and, secondly, there was little overall understanding of the costs involved of maintaining regional or national collaborative rosters. This research has furthered the understanding of costs of both setting up and maintaining national and regional rosters. There is now data showing the cost of set up of regional (£99,400) and national (£101,905) rosters and more importantly what it costs to annually maintain those rosters on an overall (£77,400 and £58,352 respectively) basis. If the regional and national rosters were to charge the annual membership subscription model they indicated and based on an average membership of 30 large INGOs, the cost for an INGO for access would be c. £2,580 for the regional and £1,945 for the national. This would enable the roster to: operate successfully, cover its maintenance costs, and provide the INGO trusted well-trained staff to surge locally when either costs were a challenge or local staff are required.

The challenge of sufficient unrestricted funding, something addressed in the financial sustainability section of this report, is the second challenge to the investment and maintenance in regional and national rosters. It was explained frequently that funds for preparedness are often restricted and frequently limited. The follow up section of this report aims to deal with the issues of funding.

The other key challenge in effectiveness through collaboration, identified across many research pieces from within the Start Network, is elements of organisational culture. Operationally the process of collaboration is often contained by these organisational factors. Barriers to collaboration that need to be challenged further are as follows:

- The additional layer of complexity when working with other organisations.
- Individual agency culture, dynamic, strategy and vision.
- Different levels of security requirements.
- Loss of control and organisational priorities

The individuality of organisations, their differing goals, levels of management and different systems can create unforeseen costs when working to collaborate. In the same way mergers in the corporate world are frequently challenging due to those operational differences, collaboration can take significant efforts. Opportunity cost needs to be considered when it comes to collaborating, resources spent on collaboration may be able to be put to better use elsewhere in the surge making collaboration not necessarily the most cost effective form of action. Collaboration at a headquarters or global level is seen at this stage as more of a long-term aspiration than a medium-term goal. Efforts to improve the sharing of information and training to share costs and avoid duplication have proved successful and agencies are more aligned to this than to collaborative global response models.
Agencies also confirmed that barriers to collaboration were furthered by risks to future funding for their particular agency. The key risk associated with increased collaborative surge at a global level being that if it does not work then future funding will be jeopardised. Whilst it is certain that the same challenges face the development of regional or national surge mechanisms, collaborations at these levels are progressing more rapidly. It is also important to note the benefits of these collaborations. Indeed, a case study conducted by the Transforming Surge Capacity Project found critical knock on effects of the collaboration, including a commitment to documenting what works and what does not, a consensus is that the project has become far stronger than the sum of its parts due to the many voices included, and an opportunity to develop working relationships to facilitate collaboration. Overall, the project’s members have described collaboration as “one of the most transformative elements of the project.”

7. Conclusions

This research has demonstrated a number of key findings regarding surge cost effectiveness and financial sustainability. It is important to again understand how this research constructed the concept of cost effectiveness given the challenges of insufficient comparative data and absence of standard effectiveness metrics across the Start Network. The research has found four critical areas of effectiveness that appeared in all interviews across the agencies, aspects of cost and financing were then linked to these understandings of effectiveness. This report enables an understanding of what agencies consider as effectiveness in surge and then explores the costs associated with those particular understandings or models. The research is a stepping-stone in understanding the complexities of cost effectiveness and financial substitutability in surge. The conclusions are sectioned into headings that best suit the areas of research they represent, Localisation, Collaboration and Preparedness and Sustainability. As this work progressed it became apparent that there were significant avenues for further research, these have been detailed and recorded in Annex 6.

7.1 Localisation: Localisation is key to determining the effectiveness of surge capacity, both in terms of reducing costs and in terms of providing contextual understanding during a surge.

Throughout this research, the concept of localisation was repeated at all platform levels and all models. The majority of agencies understood that deploying as close to the disaster as possible given the available distribution of skills was important to cost effectiveness. The daily cost of a deployee from the national roster is £70 per day with a charge out rate of £150 ($116.84). Globally based rosters and standing team always deploy based on roster member’s skill and geographical location and the nearest team member to the disaster with the appropriate skill set is deployed. This is also true of the regional deployments; the appropriate skill is identified and then the individual in the most optimal geographic location is deployed. Whilst the salary and associated costs would be higher when individuals are deployed from a global roster, there are significant savings made in terms of transport costs when deployees are closer to the disaster, this saving applies whatever the platform. There was no data to demonstrate the cost saving of deploying an individual from a global roster who is based more locally than the headquarters. This cost saving can however be demonstrated by looking at the data received from the deployments of the regional roster. In the data provided one deployment was from Nepal to India with a transportation cost of £258. A similar deployment from the regional roster but from Nepal to Indonesia had transport costs of £860, £600 more than a more local deployment. Given the total number of deployees across all agencies, platforms and disasters, the transport cost saving through localisation is likely to be significant. This brings attention to the statement from a number of agencies that explained that the cost of international surge was a deterrent for local offices requesting responders. Having responders available from the national or regional platforms may encourage country offices to request assistance where otherwise they may not.

Throughout the research, it was well recognised that regional and national agencies have so far received limited investment in their own surge capacity. The transforming surge capacity project is critical in strengthening regional and national agencies to allow them to build an effective surge response that could build local disaster resilience, reduce the overall costs and potentially reduce the over reliance on international staff.

This research also demonstrated that locally maintained rosters are significantly cheaper to deploy from. These costs are reduced further when the national rosters are collaborative and the annual maintenance costs are shared among participating agencies. The same is ultimately true wherever rosters are collaborative, sharing management and admin costs at whatever level can demonstrate a significant annual saving. This research has shown that the average costs of maintaining rosters are broadly similar across the platforms. This data could be more refined if greater cost access was available. If rosters were nationally and regionally positioned as well as collaborative, the likely cost per agency in terms of annual roster maintenance costs could be reduced.

Through this research and the wider literature, localisation, especially national responses, were shown to increase the participation rates of local communities in recovery efforts. Responders that have greater contextual understanding and a common language were explained by some agencies as having greater operational effectiveness in surge responses. This concept is explored further in section 9.2.

7.2 Impact: Impact is critical and international and local surge models may have different benefits, regardless of the cost differences

The importance of impact to any surge is critical. When there is a humanitarian disaster and a need to alleviate suffering in any given population, the importance of surge from whatever platform making an impact can mean the difference between life and death. It is important to note that international and local surge models may have different benefits, regardless of the cost differences. Cost considerations at this stage are largely second place because all agencies want to ensure the affected population is assisted. Impact also covers skills and quality of outcomes in surge.

A critical part of the localisation debate within the humanitarian sector is constructed around impact from international or local responders. Perceptions and perhaps past investment focus have placed international responders as “highly skilled” in the same way local responders are considered to have contextual local knowledge which effects the quality of the outcome. Given the breadth of the sector across all platforms, these binary identifications are insufficient to understanding the realities of each individual responder. Whilst from a cost perspective an international response costs c. £11,724\(^27\) for a four-week deployment as opposed to £3,918\(^28\) for the same response from a national roster based on charge-out rates and £3,635 from the regional roster based on salary costs\(^29\).

Based on a number of factors, it is difficult to draw direct comparisons between the three sets of data. There are cases where all responses and all costs could be considered cost effective depending on the aims and goals of the particular agency. The cost and impact is also down to the individual, international responders are not necessarily higher skilled than local responders in the same way being from the same country doesn’t automatically assure good contextual understanding. The broad range of costs across the platforms should therefore perhaps not be considered an either-or between international and local surge, but looked at on a more detailed basis, using skills to define response rather than purely cost.

\(^27\) £11,724 is $10,400 charge out rate converted into £ at a rate of $1.3 to £1 (£8000) and added to the expenses of £3724

\(^28\) £3918 is $3900 charge-out rate converted to £ at a rate of $1.3 to £1 (£3000) and added to the expenses of £918

\(^29\) £3635 is the average salary costs of one month £1296 with the average other costs added of £2339
7.3 Speed: The speed with which teams can respond to emergencies is critical to the effectiveness of the surge.

The speed of deployment was frequently cited in the interviews in respect of cost effectiveness, this was discussed in terms of international surge models and then from a more localised perspective. While expensive, costs for standing teams that are able to respond within hours are considered the most effective way of getting highly skilled individuals on the ground and working. The example of a standing team in terms of annual costs was £664,239 against the average cost of an international roster at £60,000. The cost of the standing team over and above deployment from an international roster combined with the readiness is often seen as the most cost effective model. Other agencies suggested that surge rosters were the most cost effective in their case as they had the individuals ready to deploy and they felt satisfied that the time to agree deployment from a roster was quick enough for purpose. One point raised and to be considered in further research on cost effectiveness was the gap left by roster members who are deployed from another role within the organisation. An understanding of the cost and productivity implications would allow a better reflection as to the actual overall effectiveness of standing teams over rosters.

Speed is also considered important and cost effective from regional and national platforms. The speed with which responders from the region or the country itself is often quicker than globally based teams, especially when considering visas. In one instance a period of six weeks for visa waiting times was quoted, despite individuals being mobilised within 24 hours. Given the location of the regional and national rosters, speed can ultimately be achieved by localised surge. Whilst INGOs might have an additional cost for maintaining or being a member of a regional or national roster, the speed with which members can be deployed makes them cost effective in this respect.

Whatever an agency’s definition of cost effectiveness in relation to speed, again the final element of speed is the ability for the responder to be effective. If a responder can be at the disaster zone quickly, from any of the platforms – global, regional or national – but is poorly trained or unskilled, then the likelihood is that they will not be effective. Making an accurate comparison of speed as cost effectiveness would require a metric with which to measure an individual’s effectiveness in role to be combined with the speed with which they arrive on location. This is detailed as an area of future research in the annexes.
8. Collaboration

8.1 Cost: Cost varies across agencies and cost-related decisions are determined by each agency’s understanding of ‘effectiveness’

Cost and financing are central to the discussions of cost effectiveness. With a finite amount of funding and a growing number of people impacted by disasters, ensuring funds are spent effectively is critical. To this extent, collaborating in certain areas to achieve a more cost-effective surge appears not only logical, but also necessary. The concept of cost is justified by each agency’s particular response to the ideas of effectiveness. Having a deployable standing team positioned globally may be counter to the concept of cost effectiveness expressed by other agencies or platforms who support a more localised approach. This research has demonstrated the associated costs of deployment from across the range of platforms. There are multiple subjectivities involved in this element, which ultimately agencies decide this based upon the model they operate. Maintenance costs of standing teams are high but if costs are recovered through deployment there are multiple ways they could be considered cost effective. Roster costs appear comparable across the international, regional and national levels, meaning that decisions to maintain rosters can now be understood on a cost basis. Agencies that maintain individual national rosters could make significant cost savings if they switched to a collaborative roster, given that the costs would be shared among other agencies as well. For agencies that maintain a single agency roster nationally or regionally, the understanding of the costs of their own roster versus the cost of accessing the collaborative roster should be fully explored to assist in decisions of cost effectiveness. On a daily basis, the cost of surge from a national platform is 35% of that of a deployment from an international platform. Assuming the level of effectiveness of the deployed was equal this represents a lower cost alternative which may favour country offices who are reluctant to request assistance from international rosters given the associated costs.

Cost as a stand-alone subject in terms of effectiveness is difficult to ultimately determine in the absence of a metric that looks at the effectiveness of individuals in their roles and also the lack of data concerning roles of similar or identical grades. This report has demonstrated that costs of surge can be reduced by using regional or national collaborative rosters, ultimately the true effectiveness of those rosters need to be determined by assessing impact.

9. Preparedness and Sustainability

Financial sustainability has been defined as the availability and reliability of funding sources for surge models. This is to be combined, however, with the financial and cost analysis in the previous section to give a clearer understanding of what cost effective financially sustainable surge looks like. The starting point for this section looks at how project consortium members currently fund their surge capacity across the platform levels. It is important to remember that it is the organisation’s ability to recover the costs of surge deployments and, therefore, cover the expenses invested in preparedness and other activities that ultimately ensures sustainability of the platform. It is also noted that reasons for funding allocation and, therefore, financial sustainability may be to do with donor stipulations for preparedness activities. These preparedness activities are said to be restricted in certain cases meaning that rosters are maintained at a global level while regional and national rosters are left underfunded. Most agencies identified investment in preparedness as an area that could benefit significantly from increased unrestricted funding.

9.1 International Rosters and Standing Teams

Ultimately the decision to surge is based on the availability of funding for agencies. Surge funding currently is made up from a number of sources. As explained in the previous section the decision to surge is taken once there is a certainty that the funds will be available from donors or appeals. Many agencies can draw on an internal fund for immediate response; these funds are frequently made up of a percentage of previous appeals income maintained for emergency response. All agencies interviewed reported availability of these funds within 48 hours of a disaster, with some being immediately available. This availability was reported at the international level. Funding from the DEC or institutional funds also form part of the surge funding package. The majority of funding comes from appeals income, either the agencies own or the DEC appeal. The table below shows the rapid funding mechanisms in place globally.20

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20 Start Network (2013) Transforming Surge Capacity Project Baseline
The current funding model presents two issues from an agency’s perspective: first, the lack of certainty of if funds are going to be available to surge and, secondly, the amount of funds available for investing in preparedness. As explained in detail in the previous section, deployment can only go ahead if there is some amount of certainty that the costs will be recovered from donors or appeals. This leads to delayed decisions or decisions not to surge at all for particular types of humanitarian crises. Investment in preparedness is something that most agencies identified as something that could benefit significantly from increased unrestricted funding. This could fund the training and maintenance of standing teams and rosters across all platforms, something that is often restricted by either the amount of funding or the restricted nature of available funds.
Some agencies use private unrestricted funding to budget for their standing teams and then seek to recover deployment costs from the respective requesting country office on deployment. The cost formulas discussed in the cost effectiveness section detail the costs to be recovered across the agencies. Cost recovery rates vary in two ways. First, they vary in terms of the agencies’ own expectation of cost recovery, reported as between 65% and 100. Next, they vary in terms of the way that costs are apportioned to the maintenance of the model. Agencies that have a standing team model are especially willing to invest unrestricted funding into emergency response teams because they believe in their necessity when it comes to disaster response.

Access to unrestricted funding for preparedness is something all agencies seek to increase. Funding from appeals retentions, a percentage maintained from appeals to fund preparedness and future surge deployments, is dependent in the size of the appeals from the previous year and therefore can vary greatly. Institutional funding such as that from DFID, ECHO or the DEC is used by some agencies to contribute to maintaining emergency response capacity. These funds can also vary annually by amount or by restricted nature. The result is that funding the costs of surge response is made up of a number of sources called on at various stages. Agencies that have higher amounts of unrestricted funding to cover the costs of their deployable staff have less of an imperative to recover costs from a country level. Other agencies rely on cost recovery to finance their teams and, where those costs are not covered, rely on either institutional funding or unrestricted funds to cover these costs.

9.2 Regional and National Collaborative Rosters
The current funding models for the regional and national collaborative rosters are made up from Start Network funds. These funds were provided on a 3-year basis by the DEPP transforming the surge capacity project to cover all aspects of the setting up of the rosters as well as the maintenance over that period. The total cost of setting up the first year and the two subsequent years of annual maintenance of the regional and national rosters are £254,200 and £218,609 respectively\(^5\). The challenge for these two rosters going forward is the sustainable funding to ensure the annual maintenance charges are covered. The current preferred method of moving forward with sustainable funding is the collecting of an annual roster membership charge for participating INGOs. The identified annual costs of c. £77,400 and £58,352 could be covered if 30 INGOs paid an annual membership fee. Based on the above figures and 30 INGOs participating the costs would be £2,580 for the regional and £1,945 for the national. When compared to the annual cost of an INGO maintaining a global roster appears, this potential fee appears to represent a good value. The regional and national rosters aim to demonstrate cost effectiveness with their rosters especially for disasters that would normally not trigger surge internationally due to high costs and low expectation of appeals funding.

The donor map (Part II) explores funding opportunities with these understandings of financial sustainability. It is particularly focused on funding for preparedness and for surge to lower profile disasters. The prime funding concerns of agencies highlighted throughout this research was the ability to maintain the surge model itself and the ability to cost recover when there were low profile disasters. The exploration of costs in using regional and national collaborative rosters has demonstrated that lower costs are possible. Sustainably funding those rosters through membership or support should become a new focus of financial sustainability.

\(^5\) This is calculation of the set-up costs, which include the first years running costs and two times the submitted annual maintenance costs.
Part II – Donor Mapping

1 Introduction, Methodology, and Purpose

1.1 Overview
This report describes the results of a small-scale donor mapping exercise that was conducted by MzN International in spring of 2017 as a part of its research for The Transforming Surge Capacity project. The Transforming Surge Capacity project is a Start Network project led by ActionAid and supported by 10 other humanitarian agencies and two technical partners.

MzN International’s management team, as a part of a Surge Study report, conducted this donor mapping exercise and analysis. The donor map has taken into consideration: the nature of the funding needed and possible avenues for approaching donors with a focus on humanitarian assistance. It particularly focuses on funding critical in maintaining surge capacity in the regional and local rosters.

The results presented are based on the interviews with ActionAid and partners’ staff conducted as a part of the report, online donor tracking services, and MzN’s preexisting expertise in this analysis in humanitarian funding and donor preferences.

1.2 Purpose
The main work in which MzN is engaged is a study on sustainable and effective funding for surge capacity. This donor mapping augments the research that is the main part of this project and is intended to provide useful background and practical information to ActionAid’s staff as they plan and engage on the Transforming Surge Capacity project.

As noted in the Terms of Reference, the donor mapping is limited in scope to the main funds and trends in specified geographies, due to the limited budget of this study.

1.3 Key trends in relevant funding areas
Despite the proven need for the work of the surge capacity project, OECD donors have spent only about 3–6% of their total humanitarian spending on reducing the risk and impact of disasters. This demonstrates the importance of seeking new sources of funding, including the innovation funds, private partnerships, and foundations discussed in this small-scale donor mapping.

It is important to consider that the overall ODA environment has changed considerably in the last few years for a variety of reasons. Some bilateral aid agencies have transitioned their relationships with their former aid recipient countries towards “aid for trade” relationships and increasingly find that the involvement of the private sector has become an indispensable part of their bilateral development cooperation formula. Next, development banks (World Bank, ADB) tend to be awarded a disproportionate share of the bilateral funding dedicated to fragile contexts and other relevant areas to the surge capacity work. Finally, we assume ActionAid and its partners are aware of the reduction in DFID funding. There has been a block on new project launching for nearly 9 months and it is expected that the new Government will continue spending in similar amounts, sectors and locations.

These trends indicate a need for ActionAid and its partners to be flexible in considering various different types of approaches and funding sources, including the private partnerships and innovation funds that are discussed in this report. In this, the ability of ActionAid and its partners to create in-country networks is an excellent comparative advantage for those donors that seek partnerships composed of different international and host-country partners from different institutional backgrounds (i.e., local, international, private, public, not-for-profit) as these are now increasingly expected to collaborate as applicants to larger funding opportunities.

In addition to responding to these trends, we recommend applying to the innovation funds, foundations, and private partnerships included here both because they speak to the innovative nature of the work to be pursued and because they are generally relatively less labour intensive in terms of proposal preparation. A concluding section in this short report outlines some additional strategies that ActionAid and its partners should consider, in addition to applying to the funds recommended in this report. Given these trends and what we found in our donor mapping, we suggest preparing the short applications for the opportunities that are immediately available while also working on expanding the institutional partnerships.

2.0 Analysis of the programme’s funding needs

2.1 Understanding the programme

In order to best assess funding possibilities, it is critical to understand the activities, organisation, and goals of the project, to ensure that it fulfils the criteria of potential donors. This section clarifies the type of work that needs to be funded.

- **Main activity:** According to the Terms of Reference for this research, the Transforming Surge Capacity project “aims to improve the capacity of humanitarian agencies to scale up resources for emergency response – getting the right people to the right places, doing the right things, in the shortest time possible.” The main activity, as we understand it, is to help improve preparedness of the rosters and to make funding available before disasters occur rather than having to scale up as they happen. This is, of course, related to preparedness and resilience areas of humanitarian work.

- **Project governance:** The project is delivered through collaborative platforms at national, regional and international levels. Led by ActionAid, this project is supported by 10 other humanitarian agencies and two technical partners. It is a Start Network project supported by the Department for International Development (DFID) through the Disasters Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP). The two national platforms are based in the Philippines and Pakistan, the Asia Regional Platform is led from Bangkok, and the International Platform is led from London.

- **Key deliverables:**
  - Increased capacity of skilled surge personnel;
  - Collaborative national, regional and international pilots and shared rosters to improve organisational surge capacity;
  - Sharing of good practice

2.2 Identified funding gaps

Establishing and maintaining adequate surge capacity systems requires long-term planning and predictable funding consistent with unrestricted funding models. As ActionAid has noted, while the financial sustainability of surge capacity is critical for humanitarian NGOs to respond effectively to disasters, attracting donors to preparedness and other activities that will aid in building this sustainability has proved difficult.

From our interviews, we have determined key gaps in the funding for surge capacity that this limited donor mapping addresses. We have found, in particular, the need to attract funding in two main areas: funding for ‘lower profile’ disasters and for preparedness. In the interviews, it became apparent that there is a lack of clarity about where more or different types of funding would be available. There is, however, a strong expressed need for more unrestricted funding for both purposes.

2.2.1 Funding for ‘lower profile’ disasters

To begin with, while more funding is always useful, large sudden onset disasters generally do not encounter problems getting funds for surge. Agencies can act using their own or another source of prepositioned funds knowing the appeals funding will flow in and allow them to repay or recoup.
Respondents, however, identified issues when the when the disaster is ‘lower profile’ (usually defined by extent covered by the media). ‘Lower profile’ events are also defined as a disaster that occurs slowly over time (such as environmental deterioration) rather than suddenly (such as a hurricane). The agencies that we spoke to have noted that surge activities are sometimes significantly delayed (by up to 3 weeks) due to uncertainty of funding or a lack of a decision to respond by donors. This seems to be based on the cost of an immediate action and the lack of capacity to respond immediately to a disaster that is low profile.

There is, therefore, an identified need for funding that can be used immediately for disasters that are not covered by the media (and thus not as likely to gain money quickly through urgent appeals) and is on-hand for ‘slow simmering’ disasters as well.

To address this need, several of the opportunities discussed below focus on such ‘slow simmering’ disasters as well as on-going issues that require funding for preparedness.

2.2.2 Funding for preparedness

Funding for preparedness in whichever form of surge model agencies have (standing teams, national, international, regional rosters) is a critical funding gap. The costs often include, but are not limited to: recruitment, training, salaries, and administration. Approximately 10% of funds are apportioned from appeal funds for rosters and preparedness, although occasionally there are appeals for this preparedness specifically.

Other funding methods are grants from corporates, institutions, governments, and the Start Network. All of these funds seem to be insufficient, uncertain and arguably unsustainable. Certain agencies have identified critical funding issues for standing teams as of the end of 2017. In many cases, it looks like preparedness costs (especially training) are equal to the money spent on surge activities due to the need to scale-up these funds each time that the partners respond to a disaster.

Another issue that is addressed in the findings below is the need to interact with the private sector as a way to increase funding opportunities. There is a trend in private sector collaborations to help fund preparedness in health, disaster, anti-hunger, and other areas of humanitarian work. Interviewees also discussed private sector interaction in the context of procurement arrangements and topics related to financial sustainability. From the interviews, however, it was also apparent that private sector interaction was not currently a main consideration from a funding perspective. As noted below, these opportunities should certainly be considered.

3.0 The Donor Search

Based on our background knowledge of potential donors, we completed an online search of potential donors and organizations and considered funding opportunities from a range of possible donors, including:

- Multilateral institutions (i.e., the World Bank, UNDP);
- Private and corporate partnership opportunities;
- Regional development institutions (i.e. the Asian Development Bank)
- OCED/DAC members own national agencies for international assistance;
- Private foundations (i.e., The Gates Foundation and the Open Society Foundation); and
- Innovation funds.

In addition to relying on its pre-existing information about trends and opportunities, MzN team used subscription services that regularly track global donor funding/programmes (i.e., DeveX, Fund for NGOs), donor associations, individual donor and government websites, and advertised requests for proposals (RFSs and RFPs).
For each of the potential funding opportunity, the MzN team identified the name of each donor, the name of any specific programme, and the donor’s own programmatic priorities.

Also, for each opportunity, the team considered:

**Geographical Scope** - In many cases, many larger international donors have large annual programmes that can reach several countries in several regions or subregions.

**Programme details** - Wherever possible, the assessment identified more detailed information related to opportunity, such as:

• The Date A Particular Opportunity Or Programme Was Open For Application;
• The Type Of Funding (i.e., Grants, Contracts, Or Cooperative Agreements);
• The Advertised Level Of Funding Available;
• The Intended Implementation Period Of The Intended Project; And
• Any application submission due dates. The team also included any additional information available about the actual application process and whether any preliminary “letters of interest” or “concept notes” are required before being invited by the donor to submit a full proposal. We have also provided an internet address and/or online link for the funding opportunity or donor programme.

**4.0 Key Recommendations**

Below please find some recommendations for possible sources of funding for surge and preparedness work, as described above.

We have also considered, and would recommend, that ActionAid and its partners consider multiple funding strategies. Most importantly, in addition to considering the donors listed below, we suggest teaming up with larger commercial companies to access funding through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives.

**1. JT International Foundation (Switzerland)**

JT International Foundation has a relevant focus on humanitarian relief and disaster preparedness.

**Eligibility:** Open, except for the following exceptions:

• Programs that are not aligned with their mission
• Commercial entities, unless the proposed program demonstrably relates to social enterprise
• Unregistered organizations
• Individuals
• Events
• Political parties, candidates or partisan political organizations
• Programs for religious purposes or religious activities
• Organizations or programs that discriminate on the basis of race, gender, orientation, disability, nationality or religion

**Mission:** JT International Foundation’s mission is to help people who have been struck by disasters and to invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation. They describe their mission as: “We help less privileged people and victims of natural or man-made disasters improve their quality of life. We achieve this by supporting organizations that implement programs we believe are relevant and appropriate.”
Projects: JT International currently funds multiple projects that focus on preparedness. Projects they are currently funding include, for example:

- “Improving rural livelihoods, water supplies and sanitation in earthquake damaged areas of Nepal,” focusing on preparedness and relief initiatives in Nepal’s remoter communities, which have not benefitted as much from national reconstruction efforts from the earthquake of 2015. It provides alternative-livelihood training, women’s support to prevent trafficking, and other initiatives related to resilience.
- “Disaster resilient construction techniques in Western Sumatra,” which concentrates on brickmaking businesses and their employees. The aim is to improve brick quality to address the issue of poor quality bricks, which are at increased risk of collapsing during earthquakes and major storms. This helps to increase the preparedness of the region to such disasters.

Apply: The first step is the submission of a project concept note using an online 2-page form, and if accepted, invited to submit a proposal. The 2-page concept note form can be found at the following link: [http://jtifoundation.org/contact-us/](http://jtifoundation.org/contact-us/)

2. The Global Innovation Fund

The Global Innovation fund focuses on innovations that aim to improve the lives and opportunities of millions of people in the developing world. It is focused on finding the best approaches and innovation.

Eligibility: They are global in breadth and scope: open to the best approaches to solve any major development problem in low- or lower-middle income countries.

Mission: Supports innovators who are committed to using and generating rigorous evidence about what works. Invests in innovations with strong potential for social impact at a large scale. “Innovation” includes new business models, policy practices, technologies, behavioural insights, or ways of delivering products and services that benefit the poor in developing countries — any solution that has potential to address an important development problem more effectively than existing approaches.

Projects: The GIF funds multiple projects that focus on innovative approaches to preparedness in the humanitarian sector. While their current portfolio does not include funding disaster preparedness projects per se, it does focus on innovative approaches to a wide range of humanitarian concerns. For example:

- Anti-Malaria Home-Proofing in Uganda to increase resilience to malaria, which involves modifying a traditional home redecoration custom by incorporating insecticide into the mud and other substances used on the exteriors of homes.
- To better prepare for the impact of seasonal changes on food production and hunger, Evidence Action’s No Lean Season in Indonesia offers subsidies to low-income agricultural workers as an incentive to migrate during the famine season to urban areas where higher wages can be earned.

Apply: The first step in applying to GIF required for all applicants is to submit an Initial Application. This includes a short online form and either a document (2–4 pages) OR a slide deck (8–12 slides e.g. in PowerPoint). Applicants are also welcome to submit a video (maximum 8 minutes) as an optional addition to the application. Applicants will hear 4–6 weeks of submitting the initial application as to whether they progress to the next stage.

3. Global Development Alliance (GDA)

Global Development Alliance’s focus is proactive engagement of the private sector for: problem identification, problem definition, and solution scoping and development, and solution implementation.

Eligibility: USAID seeks to foster a diverse array of results-focused, high impact Global Development Alliances (GDAs) – across a variety of regions, countries and technical sectors.

Mission: Designed to catalyse, facilitate, and support collaboration with the private sector, USAID’s call is an invitation to co-creation to the private sector and other organizations interested in working closely with the private sector to achieve significant and sustainable development results and impact. More information available at the following link: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/15396/GDA%20APS-APS-OAA-16-000001_2016.pdf

Projects: Engaging in this funding will involve finding a corporate partner which has the advantage of allowing for more innovative approaches. This programme has resulted in:

• Working to help the widespread adoption of higher yielding, climatetolerant rice in Bangladesh.
• Since 2001, USAID has formed more than 1500 GDAs with over 3,500 partner organisations, which have an estimated value of more than USD 20 billion in public and private funds.
• GDAs are composed of resource partners that fund projects (e.g. Microsoft, Pfizer, Barclays and the Rockefeller Foundation) and implementing partners that execute and monitor project activities (e.g. CARE, World Vision, etc.).34

Deadline: February 23, 2018

Apply: Please see more details online: https://www.usaid.gov/gda
If your organization wants to work with USAID and the private sector to jointly solve development challenges, start with these steps:

• Follow the guidance in the GDA Annual Program Statement,35 with particular focus on Sections I-IV for further information on GDAs and the alliance development process;
• Investigate USAID development objectives and priorities in the country or countries where alliance activities might be conducted;
• Identify and begin to engage prospective private sector partners to understand their interests and priorities and explore potential alliance ideas; and
• Connect the private sector partners with USAID as soon as possible.

If these steps identify one or more private sector partners committed to building an alliance with USAID, and lead to potentially promising alliance ideas, organizations can continue the co-creation process by submitting a concept paper under the GDA APS. Please see Sections V-VII of the GDA APS for further guidance.

34 Please find a concise summary at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Global-Development-Alliances.pdf
4. United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Private Capital and Microenterprise

USAID’s Development Office of Private Capital and Microenterprise is focused on the scaling of innovative, practical and cost-effective interventions to catalyse private investment in developing countries. USAID’s goal is to facilitate the research and development that will lead to innovative, and potentially commercially viable, solutions.

Eligibility: USAID is looking to include all types of organizations in this process – including additional donors, resource partners, and funded partners. These different roles may be filled by any organization that brings something of value to bear on the process, including public, private, for-profit, and non-profit organizations, as well as institutions of higher education, public international organizations, non-governmental organizations, multi-lateral and international donor organizations are eligible under this BAA/Addendum.

Projects: USAID’s previous private capital markets work focuses on fragile zones and on increasing resilience. Examples of this work includes:

• Providing technical assistance to mobilise public and private investment to improve urban water sanitation service delivery in multiple countries.

• Assisting cities in financing infrastructure projects that increase resilience to the impacts of climate change.

Deadline: November 23, 2017

Apply: Please see more information online, available here: [http://www.grants.gov/view-opportunity.html?oppId=280212](http://www.grants.gov/view-opportunity.html?oppId=280212)

5. Further opportunities to watch

The following opportunities do not currently have open grant cycles, but should stay on Action Aid’s radar as it considers its funding options:

• **Prudence Foundation**

  Prudence Foundation is the community investment arm of Prudential in Asia and is a registered charitable entity in Hong Kong. Its mission is to make a lasting contribution to Asian societies through sustainable initiatives focused on three key pillars: Children, Education and Disaster Preparedness and Recovery.

  Under each pillar, the Foundation runs regional flagship programmes as well as local programmes working in partnership with NGOs and governments. The Foundation claims to focus on providing "innovative, focused, and practical support" to people in Asia.

• **Japanese ODA**

  Most development assistance from Japan focuses on larger-scale infrastructure development and the associated technical assistance, but recent studies highlight the importance for Japan to increase engagement in fragile states.

  As with many bilateral donors, JICA’s aid tends to be monopolised by Japanese NGOs and, thus, partnering with a national organisation is critical to pursuing this funding. If ActionAid and its partners do not have an office in Japan, they might partner with a Japanese NGO to strengthen their application.

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36 More information available at: [www.prudencelfoundation.com](http://www.prudencelfoundation.com)

37 See, for example: [http://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/9.3.15%20Japan%20%20Fragile%20States%20UMMARY.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/9.3.15%20Japan%20%20Fragile%20States%20UMMARY.pdf)
6. Initial recommendations for funding strategy

In general, we would recommend taking the following steps to help improve funding opportunities for surge capacity:

- **Coordination is Key** – To improve the quality of proposals and enhance the success rate of donor funding, share technical expertise and programme experience, and cooperatively set donor strategies to maximise the quality and consistency of proposals.

- **Diversify Donor Base** – Make diversifying the number and types of donors supporting surge funding programming a priority and begin to explore hidden opportunities that may exist in the expanding private commercial sector.

- **Information gathering/updating** – As you explore various opportunities, country offices should subscribe to any newsletters to keep current on opportunities and donor-supported programming and strategies, and get early signals of emerging funding opportunities.

- **Learning** – One key to improving the quality of effective proposals is to institutionalise the best practice of collecting “lessons learned” after each bid submission to maintain institutional memory and increase the institutional competency involved with each donor’s management.

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36 Further information on JICA’s work on disaster relief: https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/disaster/activity.html
Part III – Annexes

Annex 1 – Surge Models

Surge Models

Across the agencies interviewed for this research, a combination of surge models are used, specifically a combination of primary and collaborative rosters at an international, regional and national level as well as standing teams. This brief overview provides an understanding of how different agencies plan for surge funding.

‘International’ or ‘Global’ Rosters and Standing Teams

A number of agencies within the start network run what would be described as an ‘International’ or ‘Global’ roster. Other agencies run standing teams that operate in the same global platform but with different staffing models. Examples of those from within the Start Network are displayed within the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>How deployments are made</th>
<th>Costs and staff development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ActionAid</td>
<td>Internal central roster named the Emergency Fast Action Support Team, positioned globally, and managed by the international secretariat.</td>
<td>Deployments are made globally, as close to the disaster location as possible. National, regional and ultimately international deployments depend on need.</td>
<td>Decisions on surge are cost conscious but ultimately driven by skills and therefore impact over cost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tearfund</td>
<td>UK managed Emergency Response Register operating at the International Level, roster members are 50% UK Based, 40% globally and 10% made up from regional rosters (mostly India and Nepal).</td>
<td>Deployments and decisions to surge are made through the emergency response committee where senior leaders and country managers convene to make decisions regarding surge.</td>
<td>UK managed roster with all costs, HR, Recruitment, Deployments, Finance and ToRs covered at the UK level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care International</td>
<td>A combined internal and external roster with over 300 staff positioned globally. (CI have a standing team RRT as primary response)</td>
<td>Of surge deployments 40% from RRT, 40% from Roster and 20% from elsewhere.</td>
<td>Primary emergency response comes from Care’s standing team “RRT” (see below) additional surge response comes from the Care International Roster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>Surge Pool</td>
<td>Christian Aid operates a Surge Pool of staff from across the organisation globally who are available to surge in response to changing humanitarian requirements. This is a move away from the previously held dedicated emergency officers deployed from headquarters.</td>
<td>Costs managed from across the global organisation, individuals that surge are charged back to requesting country office at 100% cost recovery rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Relief</td>
<td>Global Surge Roster consisting of 40 members from IRW HQ (UK) and across the countries Islamic Relief have offices in, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, Philippines, Indonesia, Mali, India, Niger, Palestine and South Africa, Kenya and Tunisia</td>
<td>Staff members are surged from their Geographic Location coordinated by IRW HQ in the UK.</td>
<td>Annual maintenance and training costs are met by the IRW HQ in the UK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Regional Collaborative Rosters

For this research, the example of a collaborative regional roster platform is the Go Team Asia roster coordinated by Plan International from Bangkok, a pilot project of the surge capacity project. The shared roster provides surge capacity to seven humanitarian INGOs (ActionAid, CARE, Christian Aid, Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid, Plan International and Save the Children) for disaster responses in ten countries in Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka). Skilled employees of the seven participating organisations make up the roster, all of whom will have been through the Go Team Asia surge training prior to deployment. Deployment from the roster is rapid (within 72 hours) and based on 4 to 12 week deployments.

### National Collaborative Rosters

The example of a national collaborative roster is the platform based in the Philippines coordinated by Christian Aid. This roster is the first of its kind and is being trialed and tested by the surge capacity project. The local roster is designed to assist NGOs based in the Philippines respond to humanitarian crisis with personnel who are based in the Philippines. The roster is aimed at building evidence of civil society surge capacity that is more collaborative, locally focused, and better engaged with other stakeholders. The roster mechanism has been developed to incorporate the following themes:

- Increasing the number of suitably trained, better prepared humanitarian personnel available at the national levels
- Better coordination and collaboration amongst NGOs
- Better engagement and collaboration with other actors

### Agency | Type | How deployments are made | Costs and staff development
---|---|---|---
**Standing Teams**

- **Care International**
  - Rapid Response Team (RRT) is the standing team of Care International
  - Managed by Care Canada but geographically globally located and deployed. There are 19 members (12 out of 19 employed by Care Canada) with a 50% Gender Balance.
  - The teamwork on a Home-Based model for cost efficiencies and work in areas such as training and advocacy outside of deployment; they are expected to be deployed 65% of the time. The members have a broad skill set (Team Leaders, WASH, Gender, Shelter, SRH, Food Security, Logistics, Cash and Markets, Proposal Writer) and are charged on a cost recoverable basis to national organisations.

- **Oxfam**
  - The Global Humanitarian Team is a standing team made up of approximately 80 Humanitarian Support Personnel
  - Deployed centrally from Oxfam International’s office.
  - The team is globally situated on the homebased model and have broad skill set including WASH, food security, vulnerable livelihoods and protection. The individuals are deployed 80 to 85% of the time; any remaining time is focused on ad hoc duties in areas such as training and advocacy. Members are charged on a cost recoverable basis to the requesting country office.

- **Save the Children**
  - Emergency Response Standing Team of 65 ERPs
  - The team are located globally and internationally mobile, their time 100% devoted to surge.
  - The team varies in size annually based on expected utilisation and individuals are deployed c. 200 days per year. The team is deployed across a variety of disasters at a range of stages from immediate response to the more preparedness based activities associated with the later stages of post disaster recovery. There are an additional 80 UK-based staff deployable for 1-6 months as part of their job description.
Annex 2 – Costs

Costs
In order to draw comparisons across surge models, it is important to define what costs are to be included. Given that every agency is likely to have variances in the costs they include, this classification of costs has been drawn after receiving the data from the agencies. Including those costs that are most frequently or always included and removing costs that only come up within a single model. Whilst this excludes a potentially deeper analysis in some respects, it also creates a comparable set of data from which to extract conclusions. The costs have been broken down into multiple areas, each one detailed below.

Set up Costs
This research, where possible, aims to identify the costs of setting up a surge model to include these costs in the overall cost of the model. Given that the surge models of most organisations are well established, these costs may be only obtainable for the newer regional or national platforms.

The costs included for review are:
• Initial Set Up Costs – Strategic Review etc.
• Salary (or Salaries) of Roster Coordinator(s)
• Set up of Roster Technology
• Annual Technology Charge
• Training of Roster Members
• Simulation and Testing

Maintenance Costs
The maintenance of a surge model is recorded as the annual cost for maintaining the readiness and preparedness of each particular model. The annual cost arguably would have to be met irrespective of if the roster members or standing teams were deployed and costs could be recouped.

Understanding the annual cost of maintaining a particular model can have two significant benefits: firstly, efficiencies can be observed through understanding costs and, secondly, funding can be sought more readily if absolute costs are defined. The aim of this research is to, first, understand what costs go into the annual maintenance costs of each particular model and then explain what is produced in 4S terms of surge from that cost base. There was an understanding that wider managerial costs are ideally to be included in the annual maintenance costs, but there is currently lack of data with regards to this.

The costs included for review are:
• Salaries of Roster Coordinator(s)
• Annual Technology Charge
• Training of Roster Members
Daily Charge-out Rates

When seeking to compare cost effectiveness across surge models, it is important to ascertain which costs are included in daily charge-out rates. The charge-out rate is the rate charged for deployed members of staff to allow the agency to recover costs. After collecting the cost data from six agencies, this research established the following cost formula to be compared throughout this research. Given the variety of agencies and models involved, the most frequently charged items have been included with some less frequently charged costs removed for comparability purposes.

Across the range of agencies interviewed, there are a number who are working on apportioning managerial and administrative costs to the daily charge-out rate. The desired outcome is a more ‘real’ cost of surge to be understood rather than a purely functional one. Given that these developments are in the early stages and only two agencies were currently moving in this direction, the research focuses on the below formula. It is important to note that within this formula there are likely to be significant differences across all costs. Different agencies, models, geographical location of deployee, skill or experience level of deployee as well as deployee nationality can influence costs. These differences will be analysed on the provision of total surge cost documents by agencies.

The formula that incorporates the majority of costs included in chargeback rates is as follows:

**Salary**
- salary + benefits / workable days

**Other costs to be recovered from receiving country local office:**
- All travel costs including airfares, visas, vaccinations, transfers, etc.
- Accommodation costs (normally paid directly by the country office)
- Per diem (at a rate set by the agency country office)
- Local R&R expenses as per policy and where applicable
- All communication expenses

Cost of Surge

This research aims to understand the true full cost of surge by analysing full cost documents for particular surge deployments. This exercise would allow costs for deployees to be understood in the context of their skill, level and location in addition to the associated costs such as transport, visas and the operational model costs. The ideal scenario would look at agency responses to the same disaster to explore costs of response from different models and different locations. The aim was to cover direct and apportioned expenses of rosters and standing teams. The costing was not to include the costs of emergency materials provided, as this would make the scope of the analysis too wide for this research.

The requested data was for the surge in Haiti for Hurricane Matthew, in which all participating agencies enacted surge funding, according to the interviews.
Annex 3 – Procurement

Procurement Costs

Within the research the subject of procurement of equipment and vital resources were frequently brought up. The issue is obviously of importance but, given the scope of the research, only a small section will be dedicated to procurement. In humanitarian relief operations, the primary emphasis in procurement is on speed and access. In order to save lives, this means delivering the goods to affected areas as quickly as possible.

Stockpiling vs. Local Procurement

As part of discussions of cost effectiveness, the interviewees frequently raised the point of a tradeoff between local procurement and purchasing from a stockpile of goods at geographically strategic locations. Some agencies felt that the pressure to use humanitarian stockpiles drove costs higher and felt that they could have been more effective purchasing things locally. Other agencies, however, experienced a post disaster spike in prices when purchasing locally, which they felt pushed the costs higher than purchasing from a stockpile. One agency concluded that some form of price pre-agreement mechanism for local procurement could help reduce costs and increase effectiveness.

Local Procurement

Issues in local procurement centre around two key areas: firstly, the availability of certain types of goods and, secondly, the rapid price rises experienced post disaster. From a broad perspective, local procurement is identified as strategically important because of its developmental benefits: it strengthens the local private sector, increases the skills and expertise of people and encourages regional trade. It is also often the case that purchasing in country, where available, reduces the associated logistics costs. Where items are not available, then the option to purchase from stockpiles is presented as the ideal solution but in the long term through engaging with local industries such products could eventually be procured locally.

The other challenge of local procurement is the rapid increase in costs post disaster, often due to increased demand for a finite supply. Identifying local actors in advance and pre-agreeing prices to be paid in the event of an emergency is one approach but given the nature of disasters and the uncertain demand this may be difficult to agree.

Stockpiling

From wider research, it is broadly accepted that for certain non-perishable items, stockpiling is critical in providing timely and cost effective response to disasters. Trading off speed of access with logistical costs was seen as necessary, response times were critical irrespective of potential cost impact.

The costs of the goods themselves can be significantly reduced due to the ability of larger agencies involved in stockpiling building long-term supplier relationships. The main cost issue is in regards to: transport arrangements, charter costs and aircraft availability can raise costs significantly and delay deliveries. Globally pre-positioned stocks and an infrastructure network can rapidly increase the speed of delivery of urgent supplies, strategically identified locations near to disaster prone areas can also reduce logistics costs. Collaborative or collective procurement centres such as Oxfam’s Humanitarian Procurement Centre in Bicester present cost effective access to commodities required. The economies of scale produce lower costs and the single source saves time in procurement operations meaning that for certain commodities it represents the most cost effective method.

This area of procurement requires further investigation to fully understand to what extent the use of both stockpiles and local procurement represent a cost-effective methodology. It is clear that ground level assessments of needs through local connectivity is the best way of determining what commodities are required. The availability, cost and speed decisions after establishing this procedure are best decided by the individual agency.
Annex 4 – Template for Reporting Surge Costs

**Set up costs**
The costs associated with setting up a surge model

- Salary of Roster Coordinator(s), Managers, Administrative Staff
- Setup of roster technology
- Roster promotion costs
- Training of roster members
- Roster simulation costs
- Any associated costs such as meetings

**Annual Maintenance Costs**
Annual costs of running the agencies surge model

- Salaries of Coordinators, Managerial or Administrative Staff
- Maintenance of roster technology
- Annual training of roster members
- Recruitment Costs
- Any other recurring annual costs

**Cost of a Particular Surge (Hurricane Matthew, South Sudan are two examples provided)**
All costs apportioned to an individual who surges

- Flight costs (outbound and return)
- Visa costs
- Taxi to airport (if needed)
- Salary costs (grade and job title included is useful)
- Travel, medical and life insurance cover
- Accommodation in country (if applicable)
- Travel in-country
- Rest and recuperation leave
- Any per diems or other allowances
- Emergency travel cash
Annex 5 – Surge Cost Details

Note: All amounts below quoted in US$ were converted in the main report to £ at a rate of US$1.3 to £1 for ease of comparison.

INGO 1

South Sudan

Details of numbers of persons sent
• 1 team member sent from UK to South Sudan

Roles and grades
• Emergency Response Officer – Monthly Salary £3577

Total cost for each member of staff deployed
1-month deployment
• Flights: £799
• Salary for Period: £3577
• Accommodation: £0 – In existing office space
• Visa: £50
• Insurance: £62
• Other Costs: £193

INGO 2

Haiti

Details of numbers of persons sent
• 2 members of staff from HQ (London) deployed to Haiti (based in Port Au Prince)

Roles and grades
• Senior Humanitarian Advisor (2 months: salary cost for deployment £7,140
• Humanitarian Programme Support Officer (1 month: salary cost for deployment £2,509)

Total cost for each member of staff deployed
HPSO (1-month deployment): approx. £3,800 (vaccinations, flights, visa, accommodation, food other associated costs in-country)
• Flights: £689
• Accommodation: £2,250
• Other expenses (vaccinations, food, field trips, travel in country etc.): £661

SHA (2-month deployment): approx. £7,300 (vaccinations, flights, visa, accommodation, food other associated costs in-country)
• Flights: £759
• Accommodation: £4,600
• Other expenses (vaccinations, food, field trips, travel in country etc.): £1,900
INGO 3
Haiti

Details of numbers of persons sent
• 1 team member sent from UK to Haiti

Roles and grades
• Annual Salary £34,000 + 2.1% additions

Total cost for each member of staff deployed
19-day deployment
• Flights: £736.15
• Salary for Period: £2537
• Accommodation: £384 ($500)
• Visa: £10.70 ($14)
• Interhealth Medical Clearance: £87

South Sudan

Details of numbers of persons sent
• 1 team member sent from UK to Haiti

Roles and grades
• Annual Salary £24,500 + 2.1% additions

Total cost for each member of staff deployed
16-day deployment
• Flights: £834.87
• Salary for Period: £1540
• Accommodation: Staff house in South Sudan with Spare Room – No cost
• Visa: £50
• Interhealth Medical Clearance: £66

INGO 4
Haiti

Details of numbers of persons sent
• 2 team members sent from HQ

Roles and grades
• Communications Manager
• Accountability Expert
**Total cost for each member of staff deployed**

5-week deployment – each staff member with identical costs

- Net monthly salary approximately £2383 for the 5-week deployment.
- EFAST stipend of £400 per month so £500 for the 5 weeks roughly
- Flight approx. £1365
- Visa £50
- Accommodation total: £895 (1790/2)
- Expenses: £815 (1631/2)
- Face to face Pre-Assignment Medical – £265
- Psychological Clearance – £166
- Resilience Risk Assessment (RRA) – £153

**INGO 5**

**Average cost of deployment based on multiple previous deployments.**

**Total cost for each staff member deployed**

1-month average deployment

- Flight costs (outbound and return): £850
- Visa costs: £50
- Taxi to and from airport: £50
- Salary costs: £2500
- Travel, medical and life insurance cover: £225
- Accommodation in country: £50 per day
- Travel in-country: £200
- Any per diems or other allowances: £840 for one calendar month surge
- Emergency travel cash £300

**Go Team Asia**

**India**

**Details of numbers of persons sent**

- 1 team member deployed from Nepal to India

**Roles and Grades**

- Senior Logistics Manager

**Total cost for each staff member deployed**

1-month deployment

- Salary and Benefits: £1400
- Allowances: £210
- Flights and Transport: £258
- Accommodation and Meals: £1200
Indonesia

Details of numbers of persons sent

• 1 team member deployed from India to Indonesia

Roles and Grades

• Mid-Level Programme Performance Advisor

Total cost for each staff member deployed

1-month deployment

• Salary and Benefits: £1637
• Allowances: £245
• Flights and Transport: £940
• Accommodation and Meals: £2200

Indonesia

Details of numbers of persons sent

• 1 team member deployed from Nepal to Indonesia

Roles and Grades

• Mid-Level Emergency Programme Officer

Total cost for each staff member deployed

1-month deployment

• Salary and Benefits: £851
• Allowances: £127
• Flights and Transport: £860
• Accommodation and Meals: £960

On Call Philippines

Philippines

Details of numbers of persons sent

• 1 team member deployed within the Philippines

Roles and Grades

• Response Manager

Total cost for each staff member deployed

3-month deployment

• Salary: £3750
• Transport: £133
• Accommodation: £2066
• Medical Insurance: £190
• Communication Allowance: £100
Annex 6 – Understanding Costs and Further Research

In the course of undertaking the research, it became clear that there are a number of avenues that would help lay the foundation for future research into cost effectiveness within Surge and the Start Network. These avenues of research would enable clearer and more conclusive results when it comes to cost effectiveness and financial sustainability.

Understanding Costs

Throughout this research there have been many indications that costs for surge responses are held across many departments and often difficult to obtain. A key finding is that a template for reporting such surge costs is not available and, thus, providing a standardised template for reporting these costs would likely be useful for future research and the work of the surge teams. The research proposes the following standard reporting mechanism to be maintained on a surge-by-surge basis to enable easier and immediate access to costs for a multitude of purposes. This simple spreadsheet is an example of something that agencies could record with relative ease to better understand their costs and cost recovery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surge Detail</th>
<th>Name:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grade:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location of Base:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location of Surge:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duration:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary and Allowances</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flights and Transport Costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Country Expenses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Expenses Please list</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                  | £                                      |
| Costs Recovered        |                                        |
| Credit or Deficit      |                                        |
Avenues for Future Research

Throughout this research, avenues for future research around the subjects of cost effectiveness and financial sustainability presented themselves. This section gives a brief outline and explanation of the critical areas for future research if the concept of cost effectiveness particularly is to be understood.
Effectiveness Metrics
As explained, this research used subjective understandings to define effectiveness and combined that with associated costs. The main reason for this was the lack of recorded outcomes when it came to looking at effectiveness of surge. There was no accepted definition of effectiveness and there were no measures in place to define whether or not a surge had been effective. Creating a metric that measures effectiveness in surge would be a step forward in a greater understanding the concept of cost effectiveness. If there was a given metric by which individuals performances or surge outcomes could be benchmarked, then when compared against costs would actually represent cost effectiveness more accurately. The same process could be applied to the analysis of the training programmes across the network.

Comparable roles defined across agencies
One of the greatest challenges of this research was achieving comparable data between agencies and platforms. Data was provided by the agencies on an ad hoc basis, covering many roles and grades across many agencies and platforms. There is no access to a template or benchmark, which allows an understanding what a particular role or grade, is in one agency compared to another. To avoid the mistake of not making fair comparisons, this research has clearly stated that the costs are just as a demonstration not as a true comparison (in the sense of being a comparison of ‘apples to apples’). All the available data for roles and grades can be found in the footnotes and annexes. If there was to be a true reflection of cost effectiveness, unified data on roles and grades could be combined with the effectiveness metrics to demonstrate cost effectiveness in a more comprehensive way.

Recording of costs
Overall, this research has found the biggest challenge to be the obtaining of any data at all on the costs of surge. Using the template provided in above as a start, agencies should become more aware of the costs of surge, as this will assist in developing deeper understanding about cost effectiveness and financial sustainability. It would also enable a deeper and quicker analysis of costs from which to base further interviews to explore them more deeply.

Organisational Impact Understanding
It was the opinion of a number of agencies that the true understanding of cost effectiveness could not be obtained unless there was an awareness in terms of costs of what the deployed individual contributed in the role which they left in order to surge. Surging from rosters was explained in some cases to leave gaps in the organisation that need to be truly understood in terms of cost implications before cost effectiveness is concluded. It is only considering these potential gaps that certain agencies believe will produce an accurate view of cost effectiveness.

Total Cost of Model Maintenance
The final aspect to consider in a more complete review of cost effectiveness is the total cost across the Start Network of maintaining surge models. Given the limitations of this research and the response rate with regards data, it was difficult to establish the total cost to the Start Network members of maintaining their global or international level surge along with any independent regional or national rosters. If this was understood, it might provide a better insight as to the cost savings of membership of regional and national collaborative rosters. Only by understanding the full cost of surge response will an understanding of where cost effective alternatives might suit different agencies be developed.
Annex 7 – Contributors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ActionAid</td>
<td>Catherine Kenyon</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Claire Bleasdale</td>
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<td>Francisco Yermo</td>
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<td>Sonya Ruparel</td>
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<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Alex Brans</td>
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<td>Julia Warrington</td>
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<td>Mat Conway</td>
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<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>Becky Mallows</td>
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<td>Cyra Bullecere</td>
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<td>Niall O’Rouke</td>
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<td>Maria Pura</td>
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<td>Care International</td>
<td>Greg Jack</td>
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<td>Kathleen O’Brien</td>
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<td>Plan International</td>
<td>Hamad Latif</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lisa Joerke</td>
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<td>Tear Fund</td>
<td>Clare Third</td>
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<td>CAFOD</td>
<td>Laura Purves</td>
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<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Martin Blansjaar</td>
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<td>Islamic Relief</td>
<td>Saba Mahmood</td>
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<td>Independent Consultants</td>
<td>Glenn O’Neil</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jeremy Loveless</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jo de Serrano</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Judith Selman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex 8 – Author Profiles

**Joseph Nelson** is a PhD candidate at the University of Bristol, Department of International Studies. He is currently researching the financial and human impacts of microfinance on beneficiaries. Joseph works concurrently as a consultant to a number of international finance and investment firms. He holds a BA (Hons) in Business Studies and an MSc in International Relations with specialism in the relationship between the Private Sector and Development. He also holds a PGDip in Research Methods and a number of professional qualifications from the London Institute of Banking and Finance. Before his return to academia, Joseph worked for five years in Corporate Finance at a global bank and for a number of years as consultant in the field of development based in the Middle East.

**Alexandra Yannias-Walker** is an experienced researcher, with specific expertise in humanitarian organisations and funding systems. She holds a PhD from Oxford University, where she studied evaluation in international development organisations and taught courses on international development and economics. She has demonstrated her research skills in diverse environments, including her work on President Obama’s 2012 campaign where she designed and facilitated national focus groups and surveys. She currently manages the technical advisory programme at MzN International.