

# **AT THE BORDERS OF AID**

Development  
Cooperation and the  
Externalisation of EU  
and Italian Migration  
Policies

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the past two decades and particularly since 2015, the relationship between migration and development cooperation has undergone considerable transformation. Development cooperation and Official Development Assistance (ODA) have increasingly been incorporated into the external dimension of EU and national migration policies, supporting both development and migration control objectives. This has raised concerns both about the diversion of ODA and the progressive reorientation of development objectives towards migration deterrence.

ODA has increasingly been used to finance interventions explicitly aimed at managing and controlling migration, such as border management and return programmes, where the risks of diversion are more evident. However, migration-deterrence lenses have also contributed to the gradual reorientation of programmes traditionally focused on development towards objectives of containing mobility. A key example of this is the so-called *root causes* approach, which frames legitimate development objectives of addressing poverty, unemployment, vulnerability and lack of opportunities as means of preventing migration. This can influence resource allocation, the selection of geographical areas and beneficiaries, the choice of partners, and the definition of expected results, bringing development cooperation progressively closer to migration policy and security objectives. In the protection and forced displacement sector, interventions are generally consistent with ODA objectives and respond to concrete needs. However, some interventions are also embedded in a deterrence logic, when assistance is part of programmes aimed at border control or containment of mobility.

In light of these transformations, the report analyses EU and Italian migration cooperation programmes financed since 2020 with resources recorded as ODA. Geographically, the report focuses on North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa as key regions of interest for both the EU and Italian external action on migration. At the EU level, the report examines the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) instrument, the main instrument covering EU external action and development cooperation in the current budget period. At the Italian level, the report covers all the national funding instruments which support migration-related activities in the external dimension, namely: the Migration Fund and the Incentive Fund for Return Policies (managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation); Chapter 2371 of the Ministry of the Interior's budget; and the Bilateral Support to Libya (managed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance). All these instruments are eligible, in whole or in part, for reporting as ODA.

The report provides a quantitative overview of budget allocations across the different instruments, distinguishing among intervention types, their geographical distribution, and their evolution over time. It then provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of a sample of projects, with key insights into the objectives, theories of change, activities, beneficiaries, and geographical focus of the main categories of intervention funded: border management, return and reintegration, protection, and root causes.

**The key questions guiding the analysis are twofold: whether the projects analysed raise concerns about ODA compliance; and whether substantive diversion of aid may occur even when expenditure is formally eligible as ODA. This assessment uses two analytical frameworks: the OECD-DAC guidelines to assess the ODA eligibility of migration actions, and Policy Coherence for Development to identify broader tensions between development objectives and migration-control priorities.**

## KEY FINDINGS

### The numbers – European Union

- » From 2021 to 2025, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region that has received most of the NDICI-GE funding from the migration and forced displacement target, with €2,8 billion allocated so far. Other regions that received the most funding are the Western Balkans and Türkiye, which received €2,7 billion; North Africa, with €1,58 billion; and the Middle East, with €1,51 billion.
- » Globally, the category of intervention that has received most of the NDICI-GE funding from the migration and forced displacement target is *Protection* (€3,8 billion), followed by *Forced Displacement* and *Migration and Border Management*, which each received €1,9 billion. *Return and Reintegration* ranks fourth at €1,1 billion, followed by *Root Causes* (€281 million), *Legal Migration and Labour Mobility* (€205 million), and other minor categories.
- » Protection ranks first globally largely because of big protection programmes in Türkiye, which alone contribute to boosting the overall budget going to protection. However, the ranking of intervention categories can vary considerably across regions: in North Africa, border management alone received 51% of the funding, followed by protection, return and reintegration, and legal migration and labour mobility. In Sub-Saharan Africa, forced displacement received 48% of the funding, followed by return and reintegration, migration and border management, root causes, legal migration and labour mobility, and other minor categories.

### The numbers – Italy

- » Italian funding is strongly concentrated in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2020 and 2025, the Migration Fund allocated around €242 million to third countries, with Libya receiving €78 million – about one-third of the total – and the five main recipient countries absorbing more than 60%. The Incentive Fund for Return Policies allocated approximately €87 million, of which €67 million, or over 70%, went to Tunisia.
- » *Protection* is the largest category across the two funds, but their profiles differ substantially. In the Migration Fund, protection accounts for 56% of spending, approximately €136 million. In the Incentive Fund, by contrast, more than 62% – around €54 million – is allocated to border control. This concentration makes border control the Fund's main operational function, despite its broader formal focus on return cooperation.
- » Chapter 2371 of the Ministry of the Interior is smaller in overall scale but remains relevant: between 2019 and 2024, it financed 46 projects for approximately €59 million. Through calls for proposals addressed to NGOs and local authorities, direct awards to IOM and contributions to European programmes, it mainly supports interventions on root causes and information campaigns, extending migration-related action into areas traditionally associated with development cooperation.

### Diversion of ODA and policy incoherence

- » **The most critical cases of ODA diversion concern border management, return and reintegration interventions.** Both EU and Italian interventions in these areas show a consistent pattern of prioritising donors' interests in preventing arrivals, conducting interceptions, and enforcing return operations along key migratory routes to Europe, at the expense of development needs and priorities of partner countries.

- In border management programmes, ODA diversion manifests itself already from the OECD-DAC framework, as all the projects analysed deviate from agreed principles and criteria despite all being reported as ODA-eligible. Their rationale is one of control and interception, which – while often misusing Search and Rescue language – clearly shows that the primary purpose is not to promote local development.
  - In return and reintegration programmes, ODA diversion manifests itself when considering the overall logic and strategies that the interventions respond to. Although individual activities may align with the OECD-DAC framework, they remain embedded in a deterrence logic in which so-called ‘voluntary’ return is the only option available in countries along key migratory routes and can also serve to prevent arrivals in Europe.
- » **The EU and Italian protection and forced displacement programmes analysed are overall aligned with ODA criteria and development priorities.** They respond to the needs of displaced populations and host communities, particularly in contexts affected by protracted displacement, conflict and severe humanitarian needs, where support for reception systems, access to services and durable solutions remain essential components of development cooperation. **However, policy incoherence can occur when protection programmes are inserted into a broader deterrence framework, especially in North Africa.** In contexts where these objectives overlap, protection interventions may have to mitigate the impact of deterrence (for instance, by providing assistance after interceptions at sea) and are increasingly mobilised in relation to migration-control objectives.
- » Root causes interventions are more complex. Over the years, and especially since 2015, standard development work on employment, training, basic services, livelihoods, and resilience has been framed as contributing to reducing so-called irregular departures. However, **if the root causes concept has been highly effective politically, its operational translation remains weak:**
- At the EU level, the European Commission developed the most concrete efforts to operationalise this concept through a specific category of intervention included in the migration and forced displacement target of NDICI-GE. However, significant discretion remains in how this category is used and defined. Root causes interventions account for a small share of the NDICI-GE target (roughly 4%) and are concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Overall, individual activities align with the OECD-DAC framework, yet underlying tension persists, as these interventions are still designed and framed by their contribution to reducing departures.
  - At the Italian level, there is more fragmentation across different legal and strategic frameworks that involve both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation and the Ministry of Interior. This fragmentation translates the migration-development nexus and the approach to root causes differently across specific project interventions.
  - The RELINT call for proposals, financed by the Ministry of the Interior, is a key example of how this approach has been operationalised. The call for proposals has a dual objective: addressing root causes and reducing arrivals to Italy. The project proposals analysed show that root cause logic is integrated more at the narrative level than at the operational level, due to the framework imposed by the call itself. However, its political significance remains important, as development interventions are situated within a framework in which the expected goal is preventing arrivals.
  - Overall, in all the projects and instruments analysed, **the main impacts of the root causes approach are seen in the selection of territories, beneficiaries, activities, or indicators, which is primarily driven or justified by the objective of reducing departures rather than by the development priorities of partner countries.**

## Incentives and conditionality

- » At the EU and Italian levels, incentives and different forms of conditionality have linked, over time, the delivery of development aid with countries' performance on migration management and return cooperation. Conditionality can take explicit forms through requirements formally attached to funding disbursements, or operate more indirectly.
- » At the Italian level, the main example of conditionality is the Incentive Fund for Return Policies, which should work as a reward budget instrument for countries that cooperate on returns and readmissions. However, the Fund's operationalisation shows a broader scope, financing interventions aimed at institutional capacity-building, border management, protection, assisted voluntary return, and reintegration.
- » At the EU level, conditionality has been operationalised in NDICI-GE through the so-called *flexible incitative approach*, which links additional funding to partner countries' cooperation on migration, following a 'more for more' logic. The implementation of this approach shows that:
  - It has been implemented differently across regions: in Sub-Saharan Africa through the €600 million Flexible Mechanism; in North Africa, flexibility is used to adjust regional funding annually among countries based on progress and cooperation, although the amounts involved are relatively limited.
  - The political nature of the *flexible incitative* approach raises concerns about ODA eligibility. While dialogue and cooperation on migration can be ODA-eligible, funding that is conditional on achieving donor-defined migration outcomes may not qualify as ODA. This makes the *flexible incitative approach* a grey area that requires assessment based on the nature and objectives of the individual activities funded.
- » Finally, the issue of conditionality is becoming increasingly relevant in the negotiations on the next Global Europe Instrument, part of the next EU long-term budget. The current proposal under negotiation introduces the possibility of suspending funding to countries that do not cooperate on readmissions. This new form of negative conditionality would clearly depart from ODA principles by directly linking development funding to EU migration objectives, further diverting aid from development to deterrence.

These findings also point to a governance problem in the EU and Italian external migration action. Funding decisions are still made and implemented without adequate safeguards to assess risks in advance, monitor their effects or establish responsibility for violations and unintended consequences. Future EU instruments should therefore require systematic human rights and development risk assessments, transparent reporting, ongoing monitoring and clear procedures for corrective action or suspension. The same framework should apply in Italy to funding, equipment and training provided to third-country authorities. Parliamentary scrutiny must take place before high-risk measures are approved or resources are reallocated, rather than after their effects have already occurred. These safeguards are also necessary to prevent development cooperation from being linked to donor-defined migration outcomes without adequate public and democratic control.

**Finally, the paper calls for a fundamental rethinking of the migration–development nexus within external funding instruments, with a view to strengthening a genuinely development-oriented external migration policy. Development cooperation will remain a structural component of external migration action, given the close interlinkages between mobility and development and the role of cooperation in engaging with partner countries on the conditions and consequences of mobility. However, development cooperation should not be instrumentalised to achieve**

migration-management objectives, such as reducing departures or securing returns, at the expense of development priorities. Instead, external migration action should be anchored in partner countries' priorities and development strategies and guided by the principle of Policy Coherence for Development. This requires a shift in perspective and practice: starting from the realities and priorities of countries of origin and transit, and meaningfully involving local actors in defining problems, setting priorities, allocating resources and assessing results. Only then can mobility be recognised in its possible contributions to development, while cooperation can support people's ability to choose whether to stay or to migrate.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### COMPLIANCE WITH ODA RULES

The analysis of EU and Italian migration programmes in the external dimension revealed a pattern of deviation from ODA principles and rules, despite classifying individual projects and/or funding instruments as ODA-eligible, in whole or in part. To ensure better compliance and respect for ODA boundaries, as well as appropriate reporting:

#### The European Commission and the Italian Government should:

- » Ensure that external migration programming truly aligns with the promotion of economic development and welfare of a developing country, as enshrined in the EU Treaties and OECD guidelines.
- » More accurately follow and respect the boundaries of ODA eligibility agreed upon by DAC members in the OECD guidelines adopted in 2022, which define six principles and eight criteria for ODA eligibility of migration actions. This could be improved, particularly by:
  - Being explicit in the *primary goal* of activities funded, as this is key to determining ODA eligibility. Activities whose primary goal is to curb migratory flows and reduce arrivals to Europe are non-ODA-eligible, as they respond to donors' interests rather than partner countries' development priorities.
  - Respect the boundaries identified in Criterion 4 of the OECD guidelines concerning ODA eligibility of border management and addressing so-called irregular migration. In particular, Search and Rescue activities are ODA-eligible only if rescue is the primary goal and the costs are additional to the regular running costs of Coast Guard operations. Actions aimed at building infrastructure for systematic interception, surveillance, and border patrol are not eligible.
  - Respect the boundaries identified in Criterion 5 of the OECD guidelines concerning ODA eligibility of return operations and Criterion 3 for projects that are supposed to respond to mutual benefits of the donor and partner countries.
- » Adapt or suspend non-ODA-eligible actions to ensure their ODA eligibility in future programming. Particular attention should be given to border management and return programming as key intervention categories where the primary goal often diverts from promoting local development.
- » Work with partner-country governments, local civil society organisations, and other local stakeholders to design migration and forced displacement programmes that are aligned with local needs and priorities, and foster country ownership – also by conducting extensive consultations at the local level with a variety of stakeholders including local civil society.

### **In particular, the European Commission should:**

- » More carefully assess the percentage of ODA eligibility assigned to actions in the areas of border management and return, where deviation from ODA boundaries is higher, but actions tend to be tagged as 100% ODA-eligible.
- » For those actions where ODA eligibility is lower than 100%, clarify which activities and objectives are counted as ODA-eligible and which aren't.
- » Apply the principles and criteria identified in the 2022 OECD guidelines comprehensively, across categories of interventions and respective DAC codes. In particular, border management actions tagged under code 15210 - *Security System Management and Reform* (rather than the more commonly used 15190 - *Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility*) still need to comply with the overall principle of promoting economic development and the welfare of a developing country to qualify as ODA.

### **In particular, the Italian Government should:**

- » Apply at project level the same ODA-eligibility approach recommended for EU actions: indicate the percentage of each project that qualifies as ODA, specify the activities and objectives included in that share, and report the relevant DAC codes, applying the 2022 OECD-DAC criteria consistently across intervention categories, including border-management projects coded 15210.

## **AID CONDITIONALITY LINKED TO MIGRATION COOPERATION**

European and Italian funding instruments have integrated forms of conditionality in various ways. So far, incentives and reward mechanisms (also called 'positive' conditionality or 'more for more' approach) are prevalent, especially at the EU level in the NDICI-GE Instrument and at the Italian level in the Incentive Fund for Return Policies. However, discussion of stricter forms of conditionality, including aid suspension, linked to migration and return cooperation is becoming central to the negotiations on the next EU long-term budget. To ensure policy coherence and adherence to development objectives:

### **The European Commission and the Italian Government should:**

- » Reject forms of conditionality that link the delivery of aid to partner countries' performance on migration and return policies. Such forms of conditionality (known as negative conditionality) fully deviate from ODA rules and the objectives of development cooperation. They impose an external agenda on migration and return to access resources meant for economic development and welfare and show policy incoherence in the EU's and Italy's external action on development and migration. Lastly, they risk harming local communities and populations by cutting crucial programmes and assistance.
- » Where forms of incentives and 'more for more' approaches are implemented, ensure that the projects funded are aligned with partner countries' local needs and priorities, for instance in the areas of protection, forced displacement response, legal pathways and labour mobility or, more broadly, development programmes that encompass migrants, refugees and IDPs. Instead, if these approaches impose a donor-driven agenda on migration, they are beyond the scope of ODA.
- » Align to the boundaries established by Criterion 2 of the OECD guidelines concerning conditionality, which clarifies that development cooperation programmes can be part of a broader policy dialogue with the partner country, but an activity is not reportable as ODA if the delivery of funds is subject to specific conditions and migration outcomes. This could be improved particularly by:

- Proactively describing the characteristics of the aid, including any forms of conditionality, linked to the individual programmes or the funding instruments they are part of, in the descriptions of projects and reporting to the OECD.

**In particular, the European Commission should:**

- » Conduct a public evaluation of the *flexible incitative approach* to assess its functioning, added value, results and perception from partner countries.
- » Use the *flexible incitative approach* to finance actions that are fully aligned with development objectives, partner countries' priorities and ODA rules. In particular, actions in the areas of protection, forced displacement response, legal pathways and labour mobility are generally aligned with development objectives and are ODA-eligible.

**Finally, the European Commission, European Council and European Parliament, in the ongoing negotiations on the next Global Europe Regulation should:**

- Reject Article 12(3-5), which allows for the possibility to suspend funding or the implementation of programmes if a partner country is deemed uncooperative on return and readmissions. This article explicitly contradicts Criterion 2 of the OECD guidelines and clearly illustrates policy incoherence between the EU's external action on migration and its development cooperation. Beyond harming the EU's reputation as a donor and partner, such negative conditionality could also severely affect local development programmes and the communities affected by their suspension.

## **EXPANDING MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING AWAY FROM DETERRANCE**

The migration-development nexus has been operationalised through an extremely narrow form of programming, namely the *root causes* approach. Alongside this, key categories of EU and Italian funding support areas of intervention such as border management and returns, where development assistance is used to deter migration and prevent arrivals. In future programming and funding instruments:

**The European Commission and the Italian Government should:**

- » Prioritise funding allocations to areas of intervention that reflect partner countries' development needs and priorities and are aligned with development objectives and ODA rules.
- » Areas of programming that should be expanded are:
  - **Legal pathways**, such as resettlement, family reunification, humanitarian corridors and other protection schemes. At both the EU and Italian level, these constitute a minimal part of the funding. However, these programmes are essential to ensure access to safe and legal mobility, prevent violations and deaths along migratory routes, and reduce reliance on smuggling networks.
  - **Educational and labour mobility schemes**. While these are essential for harnessing the positive potential of mobility for local development and skills transfer, they remain highly selective and largely underfunded at both the EU and Italian levels.
  - **Engagement of diasporas and transfers of remittances**. Such programmes can facilitate

the transfer of resources, knowledge and skills and contribute to local development of countries of origin, yet they remain underfunded.

- » Areas of programming that should be maintained and strengthened are:
  - **Development-oriented solutions for migrants, forcibly displaced persons, IDPs and their host communities**, including through socio-economic inclusion, access to the labour market, decent jobs, education and services, to promote the dignity, resilience and self-reliance of displaced persons – beyond the *root causes* logic. Such programmes should be strengthened for their developmental potential, not the potential to reduce arrivals to Europe.
  - **Protection and forced displacement programmes**, as they address crucial needs of refugees, IDPs, forcibly displaced people and host communities. These interventions foster protection, social cohesion, local integration, and durable solutions, and will remain essential in the short, medium, and long term.
  - At the same time, protection interventions should remain genuinely anchored in local needs of communities and not used to either correct the negative impact of migration deterrence programmes such as in the area of border management, or create presumptions of safety used to outsource asylum and international protection.

## HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE

The question of human rights due diligence in funding for external migration programming can no longer be postponed. As evidence of human rights violations – especially in the context of border management programmes – has increased over the years, future programmes and funding instruments should centre on a human rights-based approach and do-no-harm principle.

### In particular, the European Commission should:

- » Implement the recommendations coming from the European Court of Auditors' Special Report 17/2024 and publicly report on new procedures developed to meet these recommendations.
- » Conduct systematic *ex-ante* human rights impact assessment and gender analysis to inform the design of programmes and relevant mitigating measures.
- » Conduct systematic human rights monitoring during projects' implementation and put in place mitigating measures – including suspension of programmes and/or future funding – should violations in the context of an EU-funded project be confirmed.
- » Publicly disclose if new procedures for reporting and following up human rights allegations were developed after the Court of Auditors' recommendations, and if so, what they entail. In particular, information remains missing on:
  - how external actors, including local CSOs, can safely report alleged violations and be informed of the steps the Commission takes after such abuses are reported.
  - how individuals can seek redress through safe and clear procedures for submitting complaints, appropriate reparations, and mechanisms to ensure that findings result in corrective action.
- » If mitigating or corrective measures have been applied, especially in the context of NDICI-GE funded border management projects, clarify how they have been assessed and how they informed future programming.
- » Clarify why a suspension of programmes – especially in the area of border management – in line

with Article 29 of the NDICI Regulation was not considered an appropriate corrective measure so far, and what would trigger such a suspension in future programming.

**In particular, the Italian Government should:**

- » Adopt a domestic legal framework establishing an explicit human rights due diligence obligation for State-funded cooperation with third countries. The obligation should apply where Italian funding, equipment, transport assets, training, or operational support gives Italy the capacity to influence activities that may create or exacerbate human rights risks.
- » Conduct systematic *ex-ante* human rights impact assessment and gender analysis to inform the design of programmes, identify foreseeable risks, evaluate the likelihood and severity of potential violations, and identify corrective and mitigating measures.
- » Conduct systematic human rights monitoring during projects' implementation and put in place mitigating measures – including suspension of programmes and/or future funding – should violations in the context of funded projects be confirmed.
- » Where serious risks of human rights violations are identified, the Italian government should require concrete mitigation measures before support is provided and suspend or withdraw assistance where those measures are not implemented. Such measures should also include accessible and effective mechanisms for individuals affected by Italy-supported activities to seek redress through clear, safe procedures for submitting complaints, appropriate reparations, and mechanisms to ensure that findings result in corrective action.

## TRANSPARENCY

The issue of lack of transparency is central to externalisation policies and funding instruments. Due to the multiplicity of actors involved, the plurality of funding streams, the resort to informal arrangements, and a growing share of documents treated as inaccessible, information is often opaque, partial, or inaccessible. This limits scrutiny and accountability of public resources for both civil society and the European and national parliaments. To increase transparency:

**The European Commission should:**

- » Centralise information and documentation of all NDICI-GE projects managed across Commission DGs and services into a single website or database that allows for filtering across Commission service, budget line, spending targets, policy markers and DAC codes assigned. The recently published list of all adopted actions on the migration and forced displacement target of NDICI-GE can serve as a basis for developing a centralised platform for all NDICI-GE projects.
- » Provide the European Parliament and Council with the same level of information sharing, access to documents and ability to scrutinise public budgets. In particular, documents shared in the MOCADDEM group or the NDICI Coordination Group on migration and forced displacement should also be shared and accessible to the European Parliament.
- » Include more detailed information on the migration and forced displacement component of NDICI-GE in the *Annual Reports on the Implementation of External Action Instruments*. In particular, the information should cover actions adopted under the migration and forced displacement target, whether these Actions were reported as ODA-eligible, findings from human rights monitoring, and any corrective or mitigating measures adopted.

### **The European Parliament should:**

- » Request that some of its representatives take part in the NDICI Coordination Group on migration and forced displacement, together with the representatives from the European Commission and Member States. This is especially relevant if the Group is renewed under the next Global Europe Instrument.
- » Clarify and adopt an internal procedure to formally object, where there is a political majority, to Commission Delegated Acts financing new actions under NDICI-GE and future funding instruments.
- » In the ongoing negotiations of the next Global Europe Instrument, ensure that greater mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny of EU external action, including on migration, are in place. These could include:
  - An obligation for the European Commission to issue an annual report that includes breakdowns of migration-related spending, specific actions, ODA eligibility and results from human rights monitoring, including any corrective or mitigating measures implemented
  - *(if conditionality is maintained)* An obligation for the European Commission to inform the European Parliament before conditionality measures are triggered


### **The Italian Government should:**

- » Create a public and up-to-date database on projects funded under the external dimension of migration policies. For each project, the database should indicate the funding instrument, the responsible Ministry, the title, the budget, the implementing partners, the relevant documentation, the share eligible as ODA, and the corresponding DAC codes.
- » Repeal or substantially narrow the broad exemptions from access to information on migration introduced by the Ministry of the Interior's decree of 16 March 2022, as well as the exemptions concerning procurement and confidentiality introduced by Decree-Law No. 145/2024, converted into Law No. 187/2024. Any restriction should be strictly justified, proportionate, and limited to information whose disclosure would cause specific, serious, and demonstrable harm.
- » Present an annual comprehensive report to Parliament, in conjunction with the budget cycle, on the resources allocated to migration-related activities in third countries. The report should include information on funded projects, the funding instruments used, the responsible Ministries, the implementing partners, ODA eligibility, the DAC codes applied, human rights monitoring, and any corrective measures adopted.

### **The Italian Parliament should:**

- » Adopt legislation extending its inspection and information-gathering powers to public funds deployed beyond national borders. Such powers should include access to agreements, procurement documentation, contracts, monitoring reports, and information on the use of transferred equipment.
- » Establish a permanent interparliamentary oversight mechanism, involving the Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence, and Budget Committees, to examine the resources allocated to migration cooperation by the various Ministries and monitor their implementation also outside the normal budget cycle.
- » Introduce prior parliamentary scrutiny of high-risk measures within the external dimension of migration policies, including border management operations, returns, the transfer of equipment, and the training of authorities in third countries. Before committing or reallocating resources, the Government should provide information on the legal basis, objectives, funding, risks to human rights and development, and the monitoring mechanisms envisaged.

- » Allow the relevant parliamentary committees to conduct or commission independent fact-finding missions in third countries to verify the implementation and effects of migration-related activities financed with public resources.
- » Where ordinary oversight mechanisms are insufficient, establish a parliamentary committee of inquiry vested with the powers of a judicial authority to examine conduct that remains beyond the reach of ordinary oversight mechanisms.



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