Final Report

A Report on
Real-time Evaluation

ActionAid’s International Haiti Emergency Response Programme: Rebuilding Lives and Livelihood

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Acknowledgement

On behalf of the team of evaluators, I am delighted to submit this draft report to ActionAid Haiti.

The report is largely built on the information, analysis and reflection of many people involved in the evaluation. First, we would like to appreciate participation of the children, community members and staff and volunteers of the partner organizations for their time for us. The Executive Directors of COZPAM and KPGA provided us with encouraging lessons and open reflections.

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We were highly encouraged by the openness of these individuals to identify lessons and recommend actions to improve the programme. Purpose of the RTE is to highlight shortcomings to improve a programme; we highly encourage the programme staff to consider the findings in that light.

Khurshid Alam
Dhaka. 22 October 2011.
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Part One: **Background**

INTRODUCTION

1.1. ActionAid Haiti (AAH) has been implementing a 3-year-long emergency response programme of US $12.9 million since the January 2010 earthquake in Port of Prince. AAH already implemented considerable size of immediate support programme— and a recovery programme has been underway since January 2011 in Port of Prince and in five areas in rural Haiti where many displaced people have been residing. We undertook a real-time evaluation (RTE) of the recovery programme aiming to improve the effectiveness of recovery programme. This report presents our key findings and set of recommendations.

CURRENT AND EMERGING CONTEXT

1.2. The devastating earthquake that struck Haiti on 12 January 2010 killing a quarter of a million people, is the world’s deadliest 7 Mw earthquake as mentioned by the US seismologist Roger Bilham appeared in Nature. Paul Farmer in his recent book, ‘Haiti: after the earthquake’ termed the earthquake as an ‘acute to a chronic problem’ that highlights the range of pre-disasters vulnerabilities elucidating such massive death and destruction. In our view, three other factors contributed to the impact continue having implication on the overall recovery and reconstruction of the earthquakes. These include:

- Haiti’s historical problem with land distribution that forced many people, especially those who migrated from rural areas during long regime of social problems, to live in poorly constructed slums—eventually they died or were severely affected or displaced to the rural areas.
- The current generation forgot the past earthquakes in Haiti. This is not unique to Haiti alone. People are likely to forget the history of former earthquakes in most places where earthquake takes place once in a several generations. As a result pre-earthquake seismic awareness was low in the construction practice. There was no building code enforcement. Moreover, the Government, NGOs and UN overlooked the earthquake risks in the disaster management planning and programmes.
- National leadership was weak even before the earthquake due to the long political problems and was further weakened by the impact of earthquake on public service and necessary infrastructures. A popular hypothesis attributes to the non-existence of military force, abolished by the Aristide in the 1900s, set back country’s ability to undertake immediate search and rescue operation. The rescues were primarily done by the family, friends and neighbors who saved many lives.

1.3. Impact of the earthquake was wide-spread. In the capital Port of Prince, many people lost their homes, assets, capital and business. Poor landless people who used to live in rented house ended up living in the urban camps or moved to the rural areas. At the end of the second year the humanitarian community is still unable to start rebuilding permanent houses.
due to the complexity with and/or unavailability of land in the capital. Local economy was severely affected and not fully-recovered to provide income opportunities to the poor people in urban and rural areas. Many people who are still either injured or mentally traumatized could not start their businesses because they lost their capital and tools.

1.4. Experts termed the earthquake as an urban disaster. But we think rural impact was underestimated and far greater than what was analyzed before. As high as half a million people are still dislocated in rural areas living with their extended or immediate family members. The idea of urban disaster that shaped the character of the overall response, resulted in negligible support to rural areas—we think this has created discrimination between urban and rural survivors (similar to Kashmir Valley Earthquake of 2006).

1.5. Haitians are a highly resilient nation. This is most evident in rural areas where as high as 50% families have been hosting at least one displaced family for almost two years now. Impact of hosting has implication on economic security of the poor host families as they have been sharing their food and living space. The host families already ate up their seeds and borrowed money and spent their savings to cover the additional expenses. Impact on local organizations is also significant. According to AAH’s partner organizations almost all Community Based Organizations (CBO’s) spent all their organizational funds to support their member families hosting displaced people. We think that the ongoing international response is significantly inadequate (comparing to most post-disaster assistance programmes in last ten years) to enable people to recuperate their lives and livelihood. Plenty of evidences are there. Living condition in the camps is poor and undignified. People complained about security, privacy and comfort as tents no longer protect them from rain and storm. The condition of water and sanitation is also poor. These have impacted women and children disproportionately. Circumstances in the camps with no income opportunities led to increase in the number of women and young girls to enter into prostitution. We have met a group of volunteers who reported cases where young girls were sexually exploited. Many children couldn’t go to the schools in rural and urban areas because their parents could not afford school fees. We believe that the emergency phase is not over for as low as 50% of camp population—but food supply was suspended by all agencies.

1.6. Despite this usual camp scenario, we have also understood that people are mentally and physically ready to start rebuilding. Some families already established small business in the camps. However, primary business is yet to re-start as they are unable to overcome the shortage of capital.

1.7. A national recovery plan was drawn up. The civil society members think that the national ownership over the plan and leadership to implement it is inadequate. AAH thinks that government has least stake in the decision making and projects are being pursued from the interest of corporate and construction lobby. Earthquake recovery is not a focus of the domestic politics.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAMME

1.8. AAH did not have prior experience in managing a humanitarian response at this scale. Support from ActionAid’s International Emergency and Conflict Team (IECT) and American Regional Office; and pre-existing partnership with creditable local organizations helped ActionAid to design the response programme. In the middle of 2010, a response strategy was formulated with an objective to support the women and other poor people in rebuilding their lives and livelihoods in both urban and rural area. The strategy document outlines six core objectives of the programmes:

- Strengthen the organizational capacity in preventing and responding to future hazards
- Support communities in reducing their risk to future hazards
- Strengthen community based protection mechanism for the most vulnerable populations particularly women, children, elderly and persons with disabilities.
- Enhance food security, rebuild and strengthen livelihoods of vulnerable communities
- Restore capacity of communities to overcome trauma through psychosocial support
- Address immediate needs of earthquake affected communities.

1.9. The programme works with the most vulnerable section of the affected people such as landless people, female headed households (FHH), people with disabilities (PWD) and small holder farmers. The programme framework prioritized housing for the landless people, the livelihood, protection, education, psychosocial support and disaster risk reduction—and allocated US$ 3 million in six Development Areas (DAs). AAH also launched a campaign on the issues related to long term vulnerability and poverty in Haiti.

1.10. A multi-level of organizational structure has been set-up to lead and manage the programme. Emergency Response Programme (ERP) which is the heart of the response has been led by a group of young and committed ActionAid staff. The responsibility and accountability of overall programme management is shared between Core Management Team (CMT), ERP manager and partner organizations. A recently abolished International Oversight Group was created to manage international dimension of risk associated with the programme. At the operational level, the programme has been implemented by a group of partner organizations highly experienced in social mobilization. In order to create synergy between ERP and regular programmes, single planning and reporting mechanism was introduced in 2011. The DA Coordinators support the partners to manage both regular and emergency programme. AAH’s Human Resource, Logistic, IPD, Communications and Finance provide respective support to the ERP in meeting functional needs.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

1.11. We adopted a broad framework (rather than taking a technical monitoring line) to approach the RTE. The key question that guided us was how (and whether) AAH’s response can enable affected people to recover from the impact of the earthquake. Nevertheless we considered external and internal factors that influenced the performance of the programme. Following are few additional questions that we have examined in the process:
a) **STRATEGY.** Evaluate relevance and effectiveness of the recovery strategy and approach in context of current and future needs of the affected communities.

b) **PROGRAMME DESIGN.** Evaluate overall emergency response programs and policy initiatives; strengths and weaknesses of our programme approaches; appropriateness of programs and program design; and accountability processes to rights-holders, ActionAid internally, and donors.

c) **CAPACITY OF THE RESPONSE TEAM.** Evaluate current and required capacity of the response to implement the strategy and programme in line with ActionAid values and principles and requirement of the donors. Reviewing and making suggestions for improvements on the ERP structures and systems in place.

d) **TRANSITION STRATEGY.** Evaluate and make suggestion on transition of the programme to long term development.

1.12. We used three methods in the evaluation—
a) appreciative inquiry whereby all the stakeholders were given an opportunity to reflect their lessons, b) selective participatory tools that we used to include views of different groups of people; and finally c) use of our past experience to synthesis our observations and generate recommendations. We also used Humanitarian Code of Conduct and OECD Evaluation Criteria in the process.

1.13. We visited two DAs in Port of Prince (camps in Mariani, settlements in Philippeau) and Roseaux (Saint Vincent, Saint Martin and Chamy in Corail) that represent 70% of overall recovery allocation. We covered almost all different types of programme activities. In the field we have discussed with camp population, host and displaced families—both in groups and individually. We had long discussions with volunteers and staff of partner originations. At AAH we meet with Country Director and other CMT members, member of ERP and heads of functions. We also interviewed IECT Advisor for LAC and Carrabin.

1.14. Limitation. As with any evaluation, this RTE has definite limits. We were not able to review the budget utilization of ERP—as a result we were not able to judge the efficiency of the programme and provide specific recommendations for future resource allocation. We were also not able to meet the external stakeholder as much as we wanted to, to look into AAH’s contribution to the overall national response and visibility of the campaign at the national level.

**REPORT STRUCTURE**

1. The report is divided into four parts. Part one presents an introduction to the project, its context and RTE methods and purposes. Part two provides our findings on the relevance of the programmes strategy. Part three presents summary findings on the programme design and key lessons. Part four discusses findings on the management and capacity aspect of the programme. The final part discusses about risks, recommendation and set of lessons for ActionAid as a whole.
Part Two: Recovery Strategy

This section presents our opinion on the overall strategy of the recovery programme.

2.2 AAH put together a strategy document and programme framework in 2010 based on a few assessments done by AAH and partner organizations. But its interpretation evolved and enriched over time though they were not incorporated in the original document. Therefore, we have considered both written and un-written strategies that influence overall direction of the recovery programme.

2.3 The strategy is a reflection of rights based approach and sharp political understanding on the situation. As a result, it adopted a comprehensive programme approach to meet immediate and long term recovery needs of the most vulnerable people i.e.: i). strengthen the organizational capacity in preventing and responding to future hazards; ii). support communities in reducing their risk to future hazards; iii). strengthen community based protection mechanism for the most vulnerable groups particularly women, children, elderly and persons with disabilities; iv). enhance food security and rebuild and strengthen livelihoods of vulnerable communities; v). restore capacity of communities to overcome trauma through psychosocial support. With an overall budget of US $12.9 million, 3 million was allocated for six DAs as direct support to the affected people while another US $ 1.2 million was allocated for a large scale campaign.

2.4 Coverage of programme is a highly appropriate and credible strategy making AAH distinctive from other agencies. The programme from the outset decided to support both displaced population and host families in rural areas as well as affected poor people in Port of Prince.

2.5 Despite having such strength in overall conceptualization we think the programme needs to pay significant attention to a number of areas of its implementation.

2.6 First is to bring balance between long and medium term recovery needs of individual, households and community. At the moment more energy and resources have been allocated for long term need and priorities. For example, livelihood strategy perhaps meet more long term needs through promotion of new skills, micro-finance, grind mills, enterprise and building of roads—they clearly bring in limited cash flow to the Households (HH). The campaign as perceived by the community to have focused more towards long term issues rather than their immediate problems. The resource allocation for 2011, especially in rural areas, is inadequate to the needs and capacity of AAH to spend—although we do not have a clear picture on how much funds already been spent. All these approaches put the programme into a significant risk of limited impact in the recovery of households).

2.7 The second point is related to the understanding and application of humanitarian principles—especially the concept of ‘adequacy’, ‘equity’ and ‘building on local capacity’. CFW generates 15 days of work for everyone in rural areas where not everyone—host, displaced people and other community members—was affected equally. Host community said they would be happy if more support is given to the displaced people. Programme needs to define the adequacy in terms of determining right amount of support that would enable an affected HH to recover and build the future better than the past.
Programme should adopt far more oversight into understanding how AAH assistance is enabling HHs to recover what they have lost. Building on local capacity is essentially related to the question whether a programme is ‘enabling affected people to recover’ or ‘provisioning support given to recover’. While the programme has strong element in enabling approach in some aspects such as campaigning, psychosocial activities, we think it needs to revisit its house building strategy—that essentially planned for provisioning approach. AAH’s contractor (AAH planned to commission house building to a construction firm) is planning to build houses for the people although we were told that the company will involve people in the decision making.

2.8 Overall resource allocation need further thought. First AAH should review if it has allocated sufficient resources (less than one third of overall 2011 allocation currently) to meet the huge unmet immediate and recovery need of the displaced population. Overall programme budget of 3 million (quarter of total budget) for recovery in 2011 is also significantly inadequate to the need and capacity of the partners to spend. The program should consider strategy to provide housing support to the displaced people (stuck in rural areas). Sectoral allocation should also be revisited as we think livelihood is underfunded compared to the need.

2.9 ERP needs to consider more comprehensive strategy to disaster risk reduction (it needs to write one). The current strategy focuses on DRR through school approach that AAI has been piloting in a number of countries. We propose that ERP adopt a long term capacity building of all partner organizations (it may include more NGOs and CBOs) on disaster risk management (DRM). The two organizations we spoke have real potential to grow as disaster management organization in the country and the region. The key lessons we have learned from other countries pointing that pluralistic institutional setting can innovate locally appropriate approach for DRM and provide far more security to the vulnerable people.
Part Three: **Programme Design**

This section presents our findings on the overall and specific aspects of the programme design. This also looks into the design of various activities and their contribution to enable the vulnerable families to recover their life and livelihoods.

3.1 Five major components are included in the programme: i). economic livelihoods through CFW, enterprise development and promotion of skills, ii). securing land and building house for landless people in urban areas, iii). protection of the vulnerable people that include women rights, education and psychosocial work, iv). social mobilization/campaigning and v). capacity building and DRR. Some of these programme components such as Food/non-food items, CFW and Psychosocial work were new to AAH. The ERP team worked hard to conceptualize, design and implement these activities.

3.2 The programme collectively and some components individually already have made a reasonable impact on the lives of the affected men, women and children. As the recovery programme was built on previous programme on immediate needs—people expressed greater sense of satisfaction to us wherever we went.

3.3 There was no serious outbreak of cholera due to timely intervention by AAH with Cholera Kits and awareness campaign, no serious food problem due to food support and there is a sense of confidence among people as they are always cared by the staff and volunteers of the partner organizations. Some of the activities, although small in budgetary term, were highly strategic and timely. Seed distribution for example, helped the rural community to start their agriculture as they had used up their seed stock to feed the displaced people. Similarly psychosocial work for the children in urban areas helped many children to pass through a very difficult time of trauma for last two years. Education is another example where ActionAid has helped by providing school materials for the children to start their school. Through large CFW big section of rural community received access to cash—that helped them to pay school fees, pay medical expenses and cover incidental costs. The cash for work schemes such as road construction, cleaning up drainages for flood protection in Port of Prince are relevant and most useful for the settlement around.

**Economic Livelihood**

3.4 The economic livelihood is the second largest expenditure—that has distinct approach in rural and urban areas. In urban areas, both in camp and non-camp setting, AAH designed enterprise development and vocational training for the young boys and girls. In rural areas, cash for work and agricultural supports are being provided.

3.5 In rural areas—programme covers both host and displaced families. We have already mentioned how seeds distribution helped the host families also enable a section of displaced families to start cultivation. Without this support many families would not have
been able to cultivate in the current season. The support to the KPGA’s members transformed into seeds and tools bank. AAH also provided 12 Grinding Mills in 12 villages in Jeremie. This is a good idea as these village did not have such facilities before and they had to travel far to do their grinding. But we were not convinced by the way they are owned and managed in relation to its support to the affected families. Income they generate go to partner’s account and machines are owned by the partner—mean that AAH needs to rethink how these machines can generate benefit for the affected families. Same attention should also be paid on micro-finance seed money that AA is going to provide to the partner organization. AAH needs to be careful if fund is coming from DEC as it does not allow such provision. We suggest that AA signs a separate agreement with the partner on the ownership of the seed money and introduce flexible and interest free credit for two years to the affected people.

3.6 We visited two villages where CFW was underway and this activity has been completed in urban areas. Everyone, we met appreciated CFW scheme and cash they received. In Philipeau for example, where a water channel was cleaned-up has potential to reduce the flooding risk. In Jeremic, the road construction was extremely useful for communities as previous road was very bad. The schemes and who would get work are decided by the community members—although displaced people were least involved in the decision. One member from each host and displaced family received 15 days of work per year that generated around US$ 300. Although the cash was extremely useful for the difficult time—it also provides a number of lessons. AAH should have been more careful and systematic in understanding HH’s liquidity needs for recovery and provide adequate cash support. With the current condition AAH can think of large scale support for capital, cash grant and asset transfer that enable people to restart their business or set-up small scale IGA. The second lesson is related to the principles that AA needs to follow in design of CFW using humanitarian aid as it has potential to breach humanitarian principles. Timing is important—the work AAH has initiated could have been more appropriate when HH level recovery is reasonably over. In other circumstances CFW should be carefully determined so that they contribute directly to HH recovery.

3.7 For the camp people in Port of Prince, vocation training and enterprise development were designed that we think was useful and appropriate. We observed high level of enthusiasm among youth about the new skills such as cooking, plumbing and construction they were learning. With increased volume of upcoming reconstruction some of them may likely get to work in future. We think additional support of a pack of tools may help them to be competitive in the job market. AA partner COZPAM has also planned to support some families to set-up a Bakery in Port of Prince.

3.8 AAH did not have experience in large scale post disaster livelihood—that was supported by an IECT deployed consultant in 2010. We think the design is not robust enough in understanding and addressing livelihood needs of the IDPs in rural areas and affected people urban areas. In order to achieve a greater impact in livelihood we have several suggestions. First go beyond the minimalist approach to livelihood and consider undertaking a large scale and impact oriented programme that enable people to get back to their original business in the new environment in urban areas—and then build the additional skills and enterprise promotion on that. ERP should explore cash based approach and learned already documented lessons. For rural areas, more targeted
approach can be considered for IDP as they are least likely to receive support for housing. Deliberate strategic approach is needed in livelihood for them that can enable them to decide whether they want to set-up business in rural areas or go back to Port of Prince.

Securing land and building house for landless people in urban areas

3.9 The rehousing component of the programme experience is perhaps the most important and complex set of challenges. The situation did not surprise us as people experienced such problem after all major emergencies in last 20 years. AAH has prioritized house construction for the landless families given that these HHs are least likely to secure shelter due to complexity with land. Land is limited in valley of the Port of Prince and Haiti never had land distribution in the past. AA thinks that the situation also brings an opportunity to raise the land issues to achieve an equitable solution in current political context. Therefore, AA and its partners engaged with local city council aim to secure land to build house and at the same time demand land for the landless through the campaign. This is essentially an uncertain and long term process. The best case scenario, given the scale of the problem, it would be unlikely for AAH to complete the housing programme before 2012.

3.10 What would be the best intermediate strategy to secure a dignified living condition for the camp population? We suggest first AA to engage with the land owner where camps are set-up and agree that camp people would not be evicted until a solution is found. City Corporation should be engaged in the process. AAH should also consider providing additional re-usable shelter materials to repair the existing camps as they are already weak to protect people from harsh weather. Although COZPAM has engaged City Corporation in the discussion of land we suggest that to be more systematic and on a regular basis—a localized campaign can play a big role (see campaign section in page 15).

Management Response:
AAH has been applying this recommendation since 2010 with no success. Land owners are sensitive their land and are not open to the idea of establishing T shelters on their land for fear of losing it.

3.11 We also encourage AAH to consider an alternative ‘housing enabling approach’ in which people can be given liberty to find a land for some years—and AA can support them to build the house. We strongly believe this approach does not contradict with rights based approach—rather a pragmatic interpretation of RBA. There can be a hypothesis that might suggest that individual direct support would weaken the campaign. COZPAM did not think such approach would hamper the campaign. AAH is already in the process to enter into an agreement with a construction firm to build the house—that we suggest to reconsider. We propose (with caution) AAH to adopt an owner driven reconstruction (ODR) instead of agency driven approach – as it offers far more benefit to HH and local economy and capacity. However we propose AAH not to consider enabling approach or owner driven construction approach if they hamper the timeliness of the implementation—that’s the key at the moment.
Protection of Most Vulnerable People

3.12 AAH has invested great resources to design the protection component of its programme. The planned activities include women rights, education in emergencies and psychosocial work although they are not always put under protection. But we think conceptually all these activities directly (and others indirectly) contribute to protection—and thus suggest to put them under one single operational framework.

3.13 The protection work already made some positive impact especially in the case of children and youth through education, youth club and vocational training. As we noted earlier psychosocial centers have already helped many children to alleviate their trauma and stress. The vocational training and youth activities helped young boys and girls to spend time on constructive activities in the difficult time they have passed. Unplanned benefit is also high. For example, the volunteers provide continuous advice and support to the young boys and girls about possible sexual exploitation and how to protect them from such incidents. Education in Emergencies is an appropriate idea and has helped many children in rural and urban areas to go back to school. However, we believe the impact was limited due to non-targeted approach of EiE that supported school with materials instead supporting the parents unable to send their children. We have found many poor parents who were not able to send their children. AA and partners could have thought about large campaign and/or perhaps support the school to waive the school fees. AA did similar work in many countries in the past.

Management Response:
AAH support the functioning of the partner schools by covering operational costs and providing school equipment and materials. This reduces the cost of education significantly. Parents only pay a minimal fee of 250 gdes or 6 USD per year. The ERP also provides school kits to children which are also one less expense for parents to worry about. As the new government has place focus on free education for all, this gives an opportunity to implement an education campaign and hold the state accountable.

3.14 While we think existing programs was able to generate far greater social benefit comparing to the economic one, ActionAid has undermine timely implementation of the key aspects of the protection work. ERP does not have protection plan for rural areas and needs to undertake systematic gender analysis. Implementation of the activities such as HH protection kits and lighting in the camps aiming to provide protection to women were delayed and not adequately prioritized in the implementation. We acknowledge the contextual challenge such as problem with recruitment of women right officer and unavailability of materials in the market—AA should be provided far more effort to overcome the challenges. With recruitment of women rights officer, ActionAid could have explored other alternative to deploy an experienced women rights person in Haiti. Protection programming needs to be far more flexible to address new issues in the affected communities. Some ERP staff and partner organizations think that plans and budget can not be changed once signed. For example, the Protection Officer who carries out regular monitoring visit but was unable to find resources to implement additional protection activities due to shortage of money in the budget. This raises a question about the flexibility of planning and approval process in the ERP.
Campaign

3.15 Each international response can offer an organization something new to learn. The campaign launched by the ActionAid and partner organization is not only appropriate and relevant but also a good example of rights based work in emergencies.

3.16 ActionAid made an appropriative decision to utilize the historical inequalities in land distribution that the earthquake exposed. We have found very high level of enthusiasm and motivation among the staff and community members about the campaign although we do not think that everyone has sufficient understanding about the purpose and means of the campaign. Community mobilization and downward information flow should be an area to take up in order to strengthen the campaign at the local level. We also like to put emphasis on the need for strong advocacy strategy as real time follow up of the campaign that should be supported with adequate staff and resource allocation at both national and local level. The campaign can be perceived as an expensive one and AAH leadership needs to think whether this model of campaign can be replicated elsewhere where resource constraint is an issue.

Management Response:
Community mobilization and downward information: This is indeed foreseen to be strengthened in the campaign. The campaign has only been launched in October through a series of community mobilization at regional level. It will be important ensure downward information flow on possible national developments since the international symposium.

Advocacy strategy: We have an internally developed advocacy strategy, but now that the platform has been set this is foreseen to be reviewed in the beginning of 2012.

Resource allocation: Overall Haiti is an expensive country and mobilization cost money if you consider that poor people have to leave their livelihoods activities to claim their rights, and we already only offer a minimal transport fee and food fees.

Disaster Risk reduction

3.17 The program has a plan on DRR with component on capacity building and partners and DRR through schools. Given high earthquake risk in the country we suggest the team to consider developing a comprehensive DRR strategy with a component in building capacity of partner organization. We also suggest the team to consider school safety as a short term and scaled up objective while DRR through school can be built on fast track
school safety project. Community based DRR can be piloted a number of areas that can be scaled up in 2012.

3.18 The strategy should include institutional capacity building of the partner organizations. This should aim supporting partners to gain knowledge, skills and institutional process to design and manage disaster risk management activities independently. Some of the CBOs federating with partner organizations can also be supported to replace their organizational funds used for the response.

**Accountability to Right Holders**

3.19 There is high level of awareness among partner organizations and AAH about the accountability to the affected people. The two partner organizations we have visited are membership based organization that have been practicing community based decision making for a long time. People were involved with most decisions related to programme although we are not able to comment on the quality and inclusiveness aspect of the decision making. This for sure that the IDPs were not part of decision making in rural areas. While we believe that community has involvement in specific aspect of programme development—they did not have any influence over the overall resource allocation of the programme.

3.20 The working environment in which partners have been implementing the programme may not need specific activities for accountability—but we encourage AAH to share some of the practices AA has been implementing elsewhere. The transparency board did not mention the budget of the partners individually but rather the overall budget of AAH. Although we are not a great believer of Complain Box—but we suggest AA to consider one in each camp as Haitian generally do not complain about their donors.

**Management Response:**
Management agrees with the RTE on this but we need to mention that there is also a security component here that partners are wary of. Kidnappings and similar crimes render organizations who divulging budget information somewhat vulnerable.
Part Four: Management Process

4.1 AAH set up an effective program management system with defined roles and responsibilities. ERP being the central to the process is managed by a small team while different functions for the programme i.e. HR, Finance and Logistics are integrated in the existing management process. Support to partners is managed by existing DA coordinators reporting to the Head of Programmes but gets coordinated through Core Management Meeting and existing DA coordination mechanism to ERP. All partners have a single plan that includes regular programme and emergency programme—although ERP Manager manages the emergency part of the budget. Considering bulk resource being funded to COZPAM, the DA coordinator that has become part of ERP also oversees technical aspect of EiE. An international overseas group was created to provide timely support on the risk management—this has been discontinued recently. At the partner level, volunteers are mobilized to organize the programme with support from newly-recruited staff to manage the program.

4.2 The team was able to manage the emergency phase of the programme effectively and was able to allocate resources in systematic manner keeping priorities and requirement of the donors in mind. There was no major problem in terms of managing contractual obligations of the donors as reported by the IPD officer—although there are several problems with Ayuda on the delay in construction of two schools. Although funding is relatively small AA needs to engage with donors well ahead to explain the context.

Management Response:
Management agrees this is good practice, though these issues were explained to donors well in advance.

4.3 The management and program synergy was decided at the beginning of the program. In practice this means the program is managed by regular program management function and HR, logistics, finance, communications and IPD continue to provide support in the management of the program. AAH also established single plans and budget and followed regular programming and approval process. This approach clearly motivated staff and help them to acquire important knowledge. However, we think adoption and use of this approach did not always generate adequate benefit to the program. For example, the approval of plans and disbursement of funds to the partner was delayed in order to follow ActionAid’s regular programming process. Although we believe the delays related to procurement of important items and recruitment of vital position was caused by contextual challenges beyond ActionAid control, it raises important question whether such integration process should be done (and necessary) in future where country program has not adopted emergency procedure or do not have adequate capacity to manage large scale response. The country programme needs to carefully review all the causes of fund disbursement and delay in programme implementation.
4.4 We think management oversight on the programme is currently weak. This is primarily due to the overall programme design rather than implementation of it. The monthly reporting system and monitoring indicators are designed based on input and output of the project that does not sufficiently tell ERP and Country Director how AAH’s overall response are enabling people to recover. We think the M&E system should be redsigned keeping individual and HH’s recovery at the central focus. The oversight is also weak (or non-existing) in monitoring of the budget within the time of management significance that allow effective decision on reallocation. We strongly recommend AAH to introduce management reporting system. We propose that ERP manager to produce a monthly management report for the Country Director that should highlight budget utilization, forecast and update on risk management measures. The major risks that programme is left with include: impact and timeliness.

Management Response:
It is an overall weakness for AA to monitor impact level. HH’s recover monitoring needs to be improved. Measures are taken to strengthen the system, e.g. HRBA capacity building; strengthening baseline, etc.

Budget monitoring: We are developing the management information system. Budget utilization should be presented by Finance but interpreted by ERP Manager.

As of January 2011, with the recruitment of an M&E coordinator, reporting tools have been designed which take into account the GMF. ERP manager has also been submitting monthly management reports to CD and oversight group. Management is willing to improve these tools to better track recovery of HH’s

4.5 Both the partners—COZPAM and KPGA are highly motivated in the implementation. Being membership based organizations they have high level of accountability to their donors. However, often partners perceive AA’s plan and agreement as inflexible; thus, do not argue for its change despite having many solid ideas. These partners now manage
programme that has been increased several folds and that brought some particular challenges. Both the partners mentioned about difficulties with logistic that includes vehicles, space and computer—we believe they are all necessary in managing a programme at this pace. Although existing programmes cover expenses of a number of additional staff to the partners they are not adequate—that AA needs to consider.

Management Response:
Programme flexibility: When developing the plans detailed discussions are held on exchanging ideas with partners, but indeed in some cases money is conditioned by external donors on the basis of proposals developed in the aftermath of the disaster on the basis of needs assessments. It’s the challenge to strike a balance between good donor contract management and programme flexibility.

Logistics & materials for partners: we will have to review, because we did provide this to a certain extent.

4.6 Current programme should be scaled-up in terms of diversity in activities especially in livelihood, timeliness in implementation such as protection and increase in coverage, shelter and campaign programme. In order to manage such programme, we propose AA to do an internal reflection on how best it can manage it and what additional support it may require. We want to propose that AA recruit/seconded in a senior women rights person to accelerate its protection work and get short term support to redesign the livelihood programme.

Management Response:
Management agrees on the need to scale up in livelihood and coverage, shelter and campaign programme. This could indeed bring more focus and facilitate a more efficient management structure.

Secondment: We have had external support before, including a Protection and Livelihoods specialist. The added value of other deployments for these sectors is questionable at this point.

Lessons for ActionAid International

4.7 There are number of important lessons that we consider to be vital for ActionAid International as a whole. The first point is related to providing early support to country program with limited humanitarian experience. In such context, we think AAI should consider for deployment of an experienced program manager at the early phase of emergency. Thematic or sectoral specialist deployment can be followed on once programming and management process are clearly defined. The second lesson is related to the knowledge management and how one response contributes to improvement overall approach of actionaid—and then implemented to next one. Some of the difficulties that AAH face are not new and solution are available within ActionAid in managing similar scale and nature of disaster. We think that such a process did not work-out well—and as a result AAH was not able to access many actionaid’s effective approaches from recent disaster response especially from Asia. The third lesson is related to the use and application of right
based approach in which we believe that ActionAid needs to put much more emphasis on programming of RBA. The current approach of cash for work and power and participation of community based adaptation require further research.

**Management Response:**
Management thinks that staff deployments should be done more carefully as they can create burden in emergency situation when staff is also affected. Management suggests that prior to deployment, AAI in agreement with the concerned country conduct an in-depth analysis of real needs – based on concrete data – and an appropriate plan on how to better support the affected people.
Part Five: **Recommendations**

These are the set of recommendations that we have already validated throughout the exercise and shared with AAH CMT. However, we suggest AAH to organize staff meeting involving partners to discuss the findings and find a way forward.

Before we start describing the recommendations, we would like to draw some thoughts about future likelihood given the challenge and problem associated with overall response. We think at the end of 2012, there will widespread frustration among the survivors about the delay in house and livelihood rebuilding. Some of the camps in Port of Prince can become informal settlement while there is high chance of significant demographic change in Haiti at least for a short period of time. Many people may stay back in rural areas accepting lack of services. We also believe that the lessons from 2010 earthquake will be forgotten in near future and many wouldn’t be able to build seismic resistant houses. Finally many people will move to highly vulnerable area (up the hills) accepting the risk of typhoon, landslide and earthquake.

The AAIH and its partners collectively have significant potential to transform the entire programme to address both needs at the recovery phase as well as a long term one.

5.1 AAH should reorient the recovery program in line with humanitarian principles. In practice this means far greater emphasis on strategy and resource allocation to enable the affected household to recover.

5.2 We propose AAH to utilize significant portion of existing budget by June 2012 and adopt an accelerated management approach to utilize it effectively. This means there will be shortfall in the budget that AAH should raise through a strong IPD. A quick donor scoping is suggested.

5.3 The Country Director should work with core management team to review key organizational processes to ensure timeliness in fund disbursement, procurement and recruitment vital staff.

5.4 There is also need to revise the livelihood, shelter and protection programme.

- Livelihood program should be designed based on the capital, asset and skill need and they should work in combination to achieve household economic security. We propose that AAH hires a senior livelihood expert for a short time to design an impact oriented livelihood program. ERP should carefully determine size and expertise of human resource at the partner level to implement the scaled up program. Resource allocation for livelihood should be increased significantly.

- We encourage ActionAid to revisit its current shelter strategy. Considering uncertainty associated with land allocation by the City Corporation, with caution we would like to propose AAH to adopt ‘shelter enabling approach’ as opposed to the current ‘shelter provisioning approach’. Further resources should be explored to provide support for shelter for the displaced people in rural areas and some other HHs affected by cyclone to avoid any
discrimination. High value livelihood can be considered to enable people to meet their immediate and development needs including shelter. We encourage ActionAid to consider adoption of ODR principles in their shelter building approach.

- AAH needs to bring much more pace in the implementation of protection program. We propose current protection activities to join with women rights and education emergency as a single focus. This should help ActionAid to create effective oversight on the programme. ActionAid should verify and document the specific case of sexual abuse and rape and provide appropriate legal, moral and financial assistance to the victims. ActionAid may provide alternative education support in the camp for the children who are not able to go to the school.

5.5 Monitoring process should adopt real time impact monitoring to understand how ActionAid program is enabling people to recover. A selected number of households can be used to understand change in people’s life over a period of time. The DA coordinators in their field visit and interaction with partners should also examine how ActionAid programs are creating synergy and impact.

5.6 AAH needs to invest on operational capacity to the partners to manage the programme as well as long term capacity on DRM. Existing DRR strategy should include additional strategy of partner capacity building. The key objective of such a strategy should be on building ability to manage future disaster. We suggest ActionAid to consider first-track school safety approach with increased number of schools on which DRR through school should be built on.

5.7 ERP should carefully consider motivational aspect of staff and volunteers of the partners. Focus to be placed to bring new energy in the program and ERP team should encourage partner to organize review and reflection meeting and address the issue that might cause problem for motivation.

5.8 We have several recommendations for campaign. First AAH needs to strengthen campaign activities and mobilization at the sub national level. The second is on downward communication. The humanitarian demand of the campaign should be well communicated to the people—otherwise campaign objectives can be perceived to be long term ones by the affected people. Thus many may not find relevant for them. The communication team should play an important role to communicate the key messages and means of the campaign to the people. The third point is related to advocacy as an important part of campaign strategy. The campaign steering group should identify staffing needs at various levels to make a bigger impact in right pace.