Evaluation of the 2010 flood response of ActionAid Pakistan

Final Report

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Note for the reader:

The final evaluation report is online at

http://www.docubees.org/projects/?page_id=372

(or http://prezi.com/fpjdqfv7cwuz/aapk-final-evaluation-report/?auth_key=43e7cfedd8b04e2813c8eb1c0a60417292465f67)

This document is intended only as a companion to the online version, to facilitate offline reading and consultation.

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Report by:
Silva Ferretti and Luc Bellon

Acronyms

AA	ActionAid
AAPK	ActionAid Pakistan
ALPS	Accountability, Learning and Planning System
AusAID	Australian Government Overseas Aid Program
CBO	Community Based Organization
CFW	Cash For Work
DA	Development Area (where ActionAid has a long term engagement)
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
HDC	Hirrak Development Center
IASL	Impact Assessment and Shared Learning
KAP	Knowledge Attitudes Practices
GMF	Global Monitoring Framework
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NFI	Non Food Items
IECT	International Emergency and Conflict Team
INGO	International Non Governmental Organization
PPCF	People Power and Change Framework
PRRP	Participatory Review and Reflection Process
PVA	Participatory Vulnerability Analysis
PWD	People With Disabilities
REFLECT	Regenerated Freirean Literacy through Empowering Community Techniques
RH	Rights Holder(s)
SSSWA	Soofi Sachal Sarmast Welfare Association
SPO	Strengthening Participatory Organization
ToT	Training of Trainers
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WCFS	Women and Child Friendly Spaces

Executive summary

This evaluation looks at how the AA approach was applied and adapted to the 2010 flood response, to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups.
The field work took place in Dec 2012 and focused on two partners in two provinces: Hirrak in Punjab (Kot Addu area) and SSSWA in Sind (Kashmore area). Meetings / workshops with AA country management, e-mail feedback from international staff and a review of reports and literature also feed into the findings.

The whole report is best seen online at the address: http://prezi.com/fpjdqfv7cwuz/aapk-final-evaluation-report/?auth_key=43e7cfedd8b04e2813c8eb1c0a60417292465f67. This "prezi presentation" allows to appreciate the overall structure of the work, and to integrate the narrative with multimedia elements.

The evaluation sought to:
- Capture AA approach by looking at the interventions: to what extent AA's approach of "giving power to people" adapted to the emergency context?
- Focus more on the decision-making and accountability mechanisms than on deliverables.

To do so, it used AA's "People, Power and Change" framework as the main reference to:
- highlight what is AA's "distinctive approach to emergency"
- investigate potential for empowerment (within, with, over, to) of the most vulnerable during a humanitarian response
- assess the extent to which the different activities complement each other
- check whether immediate relief can be detrimental to longer term actions.

It emerged that applying the framework to AA's approach in emergency can yield important learning for humanitarian action.

The evaluation grouped the different activities observed into three complementary domains of intervention:
1) ensuring that right holders have access to their basic entitlements (e.g. access to material goods)
2) strengthening their capacity to overcome the upheaval of their lives created by the unprecedented floods (e.g. strengthening self confidence and linkages amongst people)
3) contributing to preparedness and reducing risks of such types of disasters happening again (e.g. risk reduction work)

Activities pertaining to these areas (e.g. food and non food distributions, shelter, WASH, seeds and livestock distributions; CFW; WATAN card movements; women and child friendly spaces; DRR) have been examined through the "flower lens" to identify their strengths, weaknesses, potential risks, and to identify opportunities for broadening their scope and impact. Activity-level findings are detailed in the report. In the following, emerging trends, across-the-bard observations and overarching issues are then articulated, and linked to broad recommendations.

[1] Protection work could have been better contextualized / locally adapted. Opportunities to broaden psychosocial work could have been seized, by reaching out to multiple groups and possibly strengthening referral systems. Reframing psychosocial activities and making them more explicit within the programmes would have also improved learning derived from them, thus strengthening this area of intervention.
- ➲ *[R1] Coping / self-reliance activities could be strengthened* by reframing the "protection" work to encompass a wider range of threats and vulnerabilities, beyond the prevailing and assumed focus on women.

[2] DRR became a pivotal area of work and was linked to mobilization and community lead activities. It is essential that AA continue to maintain this momentum, strengthening linkages among partners, and using DRR as a vehicle for empowerment.
- ➲ *[R2] AA should continue to emphasize DRR work.*

[3] The relatively slow start is compensated by a higher spending rate in the recovery and rehabilitation phases. Although a possible reason of concern for donors, this pattern was retrospectively seen as being the result of a very positive trend of participation by the partner organizations. Whilst striving to reduce delays, AA should equip itself to prove the validity of its approach to donors and other key stakeholders.

➲ *[R3] Be assertive about the need for a slow inception phase,* resulting from a focus on empowerment and participation.

[4] During the response, AA and partners ensured to address vulnerable people. However there is a risk of pre-empting vulnerability analysis by being too systematic in defining vulnerability criteria (women and elderly headed HH, people with disabilities, poor), while overseeing other local causes of vulnerability (tribal feuds, the power of feudal lords, mobility issues, etc.). AA did considered "minorities", but the initiatives taken to address tribal feuds were considered by the partners to be "outside the project realm".

➲ *[R4] Increase flexibility and space for local adaptation in addressing vulnerabilities.*

[5] The limited coverage of AA projects is a challenge in a context where, increasingly, coordination mechanisms tend to encourage a single international organization to work in one area, and cover all the needs. This calls for further strengthening selection criteria, and/or to increase capacity to deliver (e.g. through increased funding / capacity to coordinate and lobby).

➲ *[R5] Ensure adequate coverage, either by increasing capacity to deliver or by further strengthening selection criteria.*

The evaluation identified three broad factors that can contribute to building environments favorable to empowerment:

- Bring decision-making process at the grassroots.
- Adapt systems to emergency, to ensure both timely delivery of entitlements and support the empowerment of most vulnerable people
- Ensure information for empowerment, 'information' being understood not only as "delivering facts", but as a wide range of processes through which rights holders increase their capacity to control and act on their environment, including other stakeholders.

Observations and recommendations on:
"Bringing decision-making process at the grassroots"

Overall, decision making powers have been substantially devolved, especially considering the challenges to do so at the time of emergency and, at times, in areas where AA had not worked before (with weak understanding of the worth of participation). Challenges remaining include:

[6] Avoid equating "sharing power with CBOs" with "sharing power with the most vulnerable".

➲ *[R6] Modalities to diffuse decision-making power beyond CBO level to smaller groups / individuals should be tested,* building on existing mechanisms (such as transparency and feedback mechanisms) to ensure that vulnerable people have power over their local institutions.

[7] Major decisions on allocation of funds were mostly taken by AA and/or partners. More effort should go enabling the most vulnerable to take part in decisions on how money is allocated / spent.

➲ *[R7] Ensure that transparency on budgets and mechanisms for joint procurement lead to financial empowerment.*

[8] The project design model allowed micro adaptations within pre-defined macro standard framework. However it is important to broaden options and choices for rights holders, and enable them to choose what intervention they need most rather than giving them only space to adapt pre-existing choices.

➲ *[R8] Increase the involvement of right holders in the project design / choice of priority for action.*

[9] AA effectively coordinated with other agencies at the local level. Further stepping up coordination should involve building capacities of CBOs to coordinate response, consolidating local networks, and increasing their confidence to make other actors accountable. Local civil society platforms (such as Agahi in Kashmore) are an interesting step in this direction.
➲ *[R9] Further step up coordination capacities at field level.*

Observations and recommendations on:
"Adapting systems to emergency"

As far as systems are concerned, AA displayed an impressive capacity to strengthen partners, transferring skills and expertise to them through a variety of modalities. Within AA, systems have been adapted, and learning harvested and used. The 2011 intervention benefited from the experience acquired by staff during the 2010 floods. However, many adaptations and learning are not yet systematized and formalized. The following need particular consideration:

[10] International support proved useful for management and planning (it helped to set up a response plan) and to share methodologies (DRR in particular). However, sharing of practices could have been increased and more contextualized for protection work. Some issues requested to be tackled by the international team were not seen as priorities in the field, or could not realistically produce tangible results – and tended to deflect community-defined priorities.
➲ *[R10] Strengthen international support to share learning, and focus policy work on issues emerging from the response (rather than aligning it to an international agenda).*

[11] The flood response resulted in adaptation of systems and practices (financial, human resources, management), and such adaptations helped to improve the response to flood in 2011. However they have not always been systematized and shared across departments.
➲ *[R11] Further invest in streamlining and institutionalizing adaptations,* e.g. through consolidated comprehensive manuals.

[12] Partners had been strongly supported by AA. A formal strategy for institutional strengthening of partners could help overcome challenges that emerged in the process (helping partners to deal with a sudden increase in staff and resources; increase technical support; diminish the overreliance on informal information sharing; etc.).
➲ *[R12] Continue efforts to build strong partnerships.*

[13] The appropriateness of funding (i.e. flexible funding disbursed by donors that understand and agree AA approach) is key to enable AA to pursue its distinctive approach to emergency. Project proposals should be designed to allow for more flexibility – e.g. by incorporating more cash deliverables rather than prescribed outputs.
➲ *[R13] Develop donor intelligence and relationship as part of preparedness work.*

Observations and recommendations on:
"Ensuring information for empowerment"

In conformity with AA's approach, "communication" has been considered, first and foremost, as a mean to empower right holders by giving access to information; and NOT only as a tool to promote what the organization does. The work of AA displayed an impressive array of practices for sharing information and getting feedback, ranging from reviving of traditional gathering to the use of local media by CBOs. In this setup, monitoring and impact measurement leaned towards community based practices and investment in accountability to rights holders (rather than being an extractive process of collecting data for report writing sake). Recommendations include:

[14] AA needs to spell out its distinctive approach, which is apparent in the field, but not effectively articulated, systematized and shared.
➲ *[R14] Increase capacities to capture and share organizational learning.*

[15] In order to reach and be owned by the most vulnerable, information must be conveyed through multiple means. In Pakistan, AA and its partners have developed a wide range of tools. Building a catalogue could help to take stock and replicate them in the future. Further work should assess the impact of each of these information sharing tools in giving the most vulnerable opportunities to understand, use and act upon information (including financial information).

➲ *[R15] Encourage the multiplicity of information sharing mechanisms.*

[16] Partners (while presenting their work) showed very little understanding of the usefulness of statistics for quality management and advocacy. The capacity to aggregate and use numbers should further empower local actors and vulnerable rights-holders. In addition, the reporting on projects focused predominantly over outputs, and evidence of impact analysis was not always present.

➲ *[R16] Continue to improve monitoring and impact assessment modalities,* leaving analysis and information in the hands of local actors. Improve their capacity to look at impact rather than outputs, "root causes" rather than needs, and to consolidate learning. AA's participatory methodologies already offer strong bases for developing this type of analysis. AA and partners should improve their capacity to better "use numbers".

Methodology



Evaluation team and evaluation mandate

This evaluation was conducted from 4th December to 24th December (plus additional time for report writing). The evaluation team consisted of Silva Ferretti (International Consultant), Luc Bellon (International Consultant) and Sahar Gul (National Consultant). The team was accompanied in the field by Tasadduq Rasul (Impact Assessment and Shared Learning Coordinator for ActionAid Pakistan). The presence of the IASL officer allowed to bring in organizational memory and perspectives as the fieldwork unfolded.

Beyond assessing outcomes and impact of the activities after the floods, this evaluation also interrogated the organizational mandate. The response to the flood was an opportunity to investigate the possibilities of applying AA's approach in emergency, thus being responsive to the needs of the most vulnerable.

Evaluation timeline

Inception work:

- Review of proposals, reports and documentation
- Field visit planning and preparation with the support of IASL AAPK.
- Meeting with AAPK management to get an overview of the programme and discuss evaluation focus
- Areas of investigations sought prioritized by international AA staff involved in the response (through email).

Field visits

2 field visits were conducted in two distinct locations, 4 days each.

- **Day 1: meeting with partners and key stakeholders**
  - Briefing from partners (and in depth discussions) about their activities.
  - Exploration through participatory exercises of key areas of investigation - e.g. decision making mechanisms, linkages across activities and with overall strategies, capacity building.
  - Meetings with external stakeholders (representatives from local government and (I)NGOs active in the area).

- **Day 2-3: visits to project areas**. The visits were planned in agreement with partners, asking them to identify areas yielding interesting learning. Partners were very open in defining different options. SSSWA, for example, chose to show both the least and the most successful successful interventions to present a spectrum of its work. Site visits included:
  - meeting with community organizations / representatives – engaging in lengthy discussion through participatory exercises
  - visits to individual rights holder homes, to check what was delivered.
- **Day 4. Closing workshop**. To deepen discussion with partners based on observation from field visits. The workshop was not designed as a "presentation of findings" but as an opportunity for further discussion around the approaches in use. Participatory exercises were also used, to derive information about the "enabling environment" for the response.

Workshop with management:

Organized in Islamabad to complement field observations with input from management. The workshop included:

- Presentation of the evaluation framework
- A discussion + working groups around "filling in the flower for specific activities" to harvest insights about the fit of the activity within the overall strategy, the space for improvements (particularly focusing on better linkages across the different areas of empowerment and between the different interventions).
- The exercises aimed at drawing concrete propositions on ways to improve organizational support to activities. They identified key organizational functions and processes to support and strengthen emergency responses through a force field analysis of strengths and weaknesses.

Consolidation of findings.

All the information was processed and consolidated by the team in the shape of reports including multimedia.

Criteria for choosing field locations

The flood response had a broad coverage. It took place in all provinces of Pakistan, and in several districts within these. The limited time at disposal imposed to focus fieldwork in 2 locations, which were chosen according to the following criteria

	Criteria for selection	**Key observations**
Donors	To check work funded by different donors for the response. The two most important donors were AusAId – which funded work in Kot Addu – and DEC – which funded projects in Kashmore.	The evaluation ensured to visit sights where the two main donors had funded projects. Nonetheless, no striking differences amongst areas covered by different types of funding were highlighted.

Provinces	Work done in different provinces. Kashmore is in Sindh, Kot Addu in South Punjab. Because of timing and security (travel and authorizations) the evaluation did not look at programmes in KPK. The project areas in Balochistan are closed, and timing and security would have prevented visiting the province anyway.	Overall the macro approach / strategy for response - remained the same, but it was. It was possible to identify contextual micro adaptations.
Partners (old / new)	AA worked with both old and new partners. Hirrak, the partner in Kot Addu was engaged in work with AA prior to the flood. On the other hand, SSSWA in Kashmore was a new partner. The response also took place through direct response (in Thatta), but being this an isolated case, it was left out in the final selection	One year in the response, all partners – old and new – displayed strong understanding of AA approach to emergency.
Partners (type of org.)	AA partner varies, and care was taken to select partners with different approaches. Hirrak is a social movement, oriented to work with specific groups (fishermen, women, farmers). SSSWA is a more conventional local NGO, now mainly funded by AA in the response but with a history of partnership with other international organizations.	Different challenges and modus operandi emerged in the response, linked to the attitude, focus and approach of different partners.
Commitment to future Engagement in the area	In some of the areas where AA worked DA (development areas where AA has long term programmes) were already in existence (e.g. Kot Addu). Others were new areas for intervention.	This allowed exploring different dynamics amongst emergency response and long term intervention. Kashmore is a new area, yet the positive and rapid developments linked to the emergency response have driven AA to consider it as a potential DA.

Other possible criteria were also discussed (e.g. possibility to find different mix of activities, important challenges/learning on which to take stock), but discarded as they appeared not useful for discriminating where to work different organization)

Opportunities and challenges for the evaluation.

Investment in understanding AA approach through its interventions.
AA way to respond to emergency is not the conventional one. It stems for a strong organizational culture revolving around "giving power to people". It takes place in an organization that, over the past few years, experimented with cutting edge modalities of planning and decision making (as defined in ALPS, the organization's Accountability, Learning and Planning System) seeking to devolve power to the rights holders. AAPK's strength lies in its capacity to develop organic approaches and to allow staff and partners enough room to develop their own strategies.

In order to remain as close as possible to the existing approach and philosophy of the organization, the evaluation invested time in understanding the models used, and how they were applied in practice. An important amount of work went into making AA models and systems explicit, based on observation and review of processes, practices, procedures, guidelines and institutional memory of the organization. We hope that this evaluation and the tools it used will be useful for AAPK's own future assessments.

Focus on decision making and accountability mechanisms rather than on deliverables
Time available in the field was very limited (and further reduced by security concerns in the areas visited). Emphasis was therefore given to meeting with community representatives, to understand the nature of their relationship with AA partners, their role in decision-making processes and their capacity to involve the most vulnerable.
Household visits (picked randomly by "walking and stopping by" in Kashmore, and by random selection from a beneficiary list in Kot Addu) were too few to derive general overall conclusions on the quality of the intervention. They were mainly used to have a sense of rights-holders satisfaction, their degree of participation in community consultations /

relationship with local institutions, and existence and strengths of information / feedback mechanisms amongst right holders and AA and partners.
The evaluation predominantly focused on the mechanisms for decision making and accountability in the intervention rather than on the technical quality of the delivery.

Can findings be generalized?
The limited sample of sites visited makes it challenging to generalize findings. The evaluation made use of engagement and workshops with management as an opportunity to understand the extent to which emerging findings and ideas echoed a more general perception and understanding of the response.

Evaluation framework

This report looks critically at AA Pakistan's response to the consequences of the 2010 floods, with the aim of making constructive remarks leading to possible improvements. It also recognizes the fact that AA and its partners focused a lot of their efforts in exploiting new dynamics and create new spaces for participation. Activism and sustained mobilizations of people (e.g. to obtain watan card) were encouraged, and included actors that would normally not have taken an active role. The response was an opportunity to create mixed groups of women and men, something believed impossible before; the flood and the response broke existing barriers "men an women held hands to save each other from the water. This broke a taboo. And now we can hold hand in a protest." People took mobilizations far beyond what Actionaid had initially envisaged (local organizations resisting local landlords, or ending tribal feuds, etc.).
The ultimate goal for encouraging participation is to ensure empowerment of right holders. It is for this reason that the evaluation chose to base its findings on AcionAid's "People, Power and Change" Framework.

The evaluation report

The report is better looked at in the "prezi presentation" allowing dynamically looking at the different components, and also integrating the narrative with multimedia elements.
The Prezi also allows to make more visual the structure of the evaluation, and the analysis process followed.

The prezi is online at:

http://www.docubees.org/projects/?page_id=372

or

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

The distinctive approach of AA to response



The People Power Change framework summarizes the theory of change of AA. It is a framework for empowerment. It looks at different domains of changes, and links them to different types of power shifts. It puts the most vulnerable people at the center, and unveils how AA can support their actions. It thrives to recognize vulnerable people as active actors, rather than passive recipients of assistance.

The present evaluation is based on the People, Power and Change framework (aka Global Monitoring Framework –GMF - or "the flower") in order to:

- highlight what is AA's "distinctive approach to emergency"
- investigate potential for empowerment of the most vulnerable during a humanitarian response
- look at how each specific action enables concerned rights holders to increase their capacities "within", "with", "over" and "to" and positively impacts changes of position and condition of vulnerable people
- see how different activities composing the response complement each other.
- Highlight how actions leading to immediate relief may be detrimental to empowerment in the long term.

Using this framework for the evaluation is all the more coherent because AA PK has designed its approach along the same lines, which is a remarkable achievement at the time of emergencies. The response shows that this framework can indeed be applied to emergency and generate innovative approaches, strengthening the power of people and their local organizations.

Adaptations for emergency work

Despite existing tensions and risks of delays or irrelevance in the emergency, despite the need to adaptation of project implementation tools, the evaluation shows that the AA's pursuit for empowerment should be by all means encouraged at the onset of an emergency.
It makes people affected by the tragedy active actors, and breaks the dependency cycle.

How the framework can be used and adapted is one of the key learning from this evaluation. However, such learning around the approach remain largely undocumented. One of the focus

of this report is to highlight possible ways of taking stock of this experience, as it can help to prepare and model future response (nationally and internationally).

The framework can also help to more clearly illustrate and propose alternative paradigms for action to other humanitarian actors. And it can of course identify areas for improvement and future directions for the work with the people served by the flood response.



To what extent this "empowerment" framework is applicable to an emergency response? Must special provisions be made?
The people, power and change framework is the overall strategic framework for AA applied to The context of the response (a changed landscape where new actors, new needs and new vulnerabilities appear) and the very requirements of an efficient response (in terms of scale and timeliness) do not immediately strike as being compatible with the empowerment approach, but are more easily in tune with mainstream humanitarian models of interventions. The people, power and change framework needs to be adapted in the light of such challenges. Whilst using the framework to stretch thinking on the response, this evaluation also seeks to make a reality check on its applicability.

Can the "most vulnerable" people not only be "targeted" but also involved / empowered as active actors?
The framework puts the most vulnerable in the center of the empowerment process. Putting them at the center requires the capacity to:

- identify who the most vulnerable are
- Frame response to their need as a "right" – and consequently offer a dignified response
- Look at them as active actors

The extent to which this can happen varies according the context of the response:

- Vulnerability changes in the course of a response, and tends to transform from a "disaster induced vulnerability" (especially in the early stages of the response, everyone is indiscriminately affected and in need for life saving assistance) to a "position based vulnerability", where the status, skills or capacities of affected people define their need for assistance and protection.
- The extent to which rights can be "demanded" by the most vulnerable rather than "guaranteed to them" varies across time and across types of interventions.
- The capacity and willingness of the most vulnerable to engage as active actors change. Fully engaging in decision making marginalized actors - possibly feeling more vulnerable than they used to be – can be particularly challenging.

Can a specific activity tackle all areas of change? And, if not…
The framework acts as a reminder that response activities should be designed to maximize opportunities for empowerment. They should be seen as a "mean" to empowerment rather than a end in themselves. Looking at the "flower" for each individual activity (as was done by this evaluation) unveils opportunities for empowerment, which would have been missed if activities were considered solely from the angle of "tangible output" and delivery.
It is important not to take shortcuts when designing an intervention, thinking "another intervention will address this area of change". The risk is to create disconnect and fragmentation (at the end of the day, two different activities, even if part of the same program, might not address the same people!)

… how can different actions complement each other, serving the same groups?
Looking at linkages between different interventions is capital.
Even when two activities each address all areas of change, working on their mutual complementarily may prove to be exponentially beneficial.

Are there any unintended risk of disempowerment during the implementation?
One of the major risks, continuously highlighted, of emergency responses, is to create a culture of dependency. The people most in need are easily "grateful for the relief received", and rarely aware that relief is their right. The culture of dependency is pernicious, and takes a long time to dismantle. Preventing dependency remains a huge challenge in the humanitarian response, even for organizations used to adopting a participatory approach. Being alert to actions which can be, willingly or unwillingly, detrimental to empowerment, is essential.

Three areas of intervention in emergency: reflecting on practices



Action Aid Pakistan adopted a holistic approach for its response to the consequences of 2010 floods. It covered most of the immediate needs that arose after the disaster, while keeping in mind the linkages with its longer term approach. This ensued a wide variety of activities. For the sake of analysis and comparability in terms of processes, they have been grouped in three areas of interventions: 1) ensuring that right holders have access to their basic entitlements; 2) strengthening their capacity to overcome the upheaval of their lives created by the unprecedented floods; 3) contributing to preparedness and reducing risks of such types of disasters happening again.

These three domains are distinct in that they cater for needs which imply responses of different nature. The first focuses on access to tangible / material goods which can contribute to the improvement of individual lives. The second looks at intangible means to strengthen the moral, self confidence of affected people and improve their relationships amongst each other and with other members of society. The third is geared towards enabling people to be able to apprehend, face and possibly curb disaster risks that they may be face din the future, thus making them more secure about their own future.

It easy to see how these domains, however distinct (especially in terms of the way they can be apprehended), are closely interrelated. In fact, Action Aid has addressed them all realizing that empowerment needs these three components to be ensured; they cannot be dissociated. It is therefore of the utmost importance that interventions keeps the linkages in mind. If the most vulnerable who receive material goods are not supported in standing on their feet and do not take part disaster preparedness, then Action Aid will have to fully support their empowerment. On the contrary, if the same group of people is involved in these different processes, Action Aid will have created the best possible enabling environment for empowerment.

In the following we look in detail at some of the activities done by AA and its partners.
The "flower" is used to sum up key considerations and identify:

- the features which had a positive impact on empowerment
- the features which could disempowered rights holders and weaken interventions.

Ensuring basic entitlements

Food and non-food distribution.



In Kot Addu, a total of 3631 households received food and non-food items.
In Kashmore, a total of 1500 households received food and non-food items.

Relief activities involved distribution of food and non-food items, in camps as well as in villages. The distributions took place in camps as well as in villages. The food kit consisted mostly of staple foods and was usually equivalent to a one month ration. Selection of items was done in consultation with people. The non-food items comprised of mostly of kitchen and cooking appliances. In both areas, the procurement was done – as much as possible – through local markets. The approach focused on visibility and transparency, with lists of beneficiaries and what should the kit contain being posted at the distribution points. This process was time consuming (allowing the time for each right holder to thoroughly check the content of the kit before accepting it) and led to tensions linked to impatience. Yet the overall impression is that the added value of taking more time was worth it, as it avoided fights and looting. In parallel with distributions, in Kot Addu, the pre-existence of networks of activists has enabled to create a non-institutionalized collective movement to claim rights to food and NFI. This achievement is linked to previous experiences in mobilizations; the opportunity was not pro-actively created, but well utilized.

Tangible services

- Overall rights holders are satisfied about the intervention [Relevance / appropriateness]
- The most vulnerable are targeted. Lists verified through participation of right holders. [Targeting]
- Monitoring and complaint mechanisms in place helped to ensure quality of materials delivered [Monitoring]

- To what extent those who have not received food or NFI need or have the capacity to procure these goods? To what extent the coping mechanisms have been analyzed? How to determine the threshold (combining need and vulnerability) beyond which individuals should not benefit from the service delivery? [Coverage]
- Some issues of duplication of kit distribution have been mentioned [coverage / monitoring]
- The specialization of each group (in Kot Addu) might also determine which vulnerable people are taken in consideration – for example, none of these groups are particularly focused on people with disabilities [coverage]

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Awareness, knowledge, behaviors

- Leadership skills increased for those involved in mobilization for getting food and NFI in camps [Capacity]
- Rights holders are informed about what will be delivered during distributions. [Transparency]
- Right holders were actively involved in identifying the needs and specification of various items etc. [Awareness]

- The risk of creating a dependency on aid has not been frontally tackled (no evidence during the evaluation)

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

Policies, institutions

- Rights holders participated in need identification and in defining content of kits (type of food, NFI) [Power of Right Holders to decide (outputs)]
- Following series of protests organized by community activists, the government recognizes the informal camp in Kot Addu and distributes food, as well as veterinary support to livestock. Other International Organizations (in Chowk Munda) was also made to provide better quality food [Accountability / campaigning]

- Although involved in ensuring quality and content of kits, the RH make do with what is available (in terms of funds), and did not have opportunities to engage in discussions regarding budget allocations and priorities [Power of Right Holders to decide (finance)]
- To what extent have specific provisions been made to ensure that illiterate people grasp and understand the overall response (considering they cannot understand visibility boards)? [Accountability]

Organizing, mobilizing, networking

- CBOs are involved at all stages of the process (distribution, sharing lists and criteria, etc.) ensuring fair allocation of outputs [collective ownership]
- In Kot Addu (Chowk Munda) activists in camps mobilized other affected people to request food from government / other organizations [mobilization]
- This mobilization built on existing structures, created by Hirrah prior to the flood (Hali Sanh, Treimat Sanjh, Sindhu Bachao Tarla).

- In Kot Addu, slow responsiveness of AA in adapting distribution guidelines to the structure of the organization (the initial model proposed for creating committees bypassed the already constituted collective groups and attempted to create new ones, potentially jeopardizing the sustainability of the groups)
- Some of the committees created in Kot Addu to manage delivery of immediate needs, were not made into relays for longer tem interventions. Reliance on lobbying structures created before the floods meant that the potential for other forms of mobilization was not taken advantage of [Emergency specific committees]

Shelter

Shelter was provided to rights-holder through delivery of cash/ materials combined with provision of technical assistance (in Kashmore). The approach ensured that shelter was not only a process of "service delivery", but had implications across the flower (e.g. through: set up of procurement committees, mechanisms for accountability and feedback, provision of technical assistance).

Different options for distributing shelter have been opted for. In both the cases observed, right holders have been involved in monitoring and constructing the house.

HDC, in Kot Addu, gave vouchers (20000Rs) - to buy materials form a local vendor. Additional cash was given as "cash for work" for building (or for recruiting labor).

- A thorough process of selection of most vulnerable – and validation by AA partner – was put in place.
- A procurement committee, including AA, partner and community representatives, chose the vendor.
- No construction design was imposed, therefore allowing the construction to be adapted to local knowledge and norms
- Once they received the token, community members worked autonomously. For example, no joint arrangement was made for sharing labor.
- Channels for contacting the partners (for complaints / support) were available, but not always known by right holders.

SSSWA, in Kashmore created a design and supervised its construction (towards creating a more expansive house, 64000RS). The design included wall, ceiling, but not the floor (to be contributed by right holders)

- The shelter consisted of one room, built in concrete. Roof construction used bamboos patar (Wooden and straw sheets) and mud mortar, an indigenous technique.
- Sphere standards were considered in planning the house.
- People had the option to make small adaptation and customize their houses. In some cases the shelter were unfinished (e.g. not plastered), and it was not always clear how the remaining / surplus materials (extra cement bags, etc.) were used.

Tangible services (!)		Awareness, knowledge, practices
• All houses are inhabited, and people are satisfied about them. The quality of the material, the methodology employed and the targeting were praised. Housing was a priority need. [relevance] • The distribution targeted the most vulnerable. No tensions were mentioned regarding allocations. [targeting] • Materials are of good quality, and procured on local markets [efficiency / appropriateness] • In Kot Addu, providing materials allowed people freedom to customize their house [appropriateness] • In Kashmore the house model was designed based on Sphere standards and water resistance techniques [appropriateness].	+	• In Kashmore people are aware about water proof techniques and durability of the building [Knowledge] • In Kot Addu those receiving shelters had the opportunity for self management (hiring skilled and unskilled labor through CFW received). [Use of local skills/knowledge] • In Kashmore design was based on local standards and techniques but also with reference to international sphere Standards and some DRR features. [Use of local skills/knowledge]
• There were delays in procurement and delivery. At times delays were due to funds being un-availability (an audit prevented timely disbursement in one occasion). [Timeliness] • Problems were solved, but could they have been anticipated through better organizational preparedness and adapted systems? [systems] • In both areas many vulnerable families still did not get access to houses. [Coverage] • In Kot Addu, the lack of technical support might miss an opportunity to improve quality/DRR relevance of local housing [Appropriateness]. • In Kashmore the design is water proof but not necessarily flood resistant (e.g. lack of raised vaults, access to ceiling). [Appropriateness]. • Shelter delivery was often separated from toilet delivery . The flexibility of the package was an advantage to avoid duplication with the work done by other organizations, however cases of shelter provided and lacking toilets were also found.	!	• Shelters were given to vulnerable people, with little scope of direct management, creating a receiving mentality detrimental for longer term involvement and empowerment [Capacity and behaviors] • Missed opportunities for improvements in shelter and increasing DRR knowledge (e.g. innovations in shelter design, discussion on shelter design). Missed opportunity also on learning from AA's DRR experience and models in other countries [Knowledge] • Absence of measures / assistance customized to specific vulnerabilities (disabilities, etc.) may be a lost opportunity in increasing awareness about vulnerabilities and discrimination. [Awareness]



Policies, institutions		Organizing, mobilizing, networking
• By signing the delivery form, people have the power to effectively complain about / refuse improper material – in terms of type and quality of items delivered: the CBO is held accountable for quality delivery. [Accountability / complaint mechanisms] • Procurement process allows right holders to influence directly the vendor in delivering appropriate material. CBOs could request Partner and AA to improve quality of material / ensure that contract with vendor would be terminated in case of inappropriate delivery [procurement / Accountability]		• Committees involvement at all stages (distribution, sharing lists and criteria, procurement, etc.) ensures collective ownership [Process ownership / CBO role] • Involvement of local CBO in beneficiary selection and cross-checking the accuracy of beneficiary lists (CBO level), linked to transparency mechanisms for information sharing at community level. [Targeting / transparency]
• Local communities not involved in deciding upon the best ways of allocating the overall available funds – for example: should the shelter cost less and cover more, or should there be different allocations for different household types? Although satisfied with the service delivery, they were not empowered to take decisions on this matter. Choices, for rights holders, was restricted to customizing building options – at the family level . within an allocated lampsum for shelter. [Project design and financial management] • Some right holders were not aware of availability of complaint mechanisms. [Accountability]		• To what extent were all rights holders (i.e. non CBO members) involved in the distribution process? Many received shelter mainly as "beneficiaries". [Mobilization] • Missed opportunities in pooling resources (financial, technical, know how) constructing houses: were the construction of shelter a collective effort, or only a personal / domestic concern? [Solidarity] • Missed opportunities to organize neighborhood level action groups - to increase active participation in common action also by these not directly involved in CBO work (e.g. organizing collective transport to bring building materials to the village: it happened occasionally – through people's own initiative - but was not actively encouraged by the programme) [Participation]

WASH



Recovery WASH interventions were quite conventional ones, focused mainly on:

□ Provision of toilets / Provision of hand-pumps / Education and sensitization to better hygiene practices

Activities have been focused mainly on the delivery of services, some awareness raising (on hygiene and DRR) and mobilization (procurement committees). This area of work overall seems to have offered little in terms of linkages with broader issues and rights advocacy work.

Tangible services

- Villagers have clean water available through the provision of collective hand pumps (1 for 5 to 7 households)
- Vulnerable people gained access to toilets
- Quality of materials ensured through monitoring and complaint mechanisms [Monitoring]
- Women are targeted in priority for health and hygiene promotion as they are generally in charge of domestic cleanliness. [Targeting]

- To what extent are those not receiving toilets able to ensure proper sanitation in their homes? And what measures have been / could have been put in place to address lack of sanitation facilities – and related health risk? [coverage/impact]
- No special provisions made for specific vulnerabilities (e.g.: customized toilets for disabled) [appropriateness]

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Awareness, knowledge, behaviors

- Increased knowledge in health and hygiene - through the distribution of kits, delivery of trainings [Knowledge and awareness]
- The building of elevated hand pumps helped to communicate DRR issues [DRR awareness]

- To what extent it would have been possible to link sensitization on hygiene with awareness work on broader issues or make the messages more incisive? Right holders met could recall little more than "good hand washing" as key messages from the sensitization work. [Right awareness]

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- Hygiene training is short and standard. To what extent does it take stock on existing practices and knowledge? Have KAP surveys been conducted and used as baseline information to determine training needs? [Relevance / assessment]

PEOPLE, POWER

Policies, institutions

- Little evidence of RH being involved in the project design (consultation took place, but it did not encompass discussing financial options and adaptation of the model)
- Few instances of linkages betwen health / sanitation needs and holding duty bearers (government and NGOs) accountable for improving the living conditions in the village. Only one specific campaign was mentionned in Kashmore (Ghauspur) [accountability]

CHANGE

Organizing, mobilizing, networking

- Committees involvement (distribution, sharing lists and criteria, etc.) ensures collective ownership [Process ownership]

- No evidence that WASH activities have increased the solidarity at village level concerning the improvement of sanitation / collective handling of village level issues [Solidarity and linkages]

Seeds and livestock distributions

Several activities sought to restore agricultural livelihoods, such as:

- Seeds distributions,
- distributions of livestock (goats, chickens),
- kitchen gardening kits

Activities have been oriented mainly to the delivery of services, but linked to consultation with beneficiaries about items to be distributed. Trainings were also provided. Some activities (e.g. kitchen gardens) promoted new practice, a challenging endeavor at the time of emergency, and seemed to have been successful in doing so. Agricultural activities potentially have strong linkages with the long-term activities of both partners, but it is unclear to what extent they have been seen as connected to these. Longer term activities could have offered further spaces for mobilization and awareness work (on vulnerabilities, gender, discrimination as well as technical support)

Tangible services

- The seeds distributed were of acceptable quality to all people interviewed [quality]
- The distribution and allocations were seen as fair by people interviewed [Coverage]
- The amount gained through seed distribution (both staple crops and vegetables) has been calculated and the information conveyed to the right holders (though the study is not segregated at household level) [Impact monitoring]
- Distribution of tools ensured some sustainability
- Provision of veterinary support at the time of need ensured survival of hens [Monitoring]

- Delays in procurement and delivery. Some delays in distribution made farmers sew wheat seeds very late. Although they are expected to grow, the yield might be affected. Could problems have been anticipated through better organizational preparedness? [timeliness]
- The different value / size of livelihood deliverables and the possibility to combine them was used to address differential needs in the community. However the criteria through which this happened were not clearly spelled out. [coverage]
- Coverage of activities was not sufficient for all needy households. No clarity on provisions for those left out, or analysis of their vulnerability [coverage]

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Awareness, knowledge, behaviors

- New practices introduced: kitchen gardening was not widely practiced in the area before, but the training received enabled most to bring the crops to maturity [Knowledge]
- Through trainings and monitoring visits households increased their capacity to sustain themselves (increased agricultural and veterinary knowledge) [Knowledge].
- Some women benefited from entrepreneurship trainings [Knowledge]
- Cost saving analysis done by RHs and Partners through the interventions (e.g. in Kashmore)

- Trainings received were only of one day, and considered as insufficient by AA's agricultural expert (estimating the required time to be at least 3 days). [Knowledge]
- Some of the content was considered redundant by trainees ("we are farmers, we know this stuff"). How can the training be made more relevant? [Knowledge]
- Training on livelihoods could have included more systematically market / entrepreneurial analysis, to indicate to households possible alternatives for investing money [Knowledge].
- Targeting of women for distributions even when member of male headed household. In the absence of direct linkages with other gender awareness work, to what extent has this increased or confused the notion of gender related vulnerabilities? [Targeting]
- Livestock and seed distributions have not yet been linked to an overall analysis of food security issues in the area, and connected vulnerability [PVA analysis]

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

Policies, institutions

- Right holder in Kot Adu got engaged with the district livestock department for better vaccination, appointment of livestock doctors and veterinary clinic.

- Some distribution attempted to target women as a priority, to give them control of goods. Female respondents, however, did not feel that this was a major breakthrough. In addition - in men-headed households - at times outputs were delivered to men, sometimes to women. The logic behind targeting – and its linkages with women empowerment, were not always clear [Targeting]
- The potential of livelihood activities for contextual adaptation through community decision making was not harvested. The seed distribution was not linked to any empowerment in terms of financial management and deciding overall if the program money should be spend on this rather than something else (such as buying tractors for the community, etc.)
- Seed distributions to landless farmers implies that the landowners will ultimately ripe considerable benefits, has they get a share of the production. Partners were aware of this issue, and they tried to negotiate better conditions for access to land, but with little result

CHANGE

Organizing, mobilizing, networking

- Committees involvement (distribution, sharing lists and criteria, etc.) ensures collective ownership of the process [Process ownership]

- Distributions targeting women were not accompanied by opportunities for joint work on livelihood. Could a different design of livelihood activities had increased the awareness of women rights and solidarity around it? [Gender based solidarity]

Cash for work



Cash for work (CFW) was not always intended in the common sense of "provide temporary employment in collective projects", but more generally as cash handouts for individuals or groups, tied to specific projects.

- In Kot Addu, CFW was linked to shelter delivered, and granted – household-by-household – as a contribution for labor costs. Households could do the building themselves, and cash the money, or pay skilled workers.
- In Kashmore it was allocated to community initiatives, and this gave some room for decision making on activities to community groups. Some engaged in road repairs, others built storage canes and stoves to be sold locally to generate income.

Cash handouts can open interesting opportunities for response. It can allow collective financial decision-making and budget management. It can support collective mobilization (e.g. village savings). Overall the modalities of delivering cash – even if successful - did not fully exploit opportunities. Cash handouts should be regarded as an area for improvement for AA and partners, in consideration of their potential for flexible adaptations and as a mean for empowerment.

Tangible services	Awareness, knowledge, behaviors
• Some products made through CFW were then sold in the market, thus further increasing the purchasing power of concerned households [Effectiveness] • CFW activities and their expected outputs (construction of shelter, grain stocking, road and retaining walls) were monitored [monitoring]	• CFW has contributed to knowledge related to DRR when used for shelter construction. [Knowledge] • The use of CFW for shelter construction has allowed RH to directly manage the construction and decide upon certain modifications [capacity building]
• No evidence of any monitoring of what the earned income was spent for (daily expenditures? Domestic material? Other?) [monitoring] • To what extent are those not receiving having satisfactory livelihoods? Has the activity increased the relative vulnerability of those not covered? How does the organization determine the threshold (combining need and vulnerability) beyond which individuals should not benefit from the service delivery? [coverage]	• Missed opportunities in fully exploiting the potential of cash handouts (e.g. in terms of budget skills, sharing know-how on linked / potential activities, building entrepreneurial skills…) • To what extent CFW has been an opportunity to reflect upon the local market mechanisms, the daily wages practiced locally, the job opportunities, etc. linking to right awareness?



Policies, institutions	Organizing, mobilizing, networking
• The activity of CFW was initiated at home by women in Kot Addu & Kashmore which was later on adopted by UN-OCHA and a sub-cluster group was formed which was promoting & replication it for women in all humanitarian actors flood response.	• Where the option was given, the use of CFW was collectively decided upon through meetings and consensus at village level [Solidarity / collective decision making]
• Few instances where CFW activities have been linked to power over, such as asking for the government to complement the works done with CFW, thus strengthening the initiative taken at village level	• CFW could have been used as an open door for collective financial management at village level, using participatory methodologies such as village level saving and loan groups, etc. [Collective financial management] • In Kot Addu, cash deliveries at the individual level only missed opportunities for pooling resources and collective decision making. [Collective management / solidarity]

WATAN card movement



Action to get the WATAN card (and hence to access 75.000Rs grant by the government to disaster affected households) was conducted through awareness raising and campaigning. Actions took place at different level, linking work at the local and the national level.
This action played to the strengths of AA and its partners: they created awareness of rights and entitlements, and supported mobilization of people to demand them from duty bearers. It was also used as an opportunity to bring women to the forefront in asking for their rights.
Whilst many activists are now more confident of their rights and leadership skills, such confidence and awareness has not always rippled in the broader community. The risk of passive participation must be averted by continuing investment in rights awareness and mobilization in the long term.

Tangible services

- Right Holders originally not included in the government lists receive WATAN cards. Most card holders have received the first tranche of compensation [Coverage]
- The outcomes of the process are being monitored, ensuring that those who have been included in the list receive the card and compensation. [Efficiency]

- In many instances, the people interviewed could not determine how the money was spent. Knowledge of the impact of the card is not known by AA and partners. This limits options to help rights holders to stretch more the compensation received, e.g. by using it in connection with recovery activities such as shelter, livelihoods, etc [Effectiveness]
- 10 to 20% of people still did not get the card [Coverage]

Awareness, knowledge, behaviors

- Right holders are informed about their entitlements and the process to access it [awareness]
- Right holders are informed about complaint mechanisms to government institutions such as NADRA (hotline numbers/learned about the complaint office) [awareness]
- Activist – and women activists in particular - acquire leadership skills [capacity]
- Protests escalate at the national level, and rights holders organize events in Lahore and Islamabad. In the process community activists gain knowledge of "what doors to knock on" to make government accountable and confidence that "we can knock on them". [accountability / awareness]
- Right holders learn how to use and ATM machine to access the money [Knowledge]

- Some women involved in the protest are passive participants. They know vaguely – if at all - what they are protesting for, sometimes expect the demonstration to solve all issues. They were not fully aware of the results and way forward. For some, it is has been a one-off event not leading to continuous mobilization. [awareness]

Policies, institutions

- Government respond to protest by delivering cards, including some needy people who are not registered with NADRA
- A verification system is introduced to and followed by the government
- In the process of understanding entitlements, rights holders are made aware of corruption practices (such as paying money to revenue office in order to get a card) and are able to stand up against them [Accountability / Corruption]

Organizing, mobilizing, networking

- Women protest for the fist time in the streets with the support of other (male) community members [Women Mobilization]
- Creation of a civil society forum (AGAHI) and reinforcement of existing platforms (in Kot Addu, women, farmer and fishermen platforms get together) to tackle collective issues [Networking]
- Media was mobilized to diffuse information, reinforce cohesion of mobilization and pressurize decision makers
- Multiplication of information campaigns (including public meetings, theater, etc.) to ensure that all vulnerable are aware (especially widows) of their rights to demand a card and know how to join forces [Information]
- Action at the local level is linked with national level mobilization. AA support partners by linking up with civil society networks and media

- To what extent can continuity be ensured between this emergency related movement and further mobilizations in the long run? [Mobilization]
- Risk of seeing protests as an achievement in itself (in that they help women to go out of the house) – while their ripple effect of it is not explored / followed up. Stronger impact assessment of campaigning and protests need to be put in place, to judge their effectiveness, to inform participants about achievements and to devise alternatives for action rather than "protest by default". [monitoring / protection]

Self-reliance, coping, resilience

Women and child friendly spaces



Women and child friendly spaces (W/CFS) have been used as the focal point for much action at community level. WCFS build on existing practices and activities – where AA had already a presence – such a reflect circles: availability of funds for emergency work translated in the possibility to institutionalize them and to create ad hoc spaces. WCFS stems from the primary focus of AA on women, and are an opportunity for holistic work around their issues and concerns.

Tangible changes		Awareness, knowledge, behaviors
• W/CFS are highly valued by the women met. The fact of having a place to conduct theater activities, discuss about women issues, engage in training, etc without the presence of men gave to women previously un-experienced freedom. [Relevance] • Emergency-related issues (such as the increase of early marriages) are addressed as priority. [Relevance] • Children activities are also run in the spaces (e.g. education, social psycho support). • W/CFS have made linkages with previous practices (REFLECT) while introducing new one (e.g. theater) • Minority women & children participated in the centers	+	• The emergency context has created a wide understanding of a variety of threats that individuals – and women in particular -may be subject to. [Awareness] • Women are aware about the right to equality, divorce, property, education, and to refuse early marriage. They capable and willing to take action. [Rights awareness] • The convergence of multiple activities help women to build strengths holistically – by satisfying needs (e.g. through livelihoods activities), engaging in prevention (DRR) and engaging in psychosocial activities [Protection]
• To what extent traumatized / most vulnerable (as opposed to the "elite") are encouraged / able to use the space? [Targeting] • To what extent have men been involved and made part of the women movement, thus supporting the trend of women empowerment? Awareness activities for men were mentioned, but they seemed to be ad hoc rather than long term. • Disabled people have been mentioned as needy, but no specific provision were made for them [Relevance]	!	• The protection "manuals" and trainings provided to different actors of the response and RH were essentially focused on women and GBV, possibly shadowing other pressing issues that emerged and needed to be tackled as a priority during the emergency (ex. Tribal feuds in Kashmore / engaging the police against theft, etc.) [**Awareness**] • No specific knowledge on **national laws** which could be used to advocate for better protection mechanisms [Rights awareness]

Policies, institutions	Organizing, mobilizing
• WCFS were the hub leading to women participation to protest and rallies (e.g. for Watan cards, but also to improve law and order and avoid thefts). Such degree of participation is unprecedented. • The case of specifically include women as right holders in emergency has been taken up by Partners and AA at local, district, provincial and national levels. Pressure was made to ensure the registration of women with Pak Gov. in order for them to obtain entitlement and citizenship [Advocacy] • Women have influenced attitudes of family institutions regarding issues such as early marriages, women mobility, entitlement to property, etc. • Some women were encouraged and supported to take action against violence (e.g. divorce filed against husband mistreating wife) • Women started to diminish their – and their family's -reliance on local landlord (e.g. avoiding resorting to them for conflict resolution). Local landlord retaliated by diverting some of the aid away from these communities but, as one woman put it "we prefer to have our freedom even if this means we have less assistance"	• The WCFS builds on Reflect circles, and therefore capitalizes on a rich expertise for group formation and mobilizations [Mobilization]. • In Kot Addu the WCFS are an opportunity to further strengthen the local women movement [Mobilization]. • The WCFS have been the hub for organizing rallying and protests (e.g. on WATAN card) [solidarity]. • Women are actively trying to engage others in the WCFS activities. Door-to-door mobilization / support has been cited by women.[solidarity]
• Strong perception by women interviewed that "mentalities" are changing (regarding marriage, education, and "equality", including the right to take part in decision making), but this is not substantiated by a KAP survey, or any systematic / formal documentation [Impact monitoring]	• To what extent were friendly spaces used to establish referral systems with medical / psychological / social institutions? [Referral]

- Demonstrations have been organized against and have ended a 7 year old feud that caused more than 50 deaths and prevented villagers from reaching nearby markets or working in areas away from their village [conflict resolution]

Reduce impact of future threats

Disaster prevention and preparedness



This flower brings together two processes around DRR

- Sensitization/ preparedness work happening at the village level
- Creation of contingency plans at the district level

The extent to which such processes had linked up in reality varied across areas / communities. The achievements in disaster preparedness can overall be further strengthened by deepening and creating further linkages amongst these two types of processes: the analysis and planning done at community level and the planning / advocacy with government institutions, as per the PVA approach of ActionAid.

Tangible changes

- Contingency plan in the making at village level, with an emphasis on early warning systems (EWS) – i.e. installation of sirens and identification of potentially flooded areas / safe areas.
- DRR task force designated at the district level (Kashmore)

- The DRR related task force and capacities are slowly taking up speed, with several training expected to be received. The emergency has created fertile ground for sensitization around these topics, which – however - might fade away as time goes by (provided no further flood occur over the coming years) [Timeliness]

Awareness, knowledge, behaviors

- Community is newly aware of EWS that can be put in place and basic behaviors for DRR [Awareness].
- In addition, DRR awareness also capitalized on embedding DRR concerns in other activities (see shelter, latrines, hand pumps). [Knowledge]
- Participatory analysis was done at community level to identify hazards / safe places. Safe places and EWS are known by people.
- Basic training on DRR given by AA, which is now being strengthened by SPO ToT (Kashmore)
- People realize that the floods are to a large part a **man made disaster**, and therefore that infrastructures need to be addressed [Awareness]
- Better understanding of government responsibilities and structure around DRR [Knowledge]
- Self reliance of communities, and confidence built through DRR activities: "We do not want to be dependent on NGOs if disaster happens" [Self reliance/ confidence]

- The specific **national laws** related to DRR are not known, beyond the "service duties" which are meant to be performed under specific contracts [Awareness of rights]

Policies, institutions

- Rallies organized around issues related to embankments, canals, dams, roads and drains, The rallies include references to international standards [Advocacy]
- Media is being used to create awareness and strengthen advocacy around DRR issues by partners as well as local organizations [Communication].
- Fears of retaliation for taking issues to the government are lifted [Confidence / Empowerment]
- AAPk with other stakeholders has launched policy advocacy campaign for a more comprehensive government DP/DRR framework including gender & social aspects

- To what extent have the district and national level campaigns been linked with village level contingency planning? [Linkages]

Organizing, mobilizing

- Village volunteers formed on DRR (but not known by all community members) [Mobilization]
- A Task Force is in place in villages (Kashmore) designating people in charge, in case of an emergency, of: search and rescue; relief; coordination, awareness and protection (understood in the wide sense) [Solidarity / networking]
- The civil society network AGAHI is taking in charge collective concerns though coordination and consultation (Kashmore), most of which are DRR related [networking]
- Information campaigns using gatherings (ex. Saath) and media, are regularly organized [Mobilization]
- Partner coordinate with SPO for DRR trainings [networking]
- Creation of linkages with researchers and academics to deepen analysis and lobbying on DRR [Analysis].
- 13 October celebrations across the intervention areas have been an opportunity for mobilization [Mobilization]

- DRR advocacy and awareness have not taken **education facilities and personnel** to task, which could be a lost opportunity (benefiting from AA experience of DRR through school) [Networking]

Broadening the scope of activities

Reasons for broadening the scope of coping / self-reliance activities



The WCFS is the only activity falling squarely in this domain of action, but considerable work on it was done through other activities. The use of participatory approaches, mobilization and campaign activities, the focus in reaching out most vulnerable as active actors… all contributed to strengthen coping capacities and to build self reliance and confidence through relief and recovery activities.
The approach of AA's partners – Hirrak, for example – also lead to enrich response with theatre, art, poetry, music. These are important – and yet too often overlooked aspects – in rebuilding self-reliance and well being of affected people and communities.

Two areas of action – for which extensive experience exist within and outside AA – offer interesting additional pointers and considerations for action in this domain.

Protection work

AA had invested substantially in protection. It deployed an advisor from AA Australia for 1 month, to support training and analysis work.
Protection was narrowly defined: AA International/PK largely saw "protection" as a substitute word for work around women empowerment / gender based violence. This focus was useful to analyze and address specific threats (e.g. forced marriage, domestic violence), but at the risk to overlook other important protection issues. Also, specific protection needs for different groups of women were not spelled out: women tended to be seen as "needing protection by default", regardless of their status, rather than investigating their deferential needs. Local CBOs – building on their local knowledge - were indeed capable to articulate protection in a much more holistic way than what was apparent in the AA "protection manual". They consequently addressed a wider scale of threats and vulnerabilities (such as tribal feuds, tackled with impressive results Their understanding, however is that these actions were done "outside the programmes". It is imperative that AA brings back broader protection activities under its radar, and expand its framing of protection to include and support them.
Another limitation of protection work was its overall "top down" focus in illustrating protection. There was, for example, emphasis on international instruments rather than on national law in the training, indicating the need to further adapt / contextualize the work.

Psychosocial work

Psychosocial activities play an important part within the process of supporting and rebuilding resilience and self-reliance.
When understood as "support mechanisms to help individuals and communities to rebuild dignity and respect - as well as their sense of control over their lives and environment" - psychosocial activities complement and play well to the strengths of AA.

The understanding of "psychosocial" of AAPK and its partners, however, tended to be quite narrow, and the full potential of this domain of activity was not fully exploited (or achievements remains largely tacit). Psychosocial activities were considered as a recovery activity – and yet they are key in the relief phase. However, many activities that would fall under the "psychosocial realm" done in the aftermath of the emergency were not labeled as such. Framing these activities as psychosocial might help to identify more clearly some existing gaps (for example, in terms of coverage, support for referral etc.) and to provide additional support (e.g. psychosocial first aid / emergency kit)

Achievements and challenges

Make this domain more explicit, measure change within it.

Work on building resistance is indeed a central feature of AA work, which remains often implicit. It is therefore important for AAPK to spell out this domain of activity and– most importantly – to better measure change within it. Whilst the assumption is that – for many activities – that they will increase agency and self-reliance of people, impact is only measured anecdotically. When self-reliance is coupled with activities responding to needs, the "hard outputs" are measured, but the "soft" components are not tracked. Indicators and processes to measure change in these areas are lacking,	**Develop indicators and processes:** Indicators and processes to measure change in resilience / capacity to cope are still lacking, and need to be developed by AA. Such indicators should become an integral component of monitoring for empowerment. **Participatory monitoring** The abovementioned Indicators and processes should not be understood as "extractive" measures. Participatory processes for measuring confidence and self-reliance could become themselves an integral part of empowerment, leading people to appreciate the deepest changes in their lives. Opportunities to assess them in innovative ways (for example using storytelling / multimedia) are evident in the programmes and match partner's expertise.

Women… but not only!

The focus of AAPK on women ensured that they were always put at the center of this domain of action, at the risk, however, of missing out the needs of other vulnerable individuals and groups in the community. AA's approach had tended to present and tackle women as an isolated group within communities, and to treat them as the "most vulnerable by default" missing out possibilities to build their resilience in connection with others, to understand differentials	**Focus - not exclusivity! - on women** AA needs to redefine the focus of women so that prioritizing it does not create the risk of overlooking other vulnerabilities. **Broaden protection** AAPK programme offer important learning on how communities had tackled protection issues, e.g. through action on feuds. The concern of a partner

amongst women, and for more holistic work. Luckily such compartmentalization was broken - at the field level - by partners and communities. In Kot Addu, relief work became an opportunity to bring women and men network together on common action. In Kashmore sensitization work with men addressed women rights, and work on other key vulnerabilities – e.g. deriving from feuds - was initiated by CBOs.	"how can be share learning that happened OUTSIDE the programme, such as work on feuds?" indicates the need for AA to broaden up its understanding of protection to capitalized on / promoted these practices.

Reaching out and building resilience of the most vulnerable

To what extent this domain of activity reaches out the most vulnerable? Protection work helped to address the needs of abused women in the communities – and women in the WCFS mentioned that they are going from door to door to tackle such issues. There is however still a risk that activities such as the WCFS address predominantly participants that "opt in" rather than being "reached out". In addition, whilst AA has much expertise in linking women vulnerability to active action, it still lacks similar approaches to support groups recurrently defined as vulnerable in its project targeting (e.g. the aged, the disabled). Framing some categories as vulnerable, but without having resources to build their resistance comes at the risk of disempowerment: people can be targeted by the "service delivery" part of the work, but do not receive support in building their self-confidence and resilience.	**Strengthen reach out initiatives** Strengthen capacity to reach out most vulnerable people, and to engage them as active actors. Some modalities of participation in use – and through which much of the implicit resistance work is done (e.g. large meetings, building of local institutions) might not be accessible to them. **Develop processes and tools to address specific categories** Some categories of vulnerabilities – e.g. aged / disabled – were addressed as passive beneficiaries. AAPK seems to lack tools and processes to specifically build their resilience and self-confidence. This is an important disconnect that the AAPK needs to address. **Strengthen referral mechanisms** AAPK did not exhibit strong referral mechanisms to support these affected by trauma. This is an important area to address in future emergency, and preparedness work should be directed to identify support networks.

Reasons for broadening the work on reducing impact of future hazards



The 2010 flood raised attention in AAPK about the importance of DRR, and it became a strong feature of all the programmes observed. DRR was done through stand-alone activities, but also by linking DRR awareness into other activities (e.g. shelter, WASH). Linkages of DRR and

other activities could be further strengthened and systematized – and learning to this extent captured for future emergencies.

DRR was not understood narrowly - merely as "awareness raising" and "infrastructure building". It was linked to mobilization and community-lead advocacy. DRR fits well the mandate of the AA, allowing to link immediate response with long term empowerment. AA international has considerable experience around DRR, and its own methodology: the Participatory and Vulnerability Analysis and Action Approach (PVA). Experience was shared through peer support (from Nepal), substantially strengthening this area of work. It was noted, however, that AA should complement peer support with stronger repositories of practices on DRR, and proactively share it with countries: much institutional knowledge was left untapped.

DRR had emerged as a pivotal area of work, which also resonate with the needs and aspirations of AA's partners and CBOs. Two main directions of work stems from the DRR and preparedness work done so far:

- Maintain momentum on disaster work, and continue to support the ongoing advocacy and campaigning work (e.g. on mega structures), strengthening linkages across partners, and using DRR as a vehicle for empowerment of communities.
- Expand the understanding of vulnerability and of preparedness - and of the actors that can be involved in addressing it.

Disasters are not "natural": demanding the right to safety.

The understanding that disasters are not "natural", but largely man-made has been solidly at the core of the DRR action. Research work on root causes (e.g. on mega-structures) informed DRR work of AA partners. It was captured and shared in a variety of formats (including video). It fed into policy demand and campaign actions at different levels, and through different modalities: with a more participative approach at the district level (contingency planning); and more in "campaigning mode" when tackling national and international actors (e.g. World bank)	**Linking participatory and expert analysis** There is still a slight disconnect amongst the analysis done at village level and modalities for researching and tackling macro issues. Much analysis work was done involving experts and academics. It should be complemented - in the spirit of PVA - by aggregated local knowledge. Macro issues are not always fully owned by community members and conversely – analysis of causes is often expert driven rather than linked to participatory analysis on the ground, which could enrich and substantiate it. **Make duty bearers accountable to the law.** There is room to strengthen capacity to use the law in DRR work. At the national level, policy briefs explored legislative frameworks / budget analysis. Not all this information trickled to the CBO level. Partners were aware of the international frameworks for DRR work (e.g. Hyogo framework) but communities where not informed about it, or of relevant national legislation. Some local groups are already mature for advocacy action supported by knowledge of law and entitlements so this aspect should be tackled as a priority.

DRR and organizational preparedness

DRR was understood by AA and its partners not only as preparedness to confront the disaster on the ground – e.g. through early warning, rescue systems, etc - but also as "organizational preparedness". Across the board - from AAPK to local organizations there is a growing understanding of the role that organizational preparedness can play, and measures have been taken accordingly.	**Continue to foster a culture of preparedness in community organizations** What stood out in meetings with community organizations was their awareness of the importance of a strong, local organization in driving relief efforts at the time of disaster. Local organizations strongly expressed the willingness to be able to stand on their feet and be able confront emergency with no external help. Sub-committees have been created and are active to this end. It is key to maintain this culture of preparedness in the long term. **Strengthen AA's preparedness** The 2010 made AAPK more aware of the need for preparedness work. There is evidence that lessons learned in 2010 flood were used to improve efficiency of the 2011 response. However preparedness seems

	still to be happening haphazardly, and there is a need for a stronger and cohesive preparedness strategy, allowing to fully capitalizing on adaptations and learning so far.

Expand the remit of prevention work

Most action on DRR was focused on response to floods, but other vulnerabilities are equally important and should be incorporated in analysis and action. The modalities of work used in DRR work can be used and adapted to prevent also other threats affecting communities. As communities gain confidence of their capacity to prevent natural disasters, they could be accompanied to address other vulnerabilities through similar processes, as per PVA approach.	**Broaden understanding of vulnerability** DRR is an opportunity to broaden the understanding of vulnerabilities. **Broaden stakeholders (duty bearers and allies)** DRR should continue to be an opportunity to build alliances and address duty bearers. The DRR work had already stretched out to encompass many actors, but other possibilities still exist. For example, educational structures could be tapped in, building on existing experience by AA. Similarly, action on duty bearers should not be limited to the government (and the World Bank) only. Stronger analysis of root causes of vulnerabilities could lead to unveil possibilities for action also with other power structures. **Link DRR to conflict sensitivity** Conflict sensitivity needs also to be strongly integrated in the DRR work, in contexts were feudal and tribal dynamics are at play.

Main challenges linking emergency work with a long term approach

The analysis of activity flowers and their interconnection helped to discuss the impact of AA activities. Most of the points made under stem from what makes Action Aid's approach different from many other organizations, which is to increase the empowerment of disaster stricken people at the onset of an emergency intervention. This commendable approach also induces specific challenges related to the timeliness, targeting and coverage of the overall action

Timeliness

One of the immediate consequences of focusing on participation and empowerment during an emergency intervention is a relatively slow inception speed and spending curve. These have been a cause of concern for AA and other key stakeholders (e.g. international support functions, donors).

Interestingly, however, stakeholders supported the positive impact of the community participation despite the delays and slow inception it causes. No overt dissatisfaction about the intervention was witnessed. The pattern that emerged in the response was:

- AA PK managed a quick access to affected population for life saving interventions, especially in the areas where it had operating DAs.
- Early recovery programmes had a slower inception, as considerable time was spent in consultation, preparation, and stepping up capacity of partners (i.e. capacity to respond to emergency and capacity to scale up the response).
- The overall spending were delayed as compared to donor-bound timeframes and expectations.

The resulting "spending curves" can be schematically represented in the following manner:



This is a rough – and impressionistic graphic representation of a general trend. Donors tend to expect a spending curve which peaks rapidly, and allow for quick disbursement of funds. AA tends to "start slow" and disburse the bulk of fund after considerable preparatory work. It would be very informative if ActionAid was to accurately plot the actual spending for each project on such curve, and compare it to the initially planned timeframe for the utilization of funds. It would inform how to reduce delays and / or better explain the curve to donors, and manage expectations on spending.



Reduce delays The spending curve has been delayed by several factors, including lack of preparedness, challenges in procurement due to local market situation, blocking spending when concerns from whistle-blowing mechanisms emerged, time consumption in building structures, identifications of right holders and involvement of right holders in procurement processes. These reasons for delays should be closely examined and transformed into institutional learning in order to avoid them as much as possible.	**Explain the curve** The shape of the curve (longer inception work) is intrinsic to the longer term approach of AA. AA needs be explicit about this trend in proposal timelines providing evidence of the added value of such approach within a response; to negotiate funding, and better communicate with key stakeholders.
AAPK has learned from the flood response, and managed to anticipate and modify the spending curve in its response to the 2011 floods. This trend for stronger preparedness should be continued and formalized.	One of SSSWA's main learning was the importance of participation during an emergency response. "Other organizations were faster to delivery, but they were confronted with looting, tensions or security issues. We did not". It is important for AA PK to document such cases, and build comparative analysis to explain the advantages of its approach.

Targeting / vulnerability

AAPK was successful and identifying the most vulnerable transparently. Selection criteria were posted by CBOs, whilst right holders generally (though not always) of the selection criteria. A thorough verification process was also put in place, to cross check distribution lists. The community members visited had no issue about the way assistance was delivered, and were adamant that assistance went to needy people.

There is little doubt that those addressed were vulnerable. However, were ALL most vulnerable people targeted, or even identified? The vulnerability criteria used were quite standard (women and elderly headed households, PWD, poor) except for "minorities" which are seldom considered during emergencies. The fact that AA would emphasize on some vulnerability criteria can help partners to broaden their own understanding of vulnerabilities. But these criteria might also prevent actors from considering local causes of vulnerabilities, such as people under the domination of specific feudals, or the impact of tribal feuds. The evaluation discovered that some of these vulnerabilities had been addressed by people who considered their initiative as being "outside the project".



The diagram shows the need to adapt vulnerability criteria by combining: AA pre-determined criteria (bringing attention to some vulnerabilities possibly overlooked), criteria defined by right holders, and expanded knowledge through participative context analysis:

- **Reach out to most vulnerable.** The creation of the WCFS allows programmes institutionalize a welcome structure for RHs. Yet there is a risk that most vulnerable people might not have the will/ time / capacity / freedom to access the place. ALL women and children are not vulnerable; it is therefore important to understand who comes to the center. Active women of WCFS reached out vulnerable women through door to door visits, but it was hard to gauge the extent of their outreach. Such activities must to be promoted, monitored, and supported with specialized know-how.
- **Do not pre-empt vulnerability analysis**. AA transposes in emergency its gender focus with the analysis that women are the most vulnerable in emergencies. This was put on the agenda important issues (e.g. forced marriages). However this assumption may have overlooked vulnerabilities of other categories, and other potential course of action. For example, men trauma was not directly addressed, while it was noticed that the flood had resulted in increase of domestic violence because of it. In a context where cultural barriers force men to hide trauma, broadening understanding of vulnerability might reveal alternative and efficient course of action. Similarly, post-emergency protection related risks included looting, kidnapping and murders which could not have been tackled through a gender focus only.
- **Customize the interventions according to the vulnerabilities analyzed**, thus insuring that the activity will also reduce the specific vulnerability. For example, special provisions could be made in the toilet or house design to cater for problems linked to physical disabilities

Coverage

AA projects have limited coverage and fail to assist all the vulnerable people in an area. This is a challenge in a context where, increasingly, coordination mechanisms tend to encourage a single international organization to work in one area, and cover all the needs
Coverage not only looks at the number of people covered by an intervention, but also at the relevance of the choices made in selecting the right holders. This means matching the vulnerability criteria with the type of interventions.



- **Vulnerable people as active actors.** AA does not always have the know-how to best empower the vulnerable categories it has identified. Whilst AA has rich tools to address women vulnerabilities and empower them, this is not always the case for other categories. For example, tools dedicated to disabled people are lacking.
- **Cover all most vulnerable** Ensuring that all deserving people receive their due; that the fact of not receiving does comparatively increase a person's vulnerability; and that vulnerable people do not become passive and dependant recipients of aid
- **Clearly measure and define the coping mechanisms,** including of the people not covered. This will enable a more customized coverage depending on the activities, and a clear identification of what an acceptable threshold (beyond which people receive nothing) can be.
- **Involve the less vulnerable** in the intervention process to create synergies, increase solidarity and benefit from their leadership capacities when relevant

Ways forward: enabling environments for empowerment

Bring decision making processes at the grassroots



One of the key element to increase the empowerment of the most vulnerable is to bring decision making as close to them as possible.
If they technically do not have the capacity to undertake decisions on their own, this capacity should be build.
In parallel, intermediary representative institutions (village level organizations for example) could take responsibility of some of the decision making.
In short, empowerment involves maximum decentralization of decision making.
Empowering the "most vulnerable" is the ultimate result of an approach where power needs to be shared across multiple actors.

Overall, decision making powers have been substantially devolved, especially considering the challenges to do so at the time of emergency and, at times, in areas where AA had not worked before (with weak understanding of the worth of participation).
The achievements in terms of engaging in decision making, actors that have been marginalized, and are now even more vulnerable than they used to be, have been remarkable.

Sharing power with partners

AA effectively shared decision making with partners, whilst also building their capacity to more effectively conceive and manage interventions.

- AA retained power to define "macro" sectors of interventions, but partners have room to define micro adaptations within overall plan
- Plans and budgets were transparently shared and discussed.
- Procurement was largely decentralized
- **Share and explain donor requirements**. AA put considerable effort in sharing donor requirements with partners (e.g. through inception workshops for sharing donors guidelines and budgets; set up and training on accounting software and training; refresher training – e-g- on DEC project; through monitoring and internal audit). However partners still lamented insufficient/unclear sharing of donors requirements, preventing them from grasping the extent of flexibility and constraints they have to operate.

Empowering communities

Ensuring participation at the time of emergency is challenging, but AA partners largely succeeded in doing so.
These tables (designed with community members in the course of the fieldwork) highlight their perceptions on who had the power to decide, and on what topic.
Partners shaped the creation of the CBO (in providing them with and institutional framework), had a strong influence in the selection process of the most vulnerable (mainly by putting forward clear criteria and through its verification process). But overall the local CBO felt that they could control all other areas of action, the exception being budgeting / finance.

Who decides on…?

	In Kot Addu			*In Kashmore*		
	Village	Both	Partner	Village	Both	Partner
□ Creation of CBO			■			■
□ Assessment of needs	■			■		
□ Selection of most vulnerable	■					■
□ Project design		■				■
□ Implementation		■			■	
□ M&E		■		■		
□ Procurement		■			■	
□ Budgeting / finance			■			■
□ Policy /advocacy work	■			■		

Using capacity to mobilize
AA's existing partner (HDC) used its mobilization skills and participation mechanisms at the onset of the response. It utilized its activists to gather people and decide upon actions, such as: organizing protests to get food in camps from government; gather local level meetings to coordinate AA related activities.

Building confidence on participation
The new partner SSSWA was initially reluctant to bring decision making at community level, fearing problems related to unreasonable demands. Yet, it has successfully put in place participation mechanisms, and now believes it has made the intervention more relevant, timely, prevented looting and corruption, and increased trust.

Creation of local institutions
AA PK and its partners created new institutions at village level (CBOs) to strengthen the capacity of reaching vulnerable people.

Procurement committees
Procurement processes were largely decentralized, with community representatives taking part in selecting items from providers

Community-led advocacy
Community-led advocacy is one of the major achievements, with people taking lead on issues which were not originally on Action Aid's radar. For example, in Ghauspur, a demonstration was held against a 7 year old feud opposing two tribes, having caused more than 50 deaths, many injured, and preventing ordinary people from freely going to areas outside their village. The result was an agreement to end the feud. AA's approach fortunately allowed these processes to take place, rather than imposing advocacy and policy issues "from above".

Empowering the most vulnerable

Challenges	Recommendations
There has been a tendency of equating "sharing power with CBOs" with "sharing power with the most vulnerable". Devolving power at the local level certainly helps to bring decision making closer to the most vulnerable, and to make processes and decision making forums more accessible. However, power imbalances also	**Diffuse decision making!** Modalities to diffuse decision making power beyond CBO level to smaller groups / individuals should be tested. They should make participation less challenging for marginalized community members. The creation "neighborhood clusters", for example, would lead to joint action and decision over some

exist within communities, which can be overlooked when thinking the CBO as the only representatives of all vulnerable individuals. Some mechanisms are in place to address power imbalances (e.g. transparency and feedback), but risk remains to transform the CBO into a small scale traditional NGO.	interventions (e.g. procurement of materials for shelter, options for building houses) outside or beyond the members of the CBO. **Further improve feedback / transparency** Transparency and feedback mechanisms should be improved to increase the possibility of most vulnerable community to take part in decisions that directly affect their lives. This includes ensuring that illiterate people are made aware of the information disclosed by visibility boards; or that they feel full ownership of the forums during which collective decisions are taken (rather than being passively informed of what is best for them). The feedback mechanisms observed were of unequal effectiveness; AA should ensure that best practices are shared and replicated.

Overall challenges and way forward

Financial management

Challenges	Recommendations
AA and partners transparently shared detailed costs about the intervention and specific items. But transparency did not lead to financial empowerment. Decisions linked to overall allocation of finance ("what are the best ways to allocate funds?") where mostly taken by AA, with some micro adaptations done by partners and CBOs (e.g. procurement committees).	**Share budgeting!** Encourage financial management at the onset, by giving charge, whenever possible, of decisions regarding budget allocations to most vulnerable or, at least, to their representatives at village level. This can be done (as was discussed during one meeting and acknowledged by participants) through means such as giving cash directly to right holders for them to construct shelters, or decide collectively upon budget allocations. One suggestion was made to involve women specifically, thus also potentially increasing their power at domestic level. The main purpose is to initiate a financial management culture enabling most vulnerable to hold institutions accountable to their mandate as well as how they choose to carry it out. In order to do so AA needs to negotiate with donors for flexibility in project proposals, allowing for presenting communities with options (as it happened for example with the CFW component) rather than prescribed choices and outputs.

Project design

Challenges	Recommendations
The project design is often initiated and finalized at national level with consultation of partners. Areas of intervention are then adapted locally with micro-level changes to better fit with people's needs. The activities have been found to be relevant (shelters are used, seeds are being sewn, Women Friendly Spaces are visited, etc.), including "new" activities - such as kitchen gardens – which have been adopted successfully. However more space could be given to rights holders to: □ define the best activity mix (e.g. which activities to prioritize / discard) □ define alternatives (e.g. more variation in livelihoods activities...)	**Set priorities together!** Increase the involvement of most vulnerable people and their CBO representatives in project design. This is particularly challenging during emergency given the time, budget and donor constraints; but it is essential to avoid overlooking local priorities and ownership of the interventions. It is remarkable that despite important participation mechanisms, the activities conducted across the provinces (and areas within) were the same despite considerable cultural and contextual differences. The model proposed was "micro adaptations within a macro standard framework". RHs were asked "are the interventions we propose good for you"? rather than "what interventions do you propose"? This makes activities relevant for people, but might miss the possibilities of local adaptation.

Coordinate interventions

Challenges	Recommendations

AA and partners operated in areas were other organizations were active. By participating in cluster / coordination activities AA decreased duplication and overlapping. But to what extent did it empower community to lead on coordination? AA and partners build capacities of local organization to have a stronger role in coordinating response at the village level, consolidating local networks. Yet, there is still untapped potential in enabling communities to monitor all the interventions that have taken place - including through other organizations and - with the support of AA: □ factor in the interventions of other actors when defining targeting of AA's activities □ influence decision making and allocations of other actors. The most vulnerable and their CBO representatives have marginally considered other interventions in their collective decisions and priorities (explaining that other organizations were not participatory in their approach). The risk is to create discrepancies and / or inequalities amongst villagers despite the participatory approach of AA and its partners.	**Broaden up transparency!** Broaden the use of transparency / participatory tools by local CBOs to monitor activities which were not initiated or supported by AA. This can be done asking information from other NGOs, or - when secrecy prevails - gathering information locally. This will allow to: □ better understand the impact of the overall assistance (and pinpoint main gaps) and better leverage AA resources; □ formulate clear demands to other organizations **Watch other actors** Increase the scope of coordination mechanisms to ensure that actions of other NGOs are not detrimental to the decision making power given at grass roots level. Some valuable initiatives have been taken (such as the civil society platform in Kashmore called Agahi) but the resulting power over / collaboration with other organizations has been limited, and considered far more difficult than making government institutions accountable. AA should pro-actively increase the capacities to address other NGOs at local and district level, and ensure to follow up issues (related to these local interventions) at provincial and national level.

Adapt systems to emergency



Adaptations in emergency

The emergency response required organizational adaptations by AAPK, to ensure both timely delivery of entitlements and support the empowerment of most vulnerable people.

Key areas to tackle, adapt, develop when gearing up to response had included:
□ Management
□ Human resources
□ Finances

- Knowledge management and learning

All these areas were gradually tackled to fit emergency specific needs, in an organic way. Systems have been adapted, and learning harvested and used. The 2011 intervention benefited from the experience acquired by staff during the 2010 floods.
However, many adaptations and learning are not yet systematized and formalized. It is now important to capitalize them and to institutionalize them.

Strengthening AA, strengthening partners

Whilst adapting for response, it is key to strengthen capacity of partners. AA demonstrated a strong capacity to transfer skills and expertise (e.g. accountability, transparency, participation).

What was transferred?

A tremendous learning curve was shown by both partners, including:

- concepts and standards (Rescue, DRR, WASH, NFI, Right Holders, Early Recovery / Rehabilitation, Psycho-social support, Trauma; SPHERE / HAP / Hyogo Framework, HFA, GMF, Transparency / accountability / mutual accountability);
- specific methodologies (PRRP, PVA, participatory methods, KAP, street theater / training / sport events, procurement and purchase, working through committees, involvement of community members in decision making, community-based need identification, community endorsement of lists / procurement, criteria for selecting right holders, transparency, complaint mechanisms, coordination methods at various levels – cluster, CBO level, line departments)

How was it transferred?

This has been achieved through multiple modalities for support, such as handing over manuals, trainings by national and international staff, multiple field visits by monitoring staff (visits which were stated to be important learning experiences) and specialized program officers, and constant informal communication. Quarterly review and reflection forums, inceptions meetings were also organized.

What is needed to step up and adapt response?

International support

Challenges	Recommendations
The emergency happened at a time of leadership vacuum at AA Pakistan level. Yet, the country programme was capable to mobilize rapidly despite the absence of a country director and of key senior positions. AA as a whole geared up for response, and international support was mobilized. The IECT team and AAPK quickly devised a response plan. International support was also provided on practices and methodologies of action - in particular on protection and on DRR. DRR was clearly incorporated in the programmes. The main challenge and shortcoming in the support was the lack of time and investment to adapt the knowledge to context specific needs. Whilst the IECT was well equipped to provide support to management and planning, the sharing of practices lagged behind.	**Share practices!** IECT needs to further strengthen its capacity to deliver relevant and adapted know-how to countries, and proactively share practices that can be replicated. For example, the extensive expertise of AA on DRR in school was not known by the field staff consulted, and yet very relevant for their future plans. **Adapt support and demands to country!** The know-how must be adapted to context specific needs (for example by designing trainings based on a capacity assessment). To provide the most relevant support, AA International / IECT must also adapt its views and priorities to country specific context, and the actual demands of affected people during the relief phase IECT requested tackling policy issues which were not seen as priorities in the field, or could not realistically produce tangible results, improving the conditions of flood affected vulnerable people – thus deflecting community defined priorities. Similarly, protection issues were exclusively centered on women, whilst the protection needs in the emergency context were wider – as observed through the activities actually

	conducted in the field. The material used by trainers remained generic, abstract and lacking contextual analysis.

Adapted systems

Challenges	Recommendations
The scale and the urgency of the response demanded adaptation of organizational systems. □ Financial systems had to be changed, in particular to increase the speed of procurement. These adaptations: (i) were not made in anticipation of problems, but as a reaction to them, and (ii) have not been yet systematized as emergency specific systems. There is a risk that they will have to be "reinvented" in the case of another emergency, especially if the core staff has changed? □ For Human Resources, AA benefitted from national and international internal emergency rosters; but the ability of recruiting new staff, given the scale of the emergency, has been a major concern. It was hard to find competent people, and for them to adjust to Action Aid's programmatic approach. In Kot Addu, the initial recruitment of staff newly discovering field specific constraints was time consuming and lead to tensions □ In terms of management, the main challenge has been to adapt the long-term management set-up with the immediate and pressing needs triggered by the disaster. The other risk is to create an emergency specific structure which is not capable of linking the emergency approach with the long term.	**Streamline and insitutionalize adaptations!** AA was responsive and made its systems more apt to emergency. However most of these adaptations happened at the unit level, with no evidence of "taking stock" and systematize them. AA should streamline and institutionalize system adaptations / internal policies according to what was done during the flood (for example in consolidated comprehensive manual form), and thus increase the preparedness. **Increase partners' understanding of systems!** Ensure that partners understand systems in use and are fully informed of the added flexibilities that emergency adaptations induce. In Kot Addu, difficulties in customizing program activities (such as allowing for more financial control to rights holders) were attributed - erroneously - to perceived rigidity of financial / system.

Strong partners

Challenges	Recommendations
AA's support to partners was overall effective. Areas for further improvement are: □ Need to rapidly scale up partner staff and management capacities. The sudden increase of staff and budget has to be well absorbed in the existing systems, which was a challenge in both areas visited. □ Need to rapidly increase partner knowledge and program management. Much of the strengthening has been done informally, especially during constructive and useful monitoring visits. On the other hand, the informal aspect lead to alleged confusion, inefficient planning or delayed interventions □ Partners requested for more technical support staff than what AA provided	**A strategy for partner strengthening!** Formalize a strategy and a more formal course of action for partner strengthening, to avoid delays in understanding tools or approach. Such strategy should build on existing skill sharing modalities (training, on the job coaching, exchanges, mentoring...) and retain flexibility and openness to local conditions. **Plan for increased capacity!** Ensure that partners understand systems in use and the flexibilities that emergency adaptations induce. In Kot Addu, difficulties in customizing program activities (such as allowing for more financial control to rights holders) were attributed - erroneously - to perceived rigidity of financial / system.

Appropriate funding

Challenges	Recommendations
In the response, AA sets out to cater for immediate needs, and as such it is aligned with humanitarian donor expectations. However, the emphasis on empowerment implies certain priorities which are not usually in the radar during emergency operations, and which might be seen by some donors as pertaining to "long-term work".	**Approach like-minded donors!** Develop adequate donor intelligence and relationships with likeminded donors, also as part of a preparedness strategy **Persuade donors!** Better document modalities and outcomes of its response, to illustrate its approach and the resulting quality achievements to potential donors

It is key for AA to approach donors who understand and agree with its specific approach. Finding such donors has not always been easy, and sometimes driven AA to prioritize outputs more than empowerment.	**Complement funding!** Output-oriented, short-term projects could be used to complement existing response, but only when they stem from in-depth needs/gap assessment and if local structures for support already exist. **Build flexibility!** Develop capacity for embedding flexibility in proposals (for example incorporating more "cash deliverables" or similar options – rather than prescribed outputs), leaving to communities room for maneuver on project design. Negotiate longer timeframes to take in consideration the set up phase, and make more explicit the timeline.

Organizational learning

Challenges	*Recommendations*
"Organizational learning" is understood as the institutionalization of knowledge. In other words, it depicts the capacity of the organization to take stock on experience in order to increase its institutional capacity and improve the effectiveness of its intervention. The evaluation highlighted a steep learning curve for partners, and valuable system adaptations. To what extent this improved knowledge has been institutionalized?	**Spell out AA's "distinctive approach"!** One of the main findings of this evaluation is that AA has a strong distinctive approach that is interiorized by staff and partners. But it is not effectively articulated, systematized and shared. The evaluation's framework for analysis builds on existing methods of AA, which could be used as a basis for the systematization work. **Document innovative methods in use!** AAPK is using innovative methodologies and systems, which are interesting alternatives to mainstream response modalities (integration of participatory monitoring / transparency and feedback mechanisms, modalities for community-lead advocacy in emergency, etc). AAPK must make these processes explicit, so as to feed them into future responses show their value and promote their use. **Share practices and tools!** AA and its partners developed valuable tools for action (e.g. methods for communication, participatory locally adapted tools) which could be quickly captured and shared, as "how to" materials across partners and CBO. AA could make use of existing outlets for sharing (e.g. exchange visits) but also promote shared repositories for sharing practices.

Learning in *from previous responses*	**Learning during** *real-time experience / adaptations*	**Learning out** *ensure that practices are replicable. capitalize and distill experience for future emergency work*
□ Investment in partner capacity building in AA specific concepts and tools □ Trainings and support (DRR: expert from Nepal; Protection expert on site, training for protection officers) □ Personal experience from previous emergencies by some AA staff has been capitalized on.	AAPK adopted an action-reflection mode of action, and it adjusted its work and strategy in accordance. Opportunities for reflection included: □ PRRP conducted regularly, and Annual reporting process demonstrated learning □ Leaning workshop with AA partners □ Adaptation of systems (finance, HR, management) □ Exchange visits amongst partners / local organization – to a small extent. □ 6 month anniversary was also used as an opportunity to highlight how the approach unfolded	□ Personal experiences and collective meetings have enabled to learn from response and approach the 2011 emergency more efficiently □ Potential for reach learning from AAPK experience. But knowledge at this stage is still largely tacit / unstructured.
□ The absence of priorities / strategy for knowledge sharing in emergency leads to a risk to reinvent the wheel □ Methods and practices of AA (and	□ No mid-term review □ Shared learning at field level initiated late and needing boosting (exposure visits, of CBOs among themselves,	□ AA specific approach in Pakistan and its positive achievements have not been documented in a way that

related documentation) not always adequately disseminated / known / owned by partners and staff. □ Further scope for sharing and capitalizing on practical experience of AA international, which is not adequately / proactively shared (e.g. DRR in schools) □ At times imported knowledge and methodologies have been little adapted to context (e.g. protection) □ To what extent the 2005 emergency response was capitalized on?	sharing of experiences, etc)	could make external actors (AA International, other NGOs, donors, line departments, etc) understand and potential adopt some of its aspects`

Information for empowerment



To realize Action Aid's mandate of empowering the most vulnerable, strengthening institutional capacities is not enough.
The creation of an "enabling environment" also requires that individuals and communities are empowered to be active actors beyond the realms of national (AA), local (partner) or grassroots (CBO) organizations. "Information" is key to this end. Information as not only "delivering facts", but as essential to a wide range of processes through which rights holders increase capacity to control and act on their environment, including other stakeholders.

Empowerment processes demand increase capacity to RECEIVE, GENERATE and USE information

	**Receive**: Realizing the right to access information produced by other stakeholders, which includes having the capacity to understand such information (transparency & accountability mechanisms) **Generate**: Improving the capacity to produce information, including context analysis, and generating options and demands for change. Hence, this also requires Improving learning and sharing practices. - e.g. (participatory) situation and impact analysis, feedback mechanisms, shared learning processes... **Use**: Communicating information in order to: (i) improve decision-making, (ii) make clear demands based on entitlements (clearer understanding of rights leading to stronger advocacy / lobbying), (iii) strengthen "voice" and influence (communicate more effectively,

	reaching out broader audiences)

These three aspects are interlinked and enacted through processes such as accountability mechanisms, ALPS, vulnerability analysis and action, etc.

People centered accountability framework
AAPK designed a "people centered accountability framework" for the response, which has been widely promoted and referred to during the emergency. This framework builds on ALPS and practices of AA internationally. Unlike other humanitarian systems, this framework underpins accountability as a power relation amongst rights holders and duty bearers. Its that accountability truly occurs through a the combination of a series of information sharing activities which, when properly linked, feed into an overall empowerment process.

AAPK 's approach to communication

ActionAid Pakistan demonstrated a strong strategic focus towards improving communication with rights holders; "communication" being considered here, first and foremost, as a mean to empower right holders by giving access to information; and NOT as only a tool to promote what the organization does.

All the activities scrutinized during the evaluation had important communication components in their implementation and planning. Communication is found across the 4 petals of the "people, power and change" framework. Information around right awareness / skills and behaviours lead to increased power within; information to facilitate mobilization of people and group formation links to "power with"; information used as part of advocacy work increases the "power over" of right holders; transparency, feedback and complaint mechanisms increases the "power to" improve service delivery and management.

In a humanitarian landscape where communication is often one-way, and accountability / feedback mechanisms singled out as separate activities, the approach of ActionAid is refreshing and shows communication as the lifeblood of programmes.

Modalities for information sharing

Public records sharing
Public record of project implementations (planned action, deliveries, budgets) have been openly shared, and transparency has been promoted amongst all actors.

- **Written records:** Written records of distributions and related paperwork are maintained by village committees in Kashmore. The same was not observed in Kot Addu. When suggested by the evaluators, the idea was acclaimed (see video)
- **Project-related data:** Project / distribution related data was shared during distributions, with beneficiary lists as well as information about deliverables systematically posted at distribution points and public places.
- **Transparency boards:** Transparency boards have been used in the project areas. They took different shapes – but all contained some key information about the project, including financial data. During our evaluation meetings some rights holders referred to information contained in the board (e.g. cost of WCFS)
- **Visibility boards:** In some cases the "transparency boards" put in place were little more than visibility board - and not linked to other awareness raising work about the importance of transparency.

Feedback mechanisms:
Feedback mechanisms allowing for complaints or dissatisfactions to be voiced and the possibility for them to induce modifications in the implementation.

- **Feedback Mechanism**: Good feedback mechanisms where found at community level in the areas covered by SSSWA. They were owned by local CBOs, who had complaint committees established, but also offered to people the possibility to contact directly SSSWA. The feedback mechanisms of Hirrak were weaker: knowledge of organization contact numbers was limited to the local activists. Some right holders, however, were aware of the existence of community level meeting to discuss issues related to the response – but had not the time / inclination to attend them.
- **Informal / oral mechanisms:** The overall impression is that both partners met, and the CBOs visited, had very much their ear to the ground, and were keen on receiving feedback from right holders, which they did through informal meetings, discussing visibility boards with illiterate individuals, etc. Outward efforts have been made to build 'trust'. Unfortunately, these practices were not captured. The main risk is that they rely on the good intention of the aid workers.

Meetings and gatherings
Meetings and gatherings allow for sharing collectively information, but also for informal discussions to take place. They can be an adequate forum to increase knowledge and capacity, networking with different stakeholders, or take collective decisions. Partners had frequent interaction with the local institutions they created / supported through meetings, to plan intervention and discuss progress, as well as providing technical support. Rights holders and their institutions further engaged in community-level meetings for different purposes: to discuss and monitor the response, to inform about entitlements, to engage in situation analysis (e.g. through PVA assessments).

- **Reflect circles**: Reflect Circles – already in use in some project areas before the flood – created spaces for communication amongst rights holders and to connect them with local organizations. In the Kot Addu Reflect circles – mainly involving women – were run in private homes prior to the flood. Relief intervention enabled to host them in newly build Women and Child Friendly Spaces. They allowed sharing information and experience across peers, mobilization activities, a setting for training and other awareness building (linked to livelihoods and disaster risk reduction) and theatre activities.
- **Seminars**: Seminars allowed for interactions amongst rights holders and other civil society institutions. They have been held from the national (e.g. 6 months after the flood) to the local level. Local partner / rights holder local institutions had also autonomously organized seminars on response related items (e.g. women and children rights, violence against women, health) to network with other civil society actors.
- **Coordination meetings**: Coordination meetings were attended by community representatives. In Kashmore, a specific forum - AGAHI -was established regrouping different civil society members, including the media. This forum has initiated interesting cooperation, synergies, and networking.
- **Saath**: In Kot Addu, the age old 'saath' (village meetings called upon to take collective decisions) has been revived. By calling upon a practice which local inhabitants relate to, Hirrak has been able to ensure substantial attendance to these meetings where different

members of the community (not only activists) have an opportunity to express their opinions. Women are also included as participants in the meetings.

- **Theatre:** Theatre has been used by both partners to raise awareness, as well as discussing collectively issues, reducing discriminations and increasing solidarity between rights holders. Theatre was also used to give rights holders space and means to express their feelings and experience. Various options were used: performance by professional actors (e.g. in street theatre plays): engagement of rights holder as actors (e.g. as part of WCFS activities).
- **Cultural evenings**: Hirrak, in the recovery phase, resumed the practice of cultural evenings for communities. They are held under large marquees, open to men and women, and mix sensitization / information acts with music and poetry.

Media/new technologies

Several initiatives were taken to use media and new technology, displaying drive and capacity to communicate effectively by AA, partners and rights holders. The use of these tools lead to valuable practices and innovations, going beyond the usual pattern of communication found in many emergency projects.

- **Media**: AA ensured that campaigns and advocacy by rights-holders could be amplified through the press /media. What is even more noticeable is that some community-based organizations managed, by themselves, to actively use media (in particular TV and press) in their campaigns, and achieved commendable results.
- **Mobile phones**: Mobile phones: mobile phones were used in feedback system – to give access to community representatives + the partner organization. They also enabled coordinating the response at the initial stages – when most communications systems, including internet, were nonoperational. They have also been used to call on gatherings and meetings.
- **Audio campaigns:** Audio campaigns through radios, loudspeakers, mosques, etc. were mostly used for awareness raising and setting up warning systems
- **Multimedia:** Videos and photography are used by AA partners and local organizations to document activities. Hirrak is very active in the production of documentaries for advocacy purposes, as well as for the mobilization of rights holders. Video and multimedia are also used to record activities and discussions – and then transparently shared. This constitutes a very effective form of monitoring, seamlessly linked to action.
- **Internet:** Internet is proactively and efficiently used shared by AA partners. For example, Hirrak shares online multimedia documentation of key events and activities on its site (see http://www.hirrak.org).

Who measures achievements? Bringing monitoring in people's hands

AA has developed an effective system of information sharing and checks at local level. It allows rights holders and partners to track what was delivered and how it was targeted, which increases their control and ownership of the response. It has been concretely applied in Pakistan through a a set of integrated processes informing right holders of what they are suppose to receive, allowing them to check on the quality and quantity themselves, and possibly refuse what is being given while demanding duty bearers to provide adequate goods.

This system decentralizes M&E of outputs at the local level, contrary to conventional M&E extracting data. It is well suited for responses where deliverables – as well as the understanding of vulnerabilities - are adapted to the local needs. It answers the question "did we do something relevant and appropriate?" rather than "what did we do/deliver?" It ensures accountability and gives right holders control over the aid received.

It leads to understand accountability not only to "keep organizations in check" but also as a vehicle to shared decision making. Such system is in line with the requirements of donors such as DEC, whose accountability framework.

AA therefore rightfully limits data aggregation on outputs to the minimum required, and prioritizes monitoring the quality of community engagement rather than direct outputs.

One of the main challenges in looking at the system is that it is not articulated as such, and it is presented as a set of apparently disconnected processes. This might mislead observers in

feeling that "proper M&E is absent in AA". So, whilst lack of articulation has not reduced its effectiveness in the field, where partners had interiorized it by doing, it has reduced the chance for ActionAid to promote it as a valid alternative to mainstream M&E methods in emergency. AA needs to better articulate and make explicit such system, and to be rigorous in demonstrating its advantages over conventional M&E.

Understanding and measuring impact

Information sharing must be strengthened by in depth (and shared) contextual analysis prior, during and after humanitarian intervention. With it, people can take informed and relevant decisions to change and improve their own lives, hold duty bearers accountable, and make clear demands.

Conversations with management staff at different levels showed that AA Pakistan recognizes both the need for such analysis, and the challenges it presents when measuring processes rather than tangible / material service delivery. More difficult still is to enable rights holders to lead and own such analysis, and, consequently, to use their results.

Some processes are already in place that could be geared towards stronger analysis, such as community-based assessments and monitoring systems. In the response, all needs were identified by right holders, and they in charge of most of the quality controls during the implementation. This process needs now to move from output to impact analysis, and from need assessment an analysis of root causes and alternatives for resolving action.

Challenges and achievements

Stepping up information sharing

Challenges	***Recommendations***
Given the importance of information sharing for AA and its partners, they need to ensure that even the most vulnerable and marginalized can fully benefit from information. Transparency boards are the standard approach to achieve transparency with right holders, but not always the most relevant. Partners have developed an array of information tools which should complement standard visibility tools. AA should also clarify with partners the potential of existing tools - and their rationale. For example, some partners did not see what added value of transparency boards and used them in a tokenistic way, whilst a sincere reflection on the their purpose might have triggered innovations on ways to inform the most marginalized, still left out by existing communication modalities. A variety of tools and modalities for information sharing has been witnessed during the evaluation, but AA PK has certainly more practices to offer. To what extent have their specificities and complementarities been understood and highlighted within broader communication strategies? How can they be fine-tuned according to different audiences?	**Build a catalogue!** Catalogue the array of communication practices (accompanied by "how-to" tips and key learning) to take stock and replicate in future **Adapt tools to context!** AA should encourage the development of information tools according to their effectiveness, and discourage those of lesser relevance. For example, in areas with a majority of illiterate people, non-written information sharing modalities should be prioritized over transparency boards. **Focus tools on action!** Better understand the potential impact of information sharing tools, their worth and also their limits within a general approach to empowerment through participation. Is information recording and sharing self-serving? Who participates? What information is most relevant? What should be kept track of and recorded? **Learn…** Learn from new initiatives practices on the ground (media, theatre) how to best increase voice and power of people. Explore their impact on lobbying and toward increased accountability (not just awareness) **… and innovate** Increase the scope of such initiatives by exploiting the opportunities they offer. How mobile phones can be used for DRR? To what extent video and photography can be utilized for transparency rather than awareness? etc.

Linking information sharing to action

Challenges	***Recommendations***

Some information tools may not be effective because the users do not have the capacity to understand the full extent of their content and act on that. For example: □ Financial information displayed about the overall cost of the project was not used by those devoid of financial management capacity or responsibility. □ Many people in processions requested for their rights, based on international principles, but without knowing about national laws. □ Decisions which were made before, were endorsed in collective meetings, but with no alternative to choose from. This may constrict decision making, and prevent full participation.	**Increase capacity to understand information!** By doing do, AA and partners can to improve the effectiveness of information sharing mechanisms. This includes experimenting with practices / participatory tools enabling also illiterate people to manage and use information. **Inform about rights! (not only services)** Ensure that the communication prioritizes information on entitlements, rights and law. For example, strengthen the practice of providing contextualized policy briefs to communities, or actionable information about law and entitlements **Model accountability!** AA must ensure, as per it's own philosophy, accountability practices are replicated beyond the humanitarian intervention. Hence the importance of being vigilant about token participation. AA and partners should proactively create more space for debate (and potential disagreement), and increase capacities to interrogate budgets and finance.

From output to impact. From needs to "root causes"

Challenges	***Recommendations***
From needs assessments and control over outputs, communities need to analyze the impact of interventions and the root causes of vulnerabilities. This includes the capacity to aggregate and analyze data, and to use participatory methods for situation analysis. During the evaluation, little signs of analysis were observed. When existing, it lacked required depth (for example, SSSWA attempted to calculate the financial gain in seed distribution, but not linking it to any market analysis, or joint reflection on how to best utilize the added income, etc.) Overall the narrative of need and change at the community / partner level still remain confined to describe "tangible outputs" rather than changes across the "people, power, and change framework". In the process, a lot of analysis and learning is at risk of being lost. Impact and situation analysis needs to be seen as a way to improve direct work by communities, engagement with AA, but also as a way to formulate clear demands to other duty bearers.	**Use AA's methodologies!** AA could make better use of its own tools specifically designed to improve situation and impact analysis of in the context of humanitarian response, such as the PVA (participatory vulnerability analysis). **Use reporting to look at impact!** Develop reporting mechanisms that require aggregation and consolidation of achievements obtained at different levels. For example, when reporting on a collective meeting, include information about the process followed to get people together and determine the topic to be discussed, the data that has been collected to justify these topics and their importance, the expected concrete outcomes of the meeting (and how it feeds into other initiatives), etc. Give timely and substantial feedback on field reports, in order to improve the mechanism and contents **Monitor the results of policy action!!** Measure the impact of actions which are not geared towards tangible / material outputs. For example, strengthen the monitoring of policy action by including a critical reflection on the direct changes it has made on the lives of people (of empowerment, tangible changes…). Whilst this might be challenging for campaigns at national level, it should be realistic for policy and advocacy work unfolding locally.

A meaningful use of "numbers"

Challenges	***Recommendations***
The importance of using numbers within participatory approaches has been highlighted in works such as "Who Counts? The Quiet Revolution of Participation and Numbers" (Robert Chambers December 2007). Looking at processes and quality impact should not annihilate the need for numbers – knowing how much of what where and for what cost. Partners (while presenting their work) showed very little understanding of the usefulness of statistics for quality management. Evaluators were under the impression that statistical data was nothing more than	**Use participatory approaches to overcame low numeracy!** There are challenges in working with numbers where literacy and numeracy are limited, however participatory methods can be used to make it possible. For example, AA could use participatory household mapping to replace "beneficiary lists" when needed. A number of other tools are available? **Devise meaningful indicators!** Devise indicators to measure satisfaction and empowerment of communities, to better understand

a "donor requirement". Analysis and monitoring also need to be improved with meaningful quality indicators, and related means to verify them. Capacity to process and aggregate numbers and data should ultimately result in increased capacity to consolidate information, and depict an accurate overview of the overall response for better action	progress against stated mandates. Ensure that communities also own such indicators, and can use them as part of an empowerment process. **Monitor the overall assistance!** Help rights holders use monitoring for a better assessment of the overall assistance received (or needed), making stronger and better articulated demands to duty bearers, especially when other NGOs do not have elaborate transparency mechanisms.

Make AA's approach shine!

Challenges	***Recommendations***
Some of the systems in use by actionaid (e.g. participatory monitoring and accountability processes) are not made explicit, and this limits the potential for sharing its approach. As already pointed out in the section on organizational learning, AA needs to better document and embed them in reporting and proposal writing. A linked concern is that the richness of communication with stakeholders is not paralleled with the communication with donors and supporters. Reporting of AAPK fails to communicate effectively the approach. The empowerment processes are not visible in reporting, which is geared towards outputs and goods delivery. The quality and richness of work discovered in the field by this evaluation was far more than what could be guessed from the reports.	**Report to learn!** Use reporting as a first step to capture learning around practices, as well as to make aware and persuade donors and supporters of the added value of alternatives modalities to work in emergency. **Go beyond outputs!** Go beyond donor results-based reporting requirements. For example, some reports mention information, but not on the impact that participation has had; they show that village level engagements are happening, but not the evidence of ownership, decision making capacities, and extent of participation. AA needs to define and apply indicators of empowerment. **Monitor the overall assistance!** Help rights holders use monitoring for a better assessment of the overall assistance received and / or needed.

Text box - Examples of missed opportunities in conveying impact and processes:

"*How can we learn from each other, let alone from the communities in which we work, if top-down results-based reporting forces us to hide our most effective achievements?" (Chris Roche, Alternatives for reporting,* http://bigpushforward.net/archives/997*)*

- **Highlight participation, checks and balances in processes** - AusAID report (PA-12 29_4_2011) says that "project staff" has selected and identified the most vulnerable groups who were supposed to receive a shelter. It failed to unveil the far more interesting mechanisms for selection at community level, and the impact they had on the power of rights-holders and on the creation of mutual trust and fairness in distribution.
- **Demonstrate the added value of innovative processes in use**. Several reports mention a "procurement committee within the community" responsible for overseeing the procurement process, without mentioning who composes the committee and what is the followed. This is a missed opportunity to highlight the role of the community, enhanced transparency, and increased power over of community members over vendors.
- **Convey the approach through case studies.** Most case studies do not use the "people power and change flower" as guidance about how to illustrate – through the story of an individual – the change in a person life. They end up showing poor people who are happy receiving goods, or participating in an activity – but not how representative such "success stories of delivery" are and tend to portray them as "beneficiaries" (see for example case study DEC1 Report – SSSWA). An example of a good case study is in DEC 2 (woman heading household becoming prominent figure of Ghauspur CBO)
- **Show activities as a mean, not as an end.** They way in which activities are named lead to see them as an end in themselves. Most of the activities are described with direct reference to outputs, making secondary the objective of achieving empowerment (ex: "To provide livelihood support to 6,385 families" is the "purpose" of the activity). AA should make sure to incorporate "empowerment" as a goal when highlighting results.
- **Do not confuse CBOs and rights holders (or "communities").** One DEC2 activity is "To mobilise and build the capacity of affected communities and partners on DRR and protection", but the achievement only mentions the creation of CBOs and the need to further strengthen the women CBO due to patriarchal norms limiting its capacities. Nothing is being said of the empowerment of villagers, and what they can effectively do on DRR and protection, leaving the CBO aside (or to what extent they can directly influence the CBO in taking up certain issues)